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On 03/19/2014 01:13 PM, Ian Goldberg wrote:
You may also be interested in our new tech report:
T. Wang, X. Cai, R. Nithyanand, R. Johnson and I. Goldberg
Effective Attacks and Provable Defenses for Website Fingerprinting
CACR 2014-05
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Mike, thanks for your comments. My main concern for applying to GSoC is
the time commitment. As I said in my first message, I would like to work
part-time in the project. Anyway, I will submit a proposal and specify
this there.
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Hi everyone,
Thanks for the answers. Some inline comments below.
On 03/12/2014 09:25 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
It sounds like the implementation might be the easy part, compared to the
design part. And since GSoC is mostly about implementation,
On Wed, Mar 19, 2014 at 12:01:09PM +0100, Marc Juarez wrote:
Hi everyone,
Thanks for the answers. Some inline comments below.
You may also be interested in our new tech report:
T. Wang, X. Cai, R. Nithyanand, R. Johnson and I. Goldberg
Effective Attacks and Provable Defenses for Website
Marc Juarez:
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Hi everyone,
Thanks for the answers. Some inline comments below.
On 03/12/2014 09:25 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
It sounds like the implementation might be the easy part, compared to the
design part. And since GSoC is mostly
Marc Juarez:
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Lunar:
Have you read Mike Perry's long blog post on the topic?
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/critique-website-traffic-fingerprinting-attacks
It outlines future research work in evaluating the efficiency of
fingerprinting
On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 06:00:13PM +0100, Marc Juarez wrote:
I'm a PhD student at COSIC (COmputer Security and Industrial
Cryptography) in KU Leuven, Belgium. My research topic is related to
network traffic analysis and I'm now focused in the more specific
problem of website fingerprinting
On Wed, 12 Mar 2014 16:25:20 -0400
Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
It seems like some of the approaches would best be done inside Tor (as
modifications to the Tor program), and some of them would best be done
in a separate pluggable transport? Or should they all be done in a PT?
Can the
Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu writes:
On Mon, Mar 10, 2014 at 06:00:13PM +0100, Marc Juarez wrote:
I'm a PhD student at COSIC (COmputer Security and Industrial
Cryptography) in KU Leuven, Belgium. My research topic is related to
network traffic analysis and I'm now focused in the more
Marc Juarez:
I think website fingerprinting is one of the most threatening attacks to
Tor because it can be deployed with moderate resources and the
information that can be extracted as a result is highly sensitive (e.g.,
browsing history). It basically defeats one of the main privacy
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Lunar:
Have you read Mike Perry's long blog post on the topic?
https://blog.torproject.org/blog/critique-website-traffic-fingerprinting-attacks
It outlines future research work in evaluating the efficiency of
fingerprinting attacks, and also
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Hi all,
I'm a PhD student at COSIC (COmputer Security and Industrial
Cryptography) in KU Leuven, Belgium. My research topic is related to
network traffic analysis and I'm now focused in the more specific
problem of website fingerprinting
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