I received a botnet/drone complaint from shadowserver.org today
If the complaint was sent directly to you, rather than to you via your
ISP, it is unlikely you need to do anything. Unless you're concerned
about possibly having your own IP space blacklisted (which is normally
an ISP concern).
If
With this set-up I see the Tor process consuming 2% of CPU,
about 60MB of RAM (RSS) used
100 - 200 connections active at any given time.
Seconded. It's not much. And irrespective of hardware, seconded
also on using current OS, build libs and Tor. Some OS require
setting kernel sysctl to enable
I've thought about constructing iptables rules to limit the number of
SYN packets for the same host per second or such
Multiple flows to the same host don't really bother routers of any class.
Old routers choke when looking up many hosts in the routing table.
So your proposed rules against
Is there any justification for a low-bandwidth Tor node?
Other than the diversity of having more nodes around...
seems from discussions here that slower nodes see less
users. Which means they're not as likely to be blocked
by content providers for user misbehavior. This can be
valuable for the
Sorry for exposing the internals of running
a non-profit. But I think transparency is especially important here. :)
I don't know why you feel sorry. Transparency is important for
non-profit, at least for most I guess.
Non-profit is just a tax and legal designation. After any necessary
Exit (one of these two I think, no guarantees):
109C56AC68DB55D16E79F832E19313E6C3E47363
67FD1D03F922975269F94EC7E4FD38C6D0E5E900 - torservers?
It's not occurring now via them, but whatever exit it
was generated these...
Error:
mail.google.com uses an invalid security certificate.
The
quite useful for placing new nodes. thx moritz.
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
Shouldn't some exit relays (funded or not) be deployed
to use an exit IP that is different from it's advertised
exit IP in order to prevent a simplistic form of blocking
based on scraping the descriptor set? I think this can
happen if the default route is out another interface or
secondary
Also related, has anyone tried operating an exit
behind a VPN/NAT/proxy service? As opposed
to having secondary interfaces/routes on the
local machine.
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
Running an exit node from home DSL or Cable is bad idea. One must look
for a Tor friendly ISP and have balls made of steel!
... ISP[/hoster] and[/or] have ...
However, I do not believe it is that way in
the United States
What 'way'?
Running an exit node at home, or elsewhere, would seem
Only regarding home Wireless access in the US
I was involved in a case with just this situation.
According to my lawyer there is no consensus on who is responsible for wifi.
Every State has different laws each one is just a vague.
In NY, if your wireless is secured (pw protected) you are ok.
In NH, you are responsible for all data that passes your wifi point secured
or not.
Where is this codified?
NH - This is a Bill that has passed, but not signed into law...
https://www.gencourt.state.nh.us/rsa/html/LXII/638/638-17.htm
From time to time
that the traffic oscillates with a period of about 14 seconds and the
traffic doubles in the peaks.
1? Some buffer fill/pause/empty cycle somewhere during a large transfer.
Try building a circuit through your node and transfer large to eliminate your
node if cycle is not
I'd prefer to stay away from the US.
(That said, the 1st and 2nd place remain the same in this case.)
Exit probability is interesting: 43% chance of exiting from a US-based node.
Also, I feel for that poor guy in Chile.
Try posting up on some of the lists/forums... isp-planet, datacenter,
It is an interesting questions, if with a modern user interface, can they
get to new life?
I see no reason the state of the art from the legacy remailer types
can't be combined and updated into a new service running on some
of the same relay machines we have for Tor today. Even if only
10% ran
New to the list, I run a Tor exit node from my small cable modem connection
in Honolulu, as well as for a short time on a few on VPS's to prove to
Over the last several weeks, I have collected substantial evidence
indicating that a botnet is degrading the Tor anonymity network in its
tor could easily be made to efficiently use a similar mechanism, if it
doesn't already in order to perform the lookups to compute the answer to
What is the subset of exit nodes allowing exit to IP addr X on port Y?
