Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961

dawuud: > The Golang rewrite of the scanner is cool! Thanks! > btw i'm surprised you wrote > https://github.com/nogoegst/rough/blob/master/tcp.go > instead of using https://github.com/google/gopacket You shouldn't; rough is just a convenient wrapper on top of TCP-ish stuff from gopacket (it

Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961

Hi Ivan and tor-relay operators, The Golang rewrite of the scanner is cool! btw i'm surprised you wrote https://github.com/nogoegst/rough/blob/master/tcp.go instead of using https://github.com/google/gopacket Maybe you could also implement my Tor guard discovery attack that uses this

Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961

teor: > For Tor client path selection, it is typically the vulnerable consensus > weight that matters, not the number of relays. > (Except in the case of HSDirs, where the hash ring is unweighted.) > > Have you looked at the vulnerable consensus weight proportion? Thanks for the tip! Laziness

Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961

4 server rebooted, thank you very much. markus > On 9 Dec 2016, at 06:31, Ivan Markin wrote: > > Hi tor-relays@, > > Getting back with more results on this. > I've implemented CVE-2016-5696 scanner in Go [1] and scanned the Tor > network several times [2]. > First results

Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961

> On 9 Dec. 2016, at 16:31, Ivan Markin wrote: > > Hi tor-relays@, > > Getting back with more results on this. > I've implemented CVE-2016-5696 scanner in Go [1] and scanned the Tor > network several times [2]. > First results I've got using technique similar to David's

Re: [tor-relays] Network scan results for CVE-2016-5696 / RFC5961

Hi tor-relays@, Getting back with more results on this. I've implemented CVE-2016-5696 scanner in Go [1] and scanned the Tor network several times [2]. First results I've got using technique similar to David's (sending 500 RSTs in one burst), second ones are got via another method (send 111 RSTs

Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt

 Tim,Good for Jon.But... I should have got one or two in the last year or so I wonder...When I asked had anybody received a shirt only one answered, from memoryNevertheless someone's active so I'll be quiet.Your explanations on the list are exemplary which expand my knowledge.I partly

Re: [tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt

Indeed. In every Tor user there is a seething anarcho-capitalist. On 09/12/16 01:58, niftybunny wrote: Are there any “special” t-shirts for the 1%? markus Hi, Jon is distributing t-shirts and Christmas cheer this year. Have you been naughty or nice? And by the way, it's SanTor, not

Re: [tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt

Are there any “special” t-shirts for the 1%? markus > > Hi, > > Jon is distributing t-shirts and Christmas cheer this year. > > Have you been naughty or nice? > > And by the way, it's SanTor, not SanTOR (or SANTOR). > (And our trademark lawyers prefer onion jokes.) > > :-) > > T > > --

[tor-relays] Fwd: All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt

> Begin forwarded message: > > From: I > Subject: Re: [tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt > Date: 9 December 2016 at 00:09:51 AEDT > To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > Reply-To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org > > From SanTOR Hi, Jon is

Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?

Again, I think I was quite clear on that: I don't care. I'm not using Tor to hide anything from Facebook, and I'm quite aware that any data Facebook can touch is recorded and I assume it is or will be published. That's not acceptable to everyone but it's fine for me in many cases. Even here, Tor

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Node Geographical Location

Hi folks, I think it would be interesting to run relays in Africa and Asia. Especially Africa, as this area has growing internet usage, and censorship of the internet in some countries is not widespread, e.g. Liberia. Another argument is that even if there is censorship, having more relays in

Re: [tor-relays] Creanova hosting Finland

Just to update list - the vps came back up after 11 hours downtime - no word at all from Creanova but at least its back up regards Mark B > On 8 Dec 2016, at 10:00, Sec INT wrote: > > Hi Chris - I already tried as did others but we keep getting errors - > sonething to

Re: [tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt

From SanTOR ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt

From SanTOR ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

[tor-relays] All I want for Chrismas is a bloody t-shirt

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Re: [tor-relays] EOMA68 as a platform for trustworthy computing? / was: Exploiting firmware

On Thu, 8 Dec 2016 12:11:48 +0100 Christian Pietsch wrote: > On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 10:41:46AM +0500, Roman Mamedov wrote: > > On AMD that's been implemented only after "Family 15h" > > https://libreboot.org/faq/#amdbastards > >

[tor-relays] Is EOMA68 a good platform for Tor relays?

