Re: [tor-dev] Tor Geolocating exit nodes.

2014-06-19 Thread Max Hovens
Reply: tor-dev@lists.torproject.org tor-dev@lists.torproject.org Date: 18 Jun 2014 at 17:41:43 To: tor-dev@lists.torproject.org tor-dev@lists.torproject.org Subject:  Re: [tor-dev] Tor Geolocating exit nodes. On 06/18/2014 04:38 AM, JP Wulf wrote: This geolocation could perhaps be used

[tor-dev] Tor Geolocating exit nodes.

2014-06-18 Thread JP Wulf
So Griffin Boyce is canvasing for some input to improve Tor, specifially for Journalists. https://twitter.com/abditum/status/479052228138119168 1. It is known that various actors are trying to compromise Tor comms by establishing own exit nodes. With enough nodes, they can break Tor (see slides).

Re: [tor-dev] Tor Geolocating exit nodes.

2014-06-18 Thread Tom Ritter
If your goal is to choose an exit specially to minimize risk of it being run by a malicious actor, it seems choosing exits run by orgs you trust would be better than choosing based on where someone is hosting a server. But yes, you can choose exits by country. I'm not saying it's a good idea or

Re: [tor-dev] Tor Geolocating exit nodes.

2014-06-18 Thread Andrew Lewman
On 06/18/2014 04:38 AM, JP Wulf wrote: This geolocation could perhaps be used to validate the integrity of the nodes (how I dont know, maybe by establishing TOR honeypots that can only be compromised through traffic through a compromised (owned) exit node). The Tor client does not trust the