On Thu, May 02, 2019 at 04:01:52PM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
> On 5/2/19, Herbert Karl Mathé wrote:
> > I strongly believe certain issues need be brought up into conscious, and
> > into presence: into discussion, actually.
> >
> > Therefore appreciating this as it might fit too well into context
> >
I have no say in how/when your relay can be reinstated. But, before
you resume any such research from any relay you should consult the Tor
Research Safety Board guidelines and then submit to them a request for
advice about the research you wish to do.
Hi Nusenu,
On Thu, Jun 08, 2017 at 09:58:00AM +, nusenu wrote:
> Dear Torservers,
>
> are you aware that you have recently become a relay operator with
> end-to-end correlation (deanonymization) capabilities? (in fact you are
> the biggest known such operator)
> This is especially bad for
On Wed, Dec 07, 2016 at 02:15:55PM +0200, Rana wrote:
> >How would that work? First of all, the clients need to know which exit nodes
> >exist, so that they can build circuits. That list, as well as that of the
> >middle nodes, is public, otherwise you'd >have to manually request exits by
>
In case it helps, here is a paper describing vulenrability of
different classes of Tor user behavior to AS, Internet Exchange Point, and
Tor relay or relay family adversaries.
http://www.nrl.navy.mil/itd/chacs/biblio/users-get-routed-traffic-correlation-tor-realistic-adversaries
Note that doing
On Tue, Dec 29, 2015 at 12:27:06PM -0900, Jesse V wrote:
> On 12/29/2015 11:18 AM, Aeris wrote:
> >> A few hidden services have added an
> >> HTTPS cert but I think that's mostly for a publicity stunt than anything
> >> else.
> >
> > As indicated in the roger’s lecture, HTTPS is usefull for HS :
On Sun, Jul 26, 2015 at 08:41:13AM +, Yawning Angel wrote:
On Sun, 26 Jul 2015 07:13:44 +0500
Roman Mamedov r...@romanrm.net wrote:
Either way you won't do much damage even if any of this ends up being
false, as the consensus weight and the stable status will drop more
rapidly than
On Fri, Jul 24, 2015 at 04:06:14AM -0400, grarpamp wrote:
On Wed, Jul 22, 2015 at 11:08 AM, teor teor2...@gmail.com wrote:
The 20 July 2015 platform percentages on
https://metrics.torproject.org/servers-data.html are:
87.9 Linux
6.9 Windows
4.5 FreeBSD
0.5 Darwin (OS X,
On Thu, Apr 23, 2015 at 11:47:17AM +0200, re...@mobtm.com wrote:
Hi,
The counterpart we need to contribute is a
letter by our lawyer and favorably a letter from EFF or some other
bigger organization guaranteeing Tor is what it is and we as client do
not try to fool them.
as the US
On Thu, Jan 08, 2015 at 10:04:35AM -0500, Nick Mathewson wrote:
Hi, all!
While looking into a bug report, I noticed that an exit node was using
one of Google's well-known public DNS servers for its own DNS server.
No disrespect to the operators of Google's fine public DNS service,
but my
On Mon, Aug 18, 2014 at 04:41:33PM +1200, Christian Gagneraud wrote:
On 18/08/2014 4:26 p.m., Rex Wolf wrote:
On 17/08/2014 9:11 PM, IceFish ThreeTwo wrote:
I'm pretty sure I read somewhere that the Family option in torrc is
used so that nodes administrated by the same person never make a
On Fri, Apr 18, 2014 at 10:02:33PM +0200, Paul Staroch wrote:
Am 2014-04-18 21:31, schrieb mr.cur...@urssmail.org:
Is there any way currently to do this, or are there already some
safeguards in place?
In its default configuration, Tor ensures that each relay in a
circuit belongs to
On Mon, Nov 04, 2013 at 08:18:29AM -0800, Gordon Morehouse wrote:
[snip]
That's just plain silly.
Not as silly as you think, but the outright blocking vs finding ways
to throttle is more a discussion worth having. I suspect most of the
Silent Majority(tm), if polled, would rather
13 matches
Mail list logo
