[tor-relays] Optimizing TOR-Relay

Hi Folks.   Some Stats: fingerprint: E20FF09A9A800B16C1C7C16E8C0DF95F46F649B0 cpu: 0.0% tor, 12.3% arm   mem: 149 MB (34.4%) pid: 2200 cpu: 20.0% tor, 10.2% arm   mem: 149 MB (34.4%) pid: 2200 load average: 0,30, 0,36, 0,33 %Cpu(s): 18,0 us,  3,1 sy,  0,0 ni, 75,3 id,  0,2 wa,  0,0 hi,  3,5

Re: [tor-relays] Exit policy reject fails

Hi @all, so I reviewed my whole ExitPolicy statements and now I understand the probleme: The first rule match wins. And because traffic to port 80 was accepted for every source the reject rule for the subnet was ignored. Thanks for the hint! ~Josef Am 19.10.2015 um 23:43 schrieb teor: >> On 20

[tor-relays] Optimizing TOR Relay

-now without HTML- Hi Folks. Some Stats: fingerprint: E20FF09A9A800B16C1C7C16E8C0DF95F46F649B0 cpu: 0.0% tor, 12.3% arm mem: 149 MB (34.4%) pid: 2200 cpu: 20.0% tor, 10.2% arm mem: 149 MB (34.4%) pid: 2200 load average: 0,30, 0,36, 0,33 %Cpu(s): 18,0 us, 3,1 sy, 0,0 ni, 75,3 id, 0,2 wa,

Re: [tor-relays] Optimizing TOR Relay

My understanding is that Raspberry Pis top out around 800kb/s. And the floor for a relay to get much traffic is around 1.5Mb/s. -V On Tue, 20 Oct 2015 at 20:08 Volker Mink wrote: > -now without HTML- > > Hi Folks. > > Some Stats: > fingerprint:

[tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

Hello, I received an abuse email today from my hoster (several emails from webiron in one email), typical automated abuse emails, not much information. However, they request, if the origin IP is a Tor exit, to block the full /24 subnet. As they also state, they will not provide the full IP of

Re: [tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

Hello yl, I also got some reports from WebIron. I also made some thoughts about blocking Tor from reaching some parts of the internet and if it's agains the ethics of tor. I think that blocking the destination for two weeks by an reject rule satisfies the "victim" and your hoster thus helps

Re: [tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

The TOR directory of exit nodes is readily available for ISP's and website operators to apply in their filters. I don't see why them putting the onus on tens of thousands of exit operators to exit-block THEIR addresses is in any way reasonable. On 2015-10-20 12:51, yl wrote: > Hello, > I

Re: [tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

I agree. I just bin these, or send the standard "abuse" response template, which includes a snippet about using a DNSBL. On 10/20/2015 04:57 PM, AMuse wrote: > > > The TOR directory of exit nodes is readily available for ISP's and > website operators to apply in their filters. I don't see why

[tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

>snake oil service like webiron A most excellent characterization! As a sales maneuver WebIron has been grandstanding for months saying that Tor operators are "unwilling to cleanup" when they know full-well that tor operators can not / should not filter traffic due to minor brute- force login