Re: [tor-relays] >18k 'Machiavelli' bridges added since 2017-09-02 (>4k currently running = 64% of bridges)

2017-09-10 Thread Andrea
bly from someone doing something nasty or at least dubious. Should I change the name of my relay just to be sure not to be caught in an eventual ban for those nodes? Regards, Andrea ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torpr

Re: [tor-relays] Middle relay

2016-09-20 Thread Andrea
Jep. Give it a try - only the fastest relays get a guard flag. ~Andrea On 9/20/2016 1:15 PM, Jim Electro House wrote: > So it is only a matter of speed? > > On Fri, Sep 16, 2016 at 5:59 PM, Andrea <a...@kalpha.de > <mailto:a...@kalpha.de>> wrote: > > > >

Re: [tor-relays] Reasons to avoid being a guard?

2016-09-16 Thread Andrea
suming that the reason is the bandwidth limitation. ~Andrea smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic Signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays@lists.torproject.org https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays

Re: [tor-relays] Middle relay

2016-09-16 Thread Andrea
I donate a part of my internet connection to tor but not much. This seems to be the solution why mine never became a guard. If you are limiting the bandwidth it should never get the guard flag. ~Andrea smime.p7s Description: S/MIME Cryptographic

Re: [tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed

2014-04-17 Thread Andrea Shepard
9AB511B6894566C1CF56043CE60077D213CF1A1A tested positive for Heartbleed several times, most recently at 2014-04-17 10:19:18, before testing negative at 2014-04-17 18:51:46 (all times UTC). If you rotate the key you should be fine, but that key is potentially exposed. -- Andrea Shepard

[tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed

2014-04-16 Thread Andrea Shepard
properly. There are a bit over 900 vulnerable relays in the latest consensus. http://charon.persephoneslair.org/~andrea/private/hb-fingerprints-20140417002500.txt -- Andrea Shepard and...@torproject.org PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA

Re: [tor-relays] Recommended reject lines for relays affected by Heartbleed

2014-04-16 Thread Andrea Shepard
On Wed, Apr 16, 2014 at 06:24:40PM -0700, Andrea Shepard wrote: A list of 1777 proposed reject lines of fingerprints which have ever turned up as potentially exposed by Heartbleed in my scans is available at the URL below. This was generated with the following query: (select distinct

Re: [tor-relays] How effective is NumCPUs?

2014-01-24 Thread Andrea Shepard
at some point, IIRC. I should rebase it against current master and get back to it at some point. -- Andrea Shepard and...@torproject.org PGP fingerprint (ECC): BDF5 F867 8A52 4E4A BECF DE79 A4FF BC34 F01D D536 PGP fingerprint (RSA): 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5

Re: [tor-relays] US Investigators seem to learn

2013-02-18 Thread Andrea Shepard
be surprised if that was that significant a difference. -- Andrea Shepard and...@torproject.org PGP fingerprint: 3611 95A4 0740 ED1B 7EA5 DF7E 4191 13D9 D0CF BDA5 pgp09yLvzHsB7.pgp Description: PGP signature ___ tor-relays mailing list tor-relays