The answer may lie with the client polling some exits and computing
the answer
Bittorrent may be an exception to the above but the performance cost
would be at the clients end and for one bittorrent is hardly a realtime
protocol a little delay making each connection would not make much
difference, two it performs poorly if you insist on running it over tor
anyway and
http://mainichi.jp/english/english/newsselect/news/20130418p2a00m0na013000c.html
to voluntarily block communications if an anonymous software
system ... is found abused online.
The second ripline leaves some room but is without specifics.
It seems they are blurring the line between
A10-6800K (4 x 4.1GHz) would be decent.
It doesn't seem to support ECC
It doesn't. And for those that recognize its importance, that's
been an kind of weakness of AMD for some time. Actually
for both AMD and Intel, it's treated as a price premium
instead of just 8+n extra gates and logic.
I don't see anything specific regarding Tor or its capabilities
in their AUP. But there are bits that could be extended to
cover Tor. Which it appears they did, whether for bandwidth
or cost of dealing with 'complaints'.
They are in New Hampshire, perhaps you could let the
FreeStateProject know
On Tue, Jul 30, 2013 at 6:50 AM, Andy Isaacson a...@hexapodia.org wrote:
On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 01:23:13PM -0400, Zack Weinberg wrote:
On Mon, Jul 29, 2013 at 12:35 PM, Andy Isaacson a...@hexapodia.org wrote:
Yes, there are cases of law enforcement seizing all computer gear from a
house
Mosh is great, but it still relies exclusively on UDP, right?
So no over Tor...
Somewhat related to things that don't work via exits...
So who wants to offer VPN termination as part of their
exit service? User tunnels VPN to you, you give back
a bound port, or a natted 10 address, somethings
I would like to propose that you take a look from a different perspective (and
I thought from the mail subject the question will be about that) on this.
To run an exit node from a VPS provider is not safer -- TO YOU -- than running
an exit node from your personal home connection.
This
There may be no better than pure ram, so this ticket may be of interest:
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/9478
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
This is why we need to implement extended exit flags for exits that want
to run post-exit filtering/enhancement policies, say for example
noporn
that way we can get all the religious groups dumping their tithes into
not just beaming reruns of the 700 club around the world, but a pile of
On 9/8/13, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
Are you sure you didn't confuse bits and bytes? Tor counts in bytes.
(The arm monitor, if that's what you're using, counts in bits by default.)
As with real networks and operators, if this is so, then big thank
you to arm people for correctly
On Wed, Oct 23, 2013 at 1:26 PM, Aaron Hopkins li...@die.net wrote:
On Wed, 23 Oct 2013, Karsten Loesing wrote:
Basically the experiment does traceroutes to three groups: all
routable IP prefixes, all Tor relays, and then all /24 subnets.
Based on my read of your input data, these will run
On Thu, Oct 24, 2013 at 11:45 PM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
You might like the 'reduced exit policy':
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/wiki/doc/TorExitGuidelines
But it sounds like it won't entirely solve your problem at this point,
and it's time for either diplomacy and
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:10 AM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
On Fri, Oct 25, 2013 at 12:43:42PM +0900, mett wrote:
Since yesterday, the kern.log of the relay I'm running is flooded with
TCP: drop open request from.
I first thought it was a kind of DDOS on our servers but it seems to
On Fri, Nov 15, 2013 at 3:47 PM, Eric van der Vlist v...@dyomedea.com wrote:
Without bandwidth limitation that's true. OTH, I currently consume only
~ 50 Gbits/month and the limit is 500 Gbits. Would a relay limited to
let's say 200 or 300 Gbits/month still be useful for the community?
People,
Why not just accept KB/sec, KiB/sec, GB/mo, GiB/mo in the config file?
Because KB/sec would be rejected as not conforming to
either SI or IEC prefix specs. Therefore the above proposed
'AND' would fail ;)
___
tor-relays mailing list
On Mon, Nov 25, 2013 at 1:29 PM, Gordon Morehouse gor...@morehouse.me wrote:
Why not just accept KB/sec, KiB/sec, GB/mo, GiB/mo in the
[1] https://bugs.torproject.org/9214
We now support gbits (127) and gbytes (130) in the torrc file,
but we do not support gib. Or I think more correctly, we
On Tue, Jan 14, 2014 at 2:14 PM, gwen hastings g...@cypherpunks.to wrote:
...
I am looking at resurrecting
mixmaster, mixminion and nym.alias.net nymserver designs from the
various code wastebaskets and retrofit them with some newer encryption
technology based on curve25519 and poly-1305
Schools are like work... either it's a free for all or requires
permission and signoff. Especially for anything that can
take heat, like an exit. To avoid issues, check with your
administration... both the network people and the people
you report to policy/class wise. Neither are hard to find or
Since you say it repeats you oppurtunity to check the
system clock first:
- configure tor to syslog
- send an ntpdate -q pool to syslog every 5min,
remove when solved.
- send *.* to /var/log/all
and see what you find around where the date lines
start to slide or jump past each other. Graph it
On Tue, Mar 18, 2014 at 4:20 PM, Mike Hearn m...@plan99.net wrote:
+Roger, as I'm curious as to the rationale.
There was a pretty big thread debate a couple years back about
people only wanting to offer cleartext ports being seen as
(whether falsely or not) doing it purely so they can cheaply
On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 4:34 PM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
On Tue, Apr 08, 2014 at 04:35:39PM +0100, mick wrote:
Moritz Bartl mor...@torservers.net allegedly wrote:
Yes. You made it generate new keys, so it is a new relay as far as
Tor is concerned. This is why not everybody should
On Tue, Apr 8, 2014 at 4:04 PM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
Actually, I'd like us to take this opportunity to throw out the Named
and Unnamed flags entirely.
I think we've done pretty well at teaching
users to use $fingerprints rather than nicknames in the few cases where
they
TvdW
* Should we consider every key that was created before Tuesday
You'd need to also know the key was created by vulnerable
openssl 1.0.1 versions, didn't already disable heartbeat, etc.
That data isn't announced in the consensus. And those that
weren't vulnerable may be happy continuing with
On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 3:21 PM, Ferdi GULER ferdigu...@outlook.com wrote:
In order to anonymize my browsing traffic on my main windows PC, I
configured Firefox to use my raspberry pi as proxy on port 9050. When I
visit the page https://check.torproject.org/, it says my configuration is
On Wed, Apr 9, 2014 at 10:33 AM, Tor Relay
t...@microcephalic-endeavors.com wrote:
My several attempts to update to TBB 3.5.4 (XP)unsuccessfully made Tor exit
upon starting, so I fell back to 3.5.3. Atlas shows that my efforts hadn't
gone unnoticed; OnionTorte now appears four times w/ my IP
Updating a previous post full of measurement caveats (in particular
not keying IP/FP to discard old descriptors)... now at:
- 35% reduction in cumulative relay uptime from 14.1Gsec pre-hb.
- 4400 out of 5835 descriptors with uptime less than hb-release
and totaling 1.2Gsec among them.
On Fri, Apr 18, 2014 at 4:21 PM, Paul Syverson
paul.syver...@nrl.navy.mil wrote:
Of those 15,000 paths, 163 (or ≈ 1.1%) contained an entry and exit
node that resided in the same AS despite having an IP address from
different /16 subnets. Out of those 163 paths, all but one also had a
distinct
On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 6:26 PM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
On Wed, Apr 23, 2014 at 03:12:36PM -0400, Zack Weinberg wrote:
I'd like a sanity check on this list of special-purpose IPv4 blocks
which I'm currently forbidding in the CMU exit node's policy. I'm
Best practice is to only
On Mon, Apr 28, 2014 at 11:23 PM, Michael Wolf mikew...@riseup.net wrote:
On 4/28/2014 10:04 PM, Zack Weinberg wrote:
For what it's worth, after complaints from campus IT we also wound up
blocking SSH in the CMU Tor exit's policy.
