Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 On 23.02.2016 22:12, Tom van der Woerdt wrote: > Op 23/02/16 om 22:10 schreef Toralf Förster: >> Louie Cardone-Noott: >>> Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot >>> might find needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

Op 23/02/16 om 22:10 schreef Toralf Förster: > Louie Cardone-Noott: >> Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot might find >> needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart (package >> debian-goodies) useful. > > Under Gentoo "lib_users -s" is a useful command IMO to see

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA512 Louie Cardone-Noott: > Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot might find > needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart (package > debian-goodies) useful. Under Gentoo "lib_users -s" is a useful command IMO to see if a

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

Louie Cardone-Noott: > Based on the exploit, aren't, at most, only the exits vulnerable? I > didn't think middles would do any DNS resolving. I didn't mean to imply that tor does the relevant DNS lookup but most servers will do DNS lookups at some point (even if not caused by tor).

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

> you say that 64% of the guard relays and 51% of the exit relaysare are > unpatched ? These numbers are not based on relaycount but on guard/exit probability (so it takes a relay's contributed bandwidth/consensus weight into account). If you are more interested in relay counts: 3754 out of

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

Based on the exploit, aren't, at most, only the exits vulnerable? I didn't think middles would do any DNS resolving. Those like me running debian and putting off doing a reboot might find needrestart (package of same name) and checkrestart (package debian-goodies) useful. On Tue, 23 Feb 2016, at

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA256 On Mon, 22 Feb 2016 21:16:42 -0800 Saint Aardvark the Carpeted wrote: > Most libraries aren't so central to everything that runs in Linux, and > restarting the programs that use the library in question is a >

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

Hi, you say that 64% of the guard relays and 51% of the exit relaysare are unpatched ? That's horrible! ~Josef Am 22.02.2016 um 23:44 schrieb nusenu: > Hi, > > if we assume for simplicity that every relay running Linux that has not > rebooted since 2016-02-16 is vulnerable to CVE-2015-7547,

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

SuperSluether disturbed my sleep to write: > Hi, > > My Raspberry Pi and Ubuntu Server already have the updated version of libc6. > Is a reboot still required? I thought only kernel updates required a reboot. When you update a shared library, any running program that uses that library still has

Re: [tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

Hi, My Raspberry Pi and Ubuntu Server already have the updated version of libc6. Is a reboot still required? I thought only kernel updates required a reboot. On 02/22/2016 04:44 PM, nusenu wrote: Hi, if we assume for simplicity that every relay running Linux that has not rebooted since

[tor-relays] CVE-2015-7547 Tor network stats

Hi, if we assume for simplicity that every relay running Linux that has not rebooted since 2016-02-16 is vulnerable to CVE-2015-7547, than these are the current stats (optimistic, because we assume that everyone that rebooted did also update). Vulnerable relays: