Re: [tor-relays] Minimum port 80 and 443 exit policy

2017-02-02 Thread JovianMallard
"iff" is shorthand for "if and only if", as opposed to "if [and maybe otherwise]" On 02/03/2017 12:16 AM, anondroid wrote: >> I was wondering what the minimum exit policy was (wrt port 80 and 443) for a >> Tor exit relay. > > https://gitweb.torproject.org/torspec.git/tree/dir-spec.txt#n2294 >

Re: [tor-relays] Web server and TOR bridge at same IP:port

2016-08-16 Thread JovianMallard
If a pluggable transport is HTTP(S)-ish, I would expect nginx to be able to use SNI or a Host header (or the lack) to decide whether to serve web content or proxy to tor or the transport. I'm not sure if nginx can decide to proxy tcp based on SNI, but it would be worth reading the docs. If this

Re: [tor-relays] webiron requesting to block several /24 subnet

2015-10-20 Thread JovianMallard
I agree. I just bin these, or send the standard "abuse" response template, which includes a snippet about using a DNSBL. On 10/20/2015 04:57 PM, AMuse wrote: > > > The TOR directory of exit nodes is readily available for ISP's and > website operators to apply in their filters. I don't see why

Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Tor family graphs

2015-07-23 Thread JovianMallard
Okay, I'm not familiar with the implementation. That leaves the other point and question though: - The attack described would require a lot of resources to significantly pull down the utilization of one family (and adding those relays to the network might help it more than hurt). - Are there any

Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Tor family graphs

2015-07-22 Thread JovianMallard
Out of curiosity, what is the need for ensuring a node cannot be put into a family without its consent? What would be wrong with, say, a FamilyName directive? Set the same FamilyName on each node you control, and routes will avoid multiples. On 07/22/2015 03:48 PM, Virgil Griffith wrote: Thanks

Re: [tor-relays] Fwd: Tor family graphs

2015-07-22 Thread JovianMallard
True, but unless one family controls a large part of the network (which is bad even with the current system), this is barely worse than an attacker flooding the current network with new relays in a family. I believe what you describe is possible in the current system as well. The only thing I can

Re: [tor-relays] Please enable IPv6 on your relay!

2015-05-13 Thread JovianMallard
[::1] is the IPv6 loopback address - use [::] to listen on any address. On 05/13/2015 03:09 AM, torser...@ittk.it wrote: I have enabled it at 1 VPS and 1 Root. And I enabled it on 2 instances which are connected via broadbandconnections with dynamic addresses for IPv4 and IPv6. There I got

Re: [tor-relays] Please enable IPv6 on your relay!

2015-05-13 Thread JovianMallard
it. Try specifying a globally reachable address explicitly. what do you think? Marcel JovianMallard t...@sec.gd hat am 13. Mai 2015 um 15:27 geschrieben: [::1] is the IPv6 loopback address - use [::] to listen on any address. On 05/13/2015 03:09 AM, torser...@ittk.it wrote: I have

Re: [tor-relays] T-shirts and Confirming Relay Control

2015-05-03 Thread JovianMallard
Matt, Inspired by the options to confirm domain ownership with Google, Could you ask the relay operator to include a randomly generated (by you) token in their contact field? It may take a while to propagate and it requires action on the operator's part, but it's not difficult and I expect it