Thank you T. I forgot to out the # beginning the line. I'm
stupid!
On 2/28/2017 12:36 PM, teor wrote:
On 1 Mar 2017, at 07:31, Arisbe wrote:
If you look at [0] on atlas, the fingerprint is listed under Properties
> On 1 Mar 2017, at 07:31, Arisbe wrote:
>
> If you look at [0] on atlas, the fingerprint is listed under Properties as it
> should be. But if you look down to Family Members, it lists the same
> fingerprint as Alleged Family members. Strange!
I think you are looking at the
If you look at [0] on atlas, the fingerprint is listed under Properties
as it should be. But if you look down to Family Members, it lists the
same fingerprint as Alleged Family members. Strange!
Several months ago, as I was growing my Tor relay inventory, I picked up
on someone's post here
On 28 February 2017 at 17:32, Arisbe wrote:
> Hello all,
> I run a variety of Tor relays--most on VPS hosts. I recently added a small
> relay and updated my family members. Strangely, this last relay is tagged
> as an "alleged family member," even on itself [0]. It has been like
On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 10:32 AM, Arisbe wrote:
> 04C095E0DAB8C28BC433677C4AE8F65CB7D7083C
Both relays will need to specify each other as family members.
Otherwise they appear as alleged family members when only one lists
the other.
-- Dakota Hourie --
Hello all,
I run a variety of Tor relays--most on VPS hosts. I recently added a
small relay and updated my family members. Strangely, this last relay
is tagged as an "alleged family member," even on itself [0]. It has been
like this for over a month. I can't detect a typo.
Any suggestions?
On 28 Feb (02:09:00), nusenu wrote:
>
>
> Donncha O'Cearbhaill:
> > nusenu:
> >> This group is still growing.
> >>
> >> Note that the following table is _not_ sorted by FP.
> >>
> >> The FP links these relays even across ISP, and given the FP column
> >> pattern it might be obvious what they are
On Tue, Feb 28, 2017 at 02:09:00AM +, nusenu wrote:
> >> Is there a tool out there that tells me which HSDir is/will probably be
> >> responsible for a given onion address (and at what time)?
> >
> > There's no tool, unless you can reverse SHA1.
> > (Or brute-force a set of popular onion