Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-30 Thread Jeremy Rand
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 11/14/2014 08:37 PM, Jacob Appelbaum wrote: On 11/15/14, Lee ler...@gmail.com wrote: c) Get .onion IANA reserved It doesn't look like that's going to happen. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-names/ is

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-19 Thread grarpamp
On Wed, Nov 19, 2014 at 1:05 AM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote: At that point, they can tell me whatever they want Some of them will ;) So I'm not sure I understand the attacks you're talking about. this .onion SSL bypass stuff into little-t tor, I'm talking about making it a Tor Browser

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-19 Thread Matthew Finkel
On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 10:53:30PM -0500, grarpamp wrote: On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 12:55 PM, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: plans for any Tor modifications we want to do (for example, trusting self-signed certs signed by the HS identity key seem like a generally good idea).

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-18 Thread George Kadianakis
Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg writes: There's been a spirited debate on irc, so I thought I would try and capture my thoughts in long form. I think it's important to look at the long-term goals rather than how to get there, so that's where I'm going to start, and then at each item maybe talk a

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-18 Thread Matthew Finkel
On Mon, Nov 17, 2014 at 05:48:26PM -0500, grarpamp wrote: On Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 12:08 PM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote: a) Eliminate self-signed certificate errors when browsing https:// on an onion site No, please don't. Browsers throw cert errors for good reasons. If you don't want

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-18 Thread Matthew Finkel
On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 05:55:29PM +, George Kadianakis wrote: Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg writes: There's been a spirited debate on irc, so I thought I would try and capture my thoughts in long form. I think it's important to look at the long-term goals rather than how to get there, so

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-18 Thread grarpamp
On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 12:55 PM, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: plans for any Tor modifications we want to do (for example, trusting self-signed certs signed by the HS identity key seem like a generally good idea). If the HS pubkey and the onion CN were both in the cert, and

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-18 Thread Tom Ritter
On 18 November 2014 21:53, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote: On Tue, Nov 18, 2014 at 12:55 PM, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: plans for any Tor modifications we want to do (for example, trusting self-signed certs signed by the HS identity key seem like a generally good idea).

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-17 Thread grarpamp
On Fri, Nov 14, 2014 at 12:08 PM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote: a) Eliminate self-signed certificate errors when browsing https:// on an onion site No, please don't. Browsers throw cert errors for good reasons. If you don't want to deal with it, just click accept or otherwise pin them out in

[tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-14 Thread Tom Ritter
There's been a spirited debate on irc, so I thought I would try and capture my thoughts in long form. I think it's important to look at the long-term goals rather than how to get there, so that's where I'm going to start, and then at each item maybe talk a little bit about how to get there. So I

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-14 Thread Jeremy Rowley
Great summary Tom, From my perspective, getting .onion reserved is a pretty high priority. Once reserved, we can really eliminate it as an internal name and get onion listed as part of the PSL. I'm happy to help with this part of the project if I can. Syrup-tan had an idea on irc: Have a DV

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-14 Thread Adam Shostack
Hi Tom, thanks for the great summary. I want to comment on one element of your writeup, the hidden service on box A, webserver on box B. My weak belief is that this is no different than the SSL added and removed here issue which impacts many 'secure sites.' Imposing a requirement that a person

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-14 Thread Lee
c) Get .onion IANA reserved It doesn't look like that's going to happen. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-names/ is expired I haven't been able to find anything indicating it's still being considered. See the existing requests/RFC 6761 process: section here

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-14 Thread Griffin Boyce
Lee wrote: c) Get .onion IANA reserved It doesn't look like that's going to happen. Yeah. Though the biggest use-case for cert+onion is when trying to match a clearnet service to a hidden service -- such as Facebook or Erowid. ~Griffin ___

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-14 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 11/15/14, Lee ler...@gmail.com wrote: c) Get .onion IANA reserved It doesn't look like that's going to happen. https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-grothoff-iesg-special-use-p2p-names/ is expired I haven't been able to find anything indicating it's still being considered. It's still

Re: [tor-dev] Of CA-signed certs and .onion URIs

2014-11-14 Thread Jacob Appelbaum
On 11/15/14, Griffin Boyce grif...@cryptolab.net wrote: Lee wrote: c) Get .onion IANA reserved It doesn't look like that's going to happen. Yeah. Though the biggest use-case for cert+onion is when trying to match a clearnet service to a hidden service -- such as Facebook or Erowid.