Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread Pascal Terjan
On 26 July 2015 at 22:42, Yawning Angel wrote: > On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 22:32:18 +0100 > Pascal Terjan wrote: > [snip] >> > I question the usefulness of most of the relays running on >> > residential lines in the first place for other reasons (Eg: most >> > consumer routers are crap, and will probab

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread Yawning Angel
On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 22:32:18 +0100 Pascal Terjan wrote: [snip] > > I question the usefulness of most of the relays running on > > residential lines in the first place for other reasons (Eg: most > > consumer routers are crap, and will probably not be able to > > simultaneously maintain a connectio

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread Pascal Terjan
On 26 July 2015 at 17:48, Yawning Angel wrote: > On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 16:11:56 +0200 > nusenu wrote: > >> -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- >> Hash: SHA512 >> >> [split from 'Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption'] > > Ok. > >> > I'm of the opinion that it may be worth adding code

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread Yawning Angel
On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 21:09:13 +0300 s7r wrote: > We need to confirm this: is a relay holding TLS connections to the > majority of the other relays? This is another metrics needed thing. In general, at any given time, any relay should be prepared to be able to open or accept a connection to any o

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread s7r
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 Hello Yawning, We need to confirm this: is a relay holding TLS connections to the majority of the other relays? On a relay with over 100 days of uptime (middle relay) Stable, HSDir, etc. I have (# netstat -a | wc -l) 1942 connections. Another one,

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread Yawning Angel
On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 16:11:56 +0200 nusenu wrote: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > [split from 'Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption'] Ok. > > I'm of the opinion that it may be worth adding code to pin relay > > identities to IP addresses on the DirAuth

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread Tor-Admin
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 teor: > >> On 27 Jul 2015, at 01:30 , starlight.201...@binnacle.cx wrote: >> >> Perhaps a way to do it is reset the consensus for a relay if its >> IP address moves to a different Autonomous System. >> >> Is rare that dynamic IP causes relays to h

Re: [tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread teor
> On 27 Jul 2015, at 01:30 , starlight.201...@binnacle.cx wrote: > > Perhaps a way to do it is reset the > consensus for a relay if its IP address > moves to a different Autonomous System. > > Is rare that dynamic IP causes relays > to hop ASs (e.g. possibly SBC/ATT), > and list of exceptions co

[tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread starlight . 2015q2
Perhaps a way to do it is reset the consensus for a relay if its IP address moves to a different Autonomous System. Is rare that dynamic IP causes relays to hop ASs (e.g. possibly SBC/ATT), and list of exceptions could be created for the few cases where it causes trouble. CYMRU has a dynamic serv

[tor-relays] pinning relay keys to IPs (or not)

2015-07-26 Thread nusenu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 [split from 'Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption'] > I'm of the opinion that it may be worth adding code to pin relay > identities to IP addresses on the DirAuth side so that consensus > weight and flag assignment gets totally re

Re: [tor-relays] Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption

2015-07-26 Thread nusenu
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 > What was knee-jerk about my response? I found it also unnecessarily sharp, maybe because I assumed no malicious intent and I don't believe malicious actors depend on such 'pre-warmed' key offers anyway. > The relay identity key is sensitive crypt

Re: [tor-relays] Giving away some "pre-warmed" relay keys for adoption

2015-07-26 Thread Yawning Angel
On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 07:13:44 +0500 Roman Mamedov wrote: > Either way you won't do much damage even if any of this ends up being > false, as the consensus weight and the stable status will drop more > rapidly than they are gathered if your node can't maintain them. Giving away the identity keys fo