Re: [tor-relays] Current state of HSDir attacks on hidden services

2018-12-13 Thread Jonathan D. Proulx
Thanks Roger, That helped a lot. The big piece I was missing was that hiddenservices are on v3 now (clearly I've not been paying attention here). And I misunderstood HSDirs thinking they were in the data path not just the look up so could collude on traffic timing. I guess lookups are part of

Re: [tor-relays] Current state of HSDir attacks on hidden services

2018-12-13 Thread Isaac Grover, Aileron I.T.
Good morning Jon, In addition to fingerprint correlation and AS choice, I also recall reading this paper about identifying hidden services using clock skew based on internal CPU temperature: https://murdoch.is/papers/ccs06hotornot.pdf . The paper is older, but I'm curious if such an attack

Re: [tor-relays] Current state of HSDir attacks on hidden services

2018-12-12 Thread Roger Dingledine
On Wed, Dec 12, 2018 at 02:59:34PM -0500, Jonathan D. Proulx wrote: > Is it really still the case that spending a little time crafting > the "right" finger prints i sall it takes for an adversary to > reliably host the HSDir for a given hidden service? Well and > 4-5 days uptime... For the