Re: [tor-relays] >23% Tor exit relay capacity found to be malicious - call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks

There seems to be a consensus toward building a web of trust. Thinking about it again, I don't like much the direction it is going. I see tor as a web of untrust actually. I never much appreciated the power already granted to directory authorities. I want to be able to use any relay (I choose) as

[tor-relays] Work with ISPs

Hi list, With the recent warning by nusenu about the malicious relays and the proposal to work around the issue , ive been wondering: Did anyone ever try to convince some isp to put a low-cap tor relay on the router of their 'unlimited bandwidth' clients? Or has there been any discussion on that

Re: [tor-relays] >23% Tor exit relay capacity found to be malicious - call for support for proposal to limit large scale attacks

I have nothing against this proposal although im not sure it would be that much efficient. Especially, how does it make relay operations 'less sustainable' or 'more risky'? @Imre Jonk: why would you want - and why should you have - an higher probability? Sounds to me the ideal case is an infinite

Re: [tor-relays] Questions about relays on IPv6

Basically, assuming relays communicate between them over ipv4, guards and exits supporting ipv6 would allow clients with ipv6-only connectivity to join the network, and establish connections to ipv6-aware servers. So I guess it makes sense if you relay ever gets the guard flag. On Wed, Jun 19,

Re: [tor-relays] ipv6 behaviour consensus

ve ND policy on the firewall). > > > > So regardless of Full v6 support, or v6 only support [both are needed], at > the very least some good logging to say if its failing would be great  > > > > > > *From:* tor-relays *On Behalf > Of *Charly Ghislain > *Sent:*

Re: [tor-relays] ipv6 behaviour consensus

reasons, the ip/interface/port you are listening to might be very different than the one you publicly advertise. Lets keep it that way. On Fri, Apr 19, 2019 at 12:41 AM Charly Ghislain wrote: > Hi list, > > Last reply from s7r on jake Visser' issue included a link to an open issue

[tor-relays] ipv6 behaviour consensus

Hi list, Last reply from s7r on jake Visser' issue included a link to an open issue waiting for a consensus on a mailing list: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/29570 Not sure if teor implied the dev mailing list or this one, but maybe gathering feedback from operators is a good

Re: [tor-relays] Debugging ipv6 conenctivity

Hi all, Indeed my relay now has the ReachableIp6 flag. I updated the wiki to mention this delay. Thanks again, Charly On Sat, Feb 23, 2019 at 4:05 PM Charly Ghislain wrote: > ok, maybe i haven't waited that long. I will put it back and come back to > you in a couple of days. > I m

Re: [tor-relays] Debugging ipv6 conenctivity

he network configuration > is fine, at least. > > Regards, > > Blicky. > > On 2019-02-23, Charly Ghislain wrote: > > Hi all, > > > > My tor relay has got the UnreachableIpv6 flag set once i mentionned an > > OrPort with my ipv6 address. > >

[tor-relays] Debugging ipv6 conenctivity

Hi all, My tor relay has got the UnreachableIpv6 flag set once i mentionned an OrPort with my ipv6 address. >From what i can tell, my server is reachable over ipv6, and can contact the directory authorities through ipv6 (following the instructions found there:

Re: [tor-relays] [tor-exit] good node providers

`https://atlas.torproject.org (yes this is the old domain but less to type ;)` seems a lot longer than `metrics.torproject.org` to me :p On Fri, Feb 15, 2019 at 7:37 PM nusenu wrote: > > > dns1...@riseup.net: > > It would be interesting to know some statistics, and to know which > > are the

[tor-relays] IP addresses on the list

We have seen ip addresses posted on this list recently. They were coming from the logs. I think it would be nice if the software powering this list could scramble all ips in message bodies. At least having to reformat them in order to avoid that filter would give the poster some time to realize

Re: [tor-relays] Who is permanently checking my bridge relay?

> > Few people use their Tor nodes as mail servers, and regardless, it's a > bad idea to run any other services on the same IP/hardware as a Tor node. > The OP was using @posteo.de which is a common email provider, regardless. True, but the link -> -> may be easier for someone with

Re: [tor-relays] Who is permanently checking my bridge relay?

If it wasn't, would posting the ip address of a client connecting to a bridge in here compromise her anonymity and/or allow one to firewall/blacklist her traffic? Im assuming one could guess the ip address of the running bridge based on the poster email address. On Tue, Dec 4, 2018 at 2:57 PM

Re: [tor-relays] MyFamily and ContactInfo fields are required for operators running multiple tor instances

If my relay running at ip A is also available, although not advertised, at ip B, should I bother with MyFamily settings? This may happen if the relay is running as service in a docker swarm. On Thu, Jan 11, 2018 at 9:11 PM, Dmitrii Tcvetkov wrote: > On Thu, 11 Jan 2018