Sounds like IT is conflicted and sans balls... permits relay
On Tue, Apr 29, 2014 at 5:26 PM, Nicolas Christin
nicol...@andrew.cmu.edu wrote:
The level of intelligence of the people that receive these complaints
is irrelevant.
It is, in fact, entirely relevant. Clueless recipients (and their upstream)
leads directly to improper kneejerk responses, such
On Wed, Apr 30, 2014 at 2:14 PM, Delton Barnes delton.bar...@mail.ru wrote:
I'd suggest the problem is administrators treating a Tor exit node the
same as a compromised machine.
Sure, and it's part of the sometimes improper administrivia kneejerk
response. And the SCREAMING involved with this
Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN terminators
We are ops because we want to allow people to avoid censorship and
speak freely. But are we doing all we can? It is well known that
all relays, exit or non-exit are added to a variety of blocklists.
Primarily through scraping the consensus. And those
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Jeroen Massar jer...@massar.ch wrote:
Thank you for suggesting the GFW folks now scan and/or directly block
these IP addresses too.
The gfw is going to do what the gfw does. And many times that is
dedicated to blocking access to tor, not access from tor,
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 8:40 PM, Andy Isaacson a...@hexapodia.org wrote:
Anecdotally, the GFW blocks OpenVPN endpoints as well.
You need to specify context... access *to* ovpn nodes?, which
is moot because that is not the deployment specified here in
diagram... you already guaranteed access via
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 8:27 PM, Tom Ritter t...@ritter.vg wrote:
This seems very similar to the idea of having private exit nodes:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq#HideExits
Tor daemon must of course know its exit OR ip's+ports via some
mechanism (currently, distributed consensus), or Tor
to list, not me.
-- Forwarded message --
From: Mirimir miri...@riseup.net
Date: Wed, May 14, 2014 at 11:58 PM
Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Fwd: [tor-relays] Ops request: Deploy OpenVPN
terminators
On 05/14/2014 09:07 PM, grarpamp wrote:
On Tue, May 13, 2014 at 5:48 PM, Jeroen Massar
Opinions please - is it worthwhile running an exit node on a home DSL
Nodes are nice to have around.
potential abuse from exit traffic more so than limited bandwidth. I've only
That's up to you. If you don't mind the odds of the queens best
afp waking you up and borrowing all your stuff for a
In some threads people are running exits from home
for principle, economy, management, etc. Some threads
question risk.
Just as you put exit-relay-notice on your IP to obtain
advantage of chance of reading it first before interacting
with you, you may consider literally posting it on your doors.
But it's also listed on http://cbl.abuseat.org/lookup.cgi?ip=5.104.224.5 as
If you find exits on blacklists, you could try to
contact the operator via their descriptor contact,
exit http banner, etc so that they can try to have
it removed. Usually a few clicks on an assertion
of
]
To: tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
On Jun 7, 2014 3:27 PM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
Has anyone tried approaching these networks themselves
to see about running relays there? Their bandwidth for sponsored
things is often free. In the US you might try internet2.edu and all
its various
On Wed, Jun 11, 2014 at 4:17 AM, Adam Brenner a...@aeb.io wrote:
I have complied a list of Sinkholes from CBL for both Cryptolocker and
Gameover Zeus. Consider adding these IPs to your ExitPolicy reject list.
Here are lists of other useless bad' stuff on the clearnet for which
exit operator
Seems to be consistently delivering random length web pages
(if they are artificially slowed such as https://berlin.craigslist.org/)
and its bandwidth is tanking on globe.tpo.