[Leaving stuff out that is not directly relevant for tor-relays.] As far as modular, low power, open hardware is concerned, I set my hopes on the new EOMA68 architecture. This is a draft standard for computer cards in the PCMCIA form factor:

Re: [tor-relays] EOMA68 as a platform for trustworthy computing? / was: Exploiting firmware

Can you please move these discussions to a more appropriate mailing list (i.e. tor-talk or maybe tor-dev)? Thank you, Alexander --- PGP Key: https://dietrich.cx/pgp | 0x52FA4EE1722D54EB On 2016-12-08 12:11, Christian Pietsch wrote: On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 10:41:46AM +0500, Roman Mamedov

[tor-relays] EOMA68 as a platform for trustworthy computing? / was: Exploiting firmware

On Thu, Dec 08, 2016 at 10:41:46AM +0500, Roman Mamedov wrote: > On AMD that's been implemented only after "Family 15h" > https://libreboot.org/faq/#amdbastards > https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_AMD_CPU_microarchitectures > > Family 15h itself is safe. > > It includes FX-series 8-core CPUs

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Node Geographical Location

Exit nodes with equal bandwidth may well do. Unfortunately that one is now a Guard do throughput will probably go down. US just has alot of people trying to exit there - so its always busy - I find Tor follows the money mostly - high concentration in W.Europe and US but drops sharply anywhere

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Node Geographical Location

On 2016-12-08 10:32:25 (+), Chris Adams wrote: > > Don't exit nodes with equal bandwidth have equal chance of being utilised > on a circuit? Why is your US exit being utilised more? I think this would be related to the bandwidth observed by the authorities, which are far away (network wise)

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Node Geographical Location

Interesting... Don't exit nodes with equal bandwidth have equal chance of being utilised on a circuit? Why is your US exit being utilised more? Looking at the map, I thought Canada could do with a few more exits? Should geo diversity be related to numbers of internet users in that country? Ie,

Re: [tor-relays] Exit Node Geographical Location

Ive got exits in the US, France ,Finland (dead) and Bulgaria but its v difficult to find any exit providers in the Far East - I have relays in Bangalore and Singapore (which gets hit pretty hard) but if you do find a provider out East let us know P.s Bangalore is under utilised - 60mb/s but

Re: [tor-relays] Creanova hosting Finland

Hi Chris - I already tried as did others but we keep getting errors - sonething to do with the anti spam settings - I'll keep trying though regards Mark B > On 8 Dec 2016, at 09:55, Chris Adams wrote: > > Mark, > > Would you be able to update the wiki GoodBadISPs? >

Re: [tor-relays] Creanova hosting Finland

Mark, Would you be able to update the wiki GoodBadISPs? https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/GoodBadISPs C On Thu, Dec 8, 2016 at 9:52 AM, Sec INT wrote: > Hi > > Please dont use this group if you are planning to - although they > apparently support Tor they

[tor-relays] Exit Node Geographical Location

Hello, I want to start up another exit node. I have a few choices for which country it's in. I currently live in a country with quite a high exit node/population density. Are there any advantages to distributing nodes around the globe in terms of performance/privacy? Are there some countries

[tor-relays] Creanova hosting Finland

Hi Please dont use this group if you are planning to - although they apparently support Tor they dont. I was running a reduced reduced exit policy with spamhaus listings and only got 2 complaints from security bots but they suspended the vps both times with no warning - now its offline

Re: [tor-relays] Is there a reason for all exit nodes being public?

Well, apart from using Facebook... On 8 December 2016 7:51:09 am GMT+00:00, Dave Warren wrote: >I agree 100%. And yet, it's still useful for those who don't have >anything to fear from using Tor, but still want the privacy and >security >from the last mile. > > >On Wed, Dec