Sometimes I get lost, and only now realize you wanted statistics from exit
relays, my bad.
As an operator of two guard relays that were impacted by the recent
disruptive activity, the update has also made a difference.
I'll just go crawl back under my rock now...
On Feb 17, 2018 09:13, "Tyler
Updated yesterday to 0.3.3.2-alpha on OpenBSD 6.2 with KISTLite
scheduler and no firewall rules to hinder the onslaught.
SVnode01 9CAFA2463A0DBE02847ED3405185CF67DA38BF8E
Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 17:59 hours, with 17370 circuits open. I've
sent 330.92 GB and received 327.63 GB.
Circuit
niftyjerboa:
Feb 17 08:53:12.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 4 days 5:59 hours, with
21016 circuits open. I've sent 4333.53 GB and received 4288.98 GB.
Feb 17 08:53:12.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time:
17663/17663 TAP, 649315/649315 NTor.
Feb 17 08:53:12.000 [notice]
niftychipmunk
> On 17. Feb 2018, at 11:40, nusenu wrote:
>
>
>
> niftybunny:
>> me:
>
> what is the fingerprint of this exit relay?
>
>
> --
> https://mastodon.social/@nusenu
> twitter: @nusenu_
>
> ___
> tor-relays
niftybunny:
> me:
what is the fingerprint of this exit relay?
--
https://mastodon.social/@nusenu
twitter: @nusenu_
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me:
Feb 17 08:55:27.000 [notice] Heartbeat: Tor's uptime is 4 days 5:59 hours, with
15062 circuits open. I've sent 4436.48 GB and received 4399.31 GB.
Feb 17 08:55:27.000 [notice] Circuit handshake stats since last time:
11751/11751 TAP, 363728/363728 NTor.
Feb 17 08:55:27.000 [notice] Since
Hello,
Here's the DoS log line after a few days:
[notice] DoS mitigation since startup: 0 circuits rejected, 0 marked
addresses. 0 connections closed. 500 single hop clients refused.
On 16/02/18 18:23, nusenu wrote:
> I was wondering if these unfriendly tor clients are using tor's default
>
On 17 Feb 2018, at 07:21, Matt Traudt wrote:
>> On 2/16/18 12:23, nusenu wrote:
>> I was wondering if these unfriendly tor clients are using tor's default
>> path selection or something else.
We think they are using Tor's bandwidth weights, but without entry guards.
They
On 2/16/18 12:23, nusenu wrote:
> I was wondering if these unfriendly tor clients are using tor's default
> path selection or something else.
>
> If they do tor exit relays would have much smaller values in their DoS stats,
> right?
>
> Would any tor exit operator (listed bellow) running
I was wondering if these unfriendly tor clients are using tor's default
path selection or something else.
If they do tor exit relays would have much smaller values in their DoS stats,
right?
Would any tor exit operator (listed bellow) running 0.3.3.2-alpha be willing to
share (obfuscated/not
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