3B486DEC5A22694C0960B4A97A3665C617C89B1C
___
tor-relays mailing list
On Thu, May 15, 2014 at 9:36 AM, Jeroen Massar jer...@massar.ch wrote:
the proposed setup breaks all anonymity (OpenVPN sends Raw IP
packets)
thus 1:1 mapping for the few people who will use it.
No, it does not break any anonymity. And it doesn't matter what
OpvenVPN sends because it all
On Mon, Jun 16, 2014 at 12:59 PM, Bogglesnatch Candycrush
bogglesna...@yahoo.com wrote:
On Monday, June 16, 2014 2:29 AM, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
No, it does not break any anonymity. And it doesn't matter what
OpvenVPN sends because it all happens over the users already secured
Tor
On Tue, Jun 17, 2014 at 10:38 AM, Jonathan D. Proulx j...@csail.mit.edu wrote:
I'm not sure if this was meant as a technical or aesthetic preference,
but I am curious. Is there any technical benefit to rounning a more
diverse set of opensource oprating systems for tor nodes? I discount
closed
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 10:44 AM, David Hill dh...@mindcry.org wrote:
On Thu, Jun 26, 2014 at 12:35:00AM -0500, Scott Bennett wrote:
ja...@icetor.is wrote:
http://www.coindesk.com/adopt-node-project-aims-bolster-bitcoin-network-security/
Assuming that the relevant bitcoin programs
Spammers subscribe to mailing lists. You post to mailing lists. Have fun.
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On Tue, Jul 1, 2014 at 3:24 PM, s7r s...@sky-ip.org wrote:
dedicated RAM - 2.6 Ghz 1 core CPU dedicated - OS: FreeBSD 10.0
Release amd64
- DO NOT KNOW IF I HAVE AES-NI SUPPORT OR HOW TO ACTIVATE IT (?)
It does not return anything. I have the proc folder, but there is no
cpuinfo file in it.
On Wed, Jul 2, 2014 at 7:46 AM, Kali Tor kalito...@yahoo.com wrote:
I have done all that, so covered on that aspect. Was wondering if disk
encryption and use of something like TRESOR would be useful?
The private keys for the node are sensitive, and even the
.tor/state file for the guard nodes
On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 11:32 AM, krishna e bera k...@cyblings.on.ca wrote:
the destination. The process on the local computer will use a random
numbered source port (from 1 to 65535) on leaving the local computer.
No, it may source from any unused port, assigned hopefully at random,
or by
Breaks TLS on check.torproject.org, etc.
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-relays
On Sun, Jul 20, 2014 at 9:57 PM, Thomas White thomaswh...@riseup.net wrote:
Mike Hearn,
Simple. If you start filtering anything at all, regardless of what it
is ... then I will
block any connection of your relays to mine
...
Freedom isn't free unless it is
totally free and a selective
As a project then to production development, someone should go back
through the entire history of descriptors and look for groups coming online...
dates, IP's, contacts, tor/OS versions, nicknames, ISP's, geoip, numbers
coming online over sliding timeframes, correlation to 'news events', etc.
On Sat, Aug 2, 2014 at 1:51 AM, I beatthebasta...@inbox.com wrote:
A free online course from The Linux Foundation for beginners begins today.
A free online course from The FreeBSD Foundation for beginners began years ago..
http://www.freebsd.org/doc/en_US.ISO8859-1/books/handbook/
On Thu, Sep 4, 2014 at 7:04 PM, Roger Dingledine a...@mit.edu wrote:
I wonder how to get them to notice more consistently?
Simple, either mail their contact (if any) and they fix it, or blacklist their
fingerprints. There is no reason any relay should not be able to sync time.
finding the best country and provider.
Tired of people asking here what's the most best/friendly provider.
Do people think saturating popular names like Amazon AWS, OVH, Dreamhost,
Rackspace, Lowendbox, Hurricane, Digitalocean, etc with nodes is
helping Tor's physical, logical or legal
On Fri, Oct 17, 2014 at 3:36 PM, Colin Mahns colinma...@riseup.net wrote:
It looks like Kickstarter has suspended the project.
Some of this thread seems a bit silly. Tor does one thing, it
anonymizes your IP address. These boxes push everything through
that, which is generally exactly what you
On Tue, Nov 4, 2014 at 12:25 PM, Libertas liber...@mykolab.com wrote:
I think it would be a good idea to add OpenBSD to doc/TUNING because [...]
promoting OpenBSD relays benefits the Tor network's security.
Absolutely. Not just due to OpenBSD's security positioning, but
moreso from network
I'd agree simply because Windows presents a much larger attack surface. The
amount of code running on a minimal Unix installation plus Tor is a lot less
than a Windows system, especially network facing code.
...
Running code, or network accessible code? Either way I don't see how
you came
On Wed, Nov 5, 2014 at 11:20 AM, Niklas Kielblock nik...@spiderschwe.in wrote:
Is there much of a difference between setting up Tor on OpenBSD vs. Linux or
other Unix(like) systems?
Tor itself? ...
https://dist.torproject.org/
tar -xzf torball.tar.gz
cd tor ; ./configure ; make ; cd src ;
On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 2:43 AM, David Serrano t...@dserrano5.es wrote:
On 2014-11-05 23:58:43 (-0500), grarpamp wrote:
The real problem below is the 96% allocation of opensource to
Linux and 4% to Other opensource.
Someone should really do an analysis of platform vs. exit bandwidth
as well
On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:52 AM, Philipp Winter p...@nymity.ch wrote:
On Wed, Nov 05, 2014 at 04:04:41AM -0500, grarpamp wrote:
173 FreeBSD
FreeBSD still seems to use globally incrementing IP IDs by default.
That's an issue as it leaks fine-grained information about how many
packets
Is it not time to establish a node operator web of trust?
Look at all the nodes out there with or without 'contact' info,
do you really know who runs them? Have you talked with
them? What are their motivations? Are they your friends?
Do you know where they work, such as you see them every day
and/or
any parameters of lesser importance to platform specific guides
on the Tor wiki.
On 7 November 2014 00:20, grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com wrote:
On Thu, Nov 6, 2014 at 8:52 AM, Philipp Winter p...@nymity.ch wrote:
FreeBSD still seems to use globally incrementing IP IDs by default.
That's
On Mon, Nov 10, 2014 at 5:58 AM, Gareth Llewellyn
gar...@networksaremadeofstring.co.uk wrote:
I had an idea for this a little while ago; https://tortbv.link/ using the
published GPG signature in the contact info to sign the node fingerprint, if
you trust the GPG key then you can _possibly_
On Mon, Nov 10, 2014 at 8:36 AM, Julien ROBIN julien.robi...@free.fr wrote:
I'm interested but, we must agree on that, it probably shouldn't be used for
adding privilege to people in this list.
It's up to the user to use or trust any assertions and/or the wot,
there is not force there. Though
In your opinion why is not it more accessible?
You asked four times. We can't see your systems
or your exits so we don't know.
Run your own restricted exits on your own various computers,
starting with those you can reach it with via clearnet, then
route all your traffic out those exits and do
What are you seeing as prices to colocate, in terms of:
1RU - rent, power, etc
IP's - a few (3, or up to a /29 ie 8-3=5)
Bandwidth - In terms of $US/Mbit
Colocation Country/State.
Company.
___
tor-relays mailing list
tor-relays@lists.torproject.org
On Wed, Dec 31, 2014 at 4:11 AM, Justaguy justa...@riseup.net wrote:
https://globe.thecthulhu.com/#/relay/F528DED21EACD2E4E9301EC0AABD370EDCAD2C47
Someone just got 149.08 MB/s on a non-exit relay.
This is amazing!
Would you mind saying what kind of hardware you use for this?
Ipredator used
Since people aren't going to like paying the 10g switchport
fee, nor the price of small bandwidth over 1gbps on it,
the fastest real world box for individual tor nodes is probably
going to be that i7-5820k off a gig port for $1235 or less.
___
tor-relays
On Fri, Jan 2, 2015 at 10:48 AM, Kura k...@kura.io wrote:
Hey guys, I recently decided to get myself an 8 core, 16 GB RAM machine to
use for running an exit relay and was wondering, Tor only works on one core,
even setting NumCPUs to 2 doesn't do a whole lot so, how is it even possible
to get
On Sat, Jan 24, 2015 at 3:16 PM, cacahuatl cacahu...@autistici.org wrote:
Most of the network is under-utilised guards and middle nodes, hidden
services don't stress exits, which are the limited resource.
Exits can and do serve in all the other node roles too.
I don't think there has yet been a
On Thu, Feb 5, 2015 at 11:15 PM, Nick Mathewson ni...@freehaven.net wrote:
The idea is that Tor could ship with some basic recommendations, and
links to places to find more advice?
If it's a question that can be answered by searching how do i
secure and run my unix server, including anything
On Mon, Jan 19, 2015 at 5:55 AM, Sebastian Urbach sebast...@urbach.org wrote:
I opened a ticket recently with the intention to use a more common unit than
MiB/s for metrics. Karsten basically agrees but is waiting for more input.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/14257
Tor is at
You obviously can't disclose your nodes for others to test
or be telling us what you're going to do over clearnet when.
Yet during the time of an outage, you might try
to leave the old tor running and
- copy over old tor .tor and torrc to a new tor instance, start it
and see if it works over the
On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 4:11 AM, Kura k...@kura.io wrote:
On a semi-related note, I run a fair number of exit and middle/guard relays
that I can guarantee do not try to do anything naughty to content, feel free
to test your Tor against them to see if you still get the same virus
warnings, OP.
On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 3:33 AM, Kura k...@kura.io wrote:
I would say that maybe it's a possibility that traffic gets
flagged as such too?
...
antivirus [...] one that does
traffic inspection
Oh, well that could be too. Tor traffic is crypted/obfuscated
and thus could generate a random hit
On Mon, Jan 5, 2015 at 2:30 AM, eliaz el...@riseup.net wrote:
The antivirus program on a machine running a bridge occasionally
reports like so:
Object: https://some IP address
Infection: URL:Mal [sic]
Process: ... \tor.exe
When I track down the addresses I find they
On Sat, Jan 10, 2015 at 10:58 PM, Richard Johnson rd...@river.com wrote:
It is especially a good idea to have your own local DNS resolver if you run
Tor exits at an institution that's required to otherwise log DNS queries.
Tor needs a separate (and non-logging) DNS resolution system to prevent
On Fri, Jan 9, 2015 at 10:26 PM, Drake Wilson dr...@dasyatidae.net wrote:
eric gisse wrote:
Plus the logic starts to get warped when you wonder So do you BadExit
every node that runs on an ISP that caches traffic?
What about ISP's (and openDNS) that NXDOMAIN trap to insert advertising?
router Tansam 79.143.87.234 443 0 0
03F84EA2E09CF427A519C65479DC0BF0D72886A6
Appears to be having trouble with, or is doing something with,
http versions of https en.wikipedia.org articles.
They're either blank or stripped of framework.
___
tor-relays
On Tue, Jan 6, 2015 at 5:34 AM, eliaz el...@riseup.net wrote:
for three different IP addresses. I'm not panicked about this don't
Those IP's are exits, no idea why they're being called out by avg.
What are the malware/virus id's, the same all the time, different?
Try a unix like freebsd or
On Sat, Jan 3, 2015 at 9:20 AM, usprey usp...@gmail.com wrote:
A8-5600K bought for a cheap private server 1,5 years ago
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_AMD_accelerated_processing_unit_microprocessors
That could probably deliver 1/3 of an i7-5820k at 1/4 the price... a
better deal if
1 - 100 of 312 matches
Mail list logo
