Re: [tor-relays] Disparity between download and upload traffic

Teor, Yes, I can absolutely do that, let me set up logging and give it a couple of hours to get some data for you. I can't say that I'm terribly comfortable sending the logs via a public, archived distribution list. Mind if I email them to you (or a non-public distribution) directly? We can

[tor-relays] Current pluggable transport recommendation

Hi, the obfs2 pluggable transport was deprecated a while ago since it was easy to detect, but obfs3 was still considered safe, IIRC. Has anything changed here? I was just wondering if new bridges should only run obfs4, or if it's fine to run obfs3 at the same time. Best regards, Alexander

Re: [tor-relays] zwieb...@online.de relays: MyFamily fixed

thanks for fixing it! +-++ | nickname| eMyFamilyCount | +-++ | chisinau2onion |29. | | rigaonion |29. | | chisinau2onion2 |29. | | budweisonion4 |29. | | budweisonionb4

Re: [tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?

>> https://github.com/ornetstats/stats/blob/master/o/main_guard_operators.txt > > I do not know how to interpret this table. How many guards are there at any > given time? The list includes all relays having - the guard flag _and_ a - guard probability > 0%* now, 2079 relays currently. 732 of

Re: [tor-relays] consensus-health

On 03 Jan (18:24:07), Felix wrote: > https:// consensus-health.torproject.org/ > (observed 2017-01-03 16:00:00 and 2017-01-03 17:00:00) > shows > * dannenberg: Missing entirely from consensus The ed25519 key of dannenberg expired so it has to be fixed to resolved the situation. I believe Andreas

[tor-relays] consensus-health

https:// consensus-health.torproject.org/ (observed 2017-01-03 16:00:00 and 2017-01-03 17:00:00) shows * dannenberg: Missing entirely from consensus * faravahar: Missing Signature! Valid-after time of auth's displayed consensus: 2017-01-03 15:00:00 * moria1: Sees only 2620 relays running Is

Re: [tor-relays] Speed up of reconnections after IP Address change

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On 01/03/2017 05:45 PM, balbea16 wrote: > stops and then restarts the Tor service again wouldn't be a SIGHUP enough ? - -- Toralf PGP: C4EACDDE 0076E94E -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-

Re: [tor-relays] Speed up of reconnections after IP Address change

Hi ThereI've just written a simple bash script which verifies (in a while loop) every 2 minutes if the OR address has been changed by my ISP. If so, it stops and then restarts the Tor service again. Then it sleeps for 24 hours and starts the 2 minute loop again. Not very sophisticated,

Re: [tor-relays] how to generate relay keys manually (before actually running the relay)

Thanks - will do Cheers Mark B Snaptor.co.uk (non commercial) On 3 Jan 2017, at 16:24, nusenu wrote: >>> Tipp: If you are planing to grow beyond your 31 relays I recommend >>> you preemptively generate the keys for your upcoming relays so you >>> don't have to touch

[tor-relays] how to generate relay keys manually (before actually running the relay)

>> Tipp: If you are planing to grow beyond your 31 relays I recommend >> you preemptively generate the keys for your upcoming relays so you >> don't have to touch all other relays everytime you add a single >> relay (to the MyFamily line). > How do you pregenerate keys? Id be interested as Im

Re: [tor-relays] zwieb...@online.de relays: MyFamily update required (new relay added)

Hi How do you pregenerate keys? Id be interested as Im spinning up quite a few soon Cheers Mark B Snaptor.co.uk (non commercial) > On 3 Jan 2017, at 00:43, nusenu wrote: > > Hi zwiebeln, > > thanks for adding your 31. relay nicknamed 'hecker' ! > > Please do not

[tor-relays] Container tor relay

Had a search but cant find much info on running tor relays in containers specifically by proxmox lxc containers - I have a free server atm but dont really want to spinup a load of vms when I could do containers instead - its a load test for me but would mean quite a few relays running with gbps

Re: [tor-relays] The Onion Box v3.2: Web Interface for your Tor relay

Sounds good - I didnt know about this before so I'll have a look tonight Cheers Mark B Snaptor.co.uk (non commercial) > On 3 Jan 2017, at 13:26, theonion...@gmx.com wrote: > > Hello friends! > > First of all I'd like to send you my greetings for 2017 wishing you and the > whole Tor

[tor-relays] The Onion Box v3.2: Web Interface for your Tor relay

Hello friends!   First of all I'd like to send you my greetings for 2017 wishing you and the whole Tor community all the best and great success on the journey to support the freedom of the internet.   There is a RC for v3.2 of The Onion Box available at GitHub. The changes happened mostly in

Re: [tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?

On Tue, 03 Jan 2017 11:34:19 +, Aeris wrote: ... > And there is also an hardware bottleneck, because every components (mainly > ethernet & SD card here) are connected to the same physical USB controller > limited to 480Mbps for *overall* transfer (network + disk + others USB). Which isn't

Re: [tor-relays] what to expect with baby exitnodes?

On 1/3/17 05:34, stinkyon...@sigaint.org wrote: well the subject sums it up really I couldn't find a solid explanation. I believe it was ARMA that explained the life cycle of a relay, so I'm curious does this apply for exit nodes? thanks for the clarification The lifecycle for exits is

[tor-relays] what to expect with baby exitnodes?

well the subject sums it up really I couldn't find a solid explanation. I believe it was ARMA that explained the life cycle of a relay, so I'm curious does this apply for exit nodes? thanks for the clarification ___ tor-relays mailing list

[tor-relays] what to expect with baby exitnodes?

well the subject sums it up really I couldn't find a solid explanation. I believe it was ARMA that explained the life cycle of a relay, so I'm curious does this apply for exit nodes? thanks for the clarification ___ tor-relays mailing list

Re: [tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?

> The question remains whether NOT having access to my relay makes life > easier for people. Sometimes I guess you are right. But when all the big > relays get overloaded, small relays could provide MORE bandwidth than large > relays.Both your and my statements are qualitative, I would like

Re: [tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?

>Any people who will use your relay on a circuit will also damn you to run such >small relay. This is so slow and not usable for day to day web surfing, >specially if you are well connected to Internet (fiber or decent ADSL). >Personnally, I have around this speed directly for my ADSL Internet

Re: [tor-relays] How can we trust the guards?

> 93% of the time despite having decent ultra-stable 153 KB/s bandwidth > and static IP); > The same relay is VERY reliable - totally stable for weeks, > yet still under-used only because it is small. Any people who will use your relay on a circuit will also damn you to run such small relay.

Re: [tor-relays] Speed up of reconnections after IP Address change

Such script is one typical entry that I would put on the small relay operator Wiki (see my earlier post) Rana -Original Message- From: tor-relays [mailto:tor-relays-boun...@lists.torproject.org] On Behalf Of Dr Gerard Bulger Sent: Tuesday, January 03, 2017 10:49 AM To: