Re: [tor-relays] Tor project helping to attempt to cancel Richard Stallman

[Chris Dagdigian]

Roman Mamedov wrote on 3/26/21 11:10 AM:

Could be important to note that no harassment allegations were ever aimed at
RMS himself, he's just being attacked for posting a personal opinion about
unrelated events.


The mattress on the floor of his MIT office and the 30 year history of 
him hitting on and creeping on women beg to differ. His nature was so 
obvious and so well known that multiple whisper networks sprung up to 
protect young MIT students from him -- including telling new female 
undergrads and grad students to ensure that they never, ever, were 
placed in a room alone with him.  They were literally warning people to 
not even venture into the *hallway* corridor where his office was 
located.  One woman's recent story involved her being accidentally the 
last person left at a table with RMS after a group outing to a buffet 
meal at an indian restaurant - as soon as RMS was alone with her he told 
her that he'd commit suicide and she would be responsible for his death 
if she did not agree to date him.


This is the type of creep responsible for driving people out of 
institutions, scientific fields and academia in general.  How many woman 
did he drive out of open source or computer science due to his 
*behavior* over multiple decades?


Not even sure why I'm typing this. The people arguing in bad faith that 
RMS is being cancelled only for opinions and not actions are the same 
ones who tend to argue that harassment does not exist unless there was 
an arrest, trial and guilty plea.








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Re: [tor-relays] Tor project helping to attempt to cancel Richard Stallman

[Chris Dagdigian]

I've already tripled the bandwidth and burst settings on my US exit 
relay that I've been running for many years in honor of the poutrage 
flounces we've seen today



niftybunny wrote on 3/25/21 3:37 PM:

I will spin up 2 relays for every relay this guy and other RMS supporters will 
shut down.

nifty


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Re: [tor-relays] Exit relay operators please help test #2667 branch

[Chris Dagdigian]

Have a tor exit running in the US ; fingerprint is 
3DE567C1350C0E858C6147AECB06EA9B3EAF3261 and OR address is 
71.174.105.126:9001


Just built and launched the ticket-2667 branch; came up as:

[notice] Tor 0.4.6.0-alpha-dev running on Linux with Libevent 
2.0.21-stable, OpenSSL 1.0.1t, Zlib 1.2.8, Liblzma N/A, Libzstd N/A and 
Glibc 2.19 as libc.


I'll monitor the log notices but feel free to probe to test. Thanks!





Roger Dingledine 
January 28, 2021 at 1:40 AM
Hello friendly relay operators,

Another day, another weird thing with the Tor network. This time we
have some jerk bombing the directory authorities with directory fetches,
and doing it via exits:
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/network-health/2021-January/000661.html

The network is mostly holding together, but I wouldn't say it is pretty.

One of the long-term fixes will be ticket #2667:
https://gitlab.torproject.org/tpo/core/tor/-/issues/2667
where exit relays refuse to let users connect back into the Tor network.

David and I made a branch this evening that implements #2667, and it
could use some testing. If you're comfortable building your exit relay
from a git branch, please do, and let us know how it goes. It is the
"ticket2667" branch on either
https://git.torproject.org/user/arma/tor
or
https://gitlab.torproject.org/arma/tor/

And if your relay is currently using 100% cpu and/or way more bandwidth
than usual, you might be especially excited to try out this patch. :)

When the defense triggers, you will see an info-level log line like
"%s tried to connect back to a known relay address. Closing."
(where %s is the destination, so don't get upset at them. :)

You can let us know how it's going either by mail just to me, or by a
reply on the list, whichever you prefer. Once we know that you're running
the branch, we can also probe your relay remotely to verify that it is
correctly refusing those connections.

Thanks!
--Roger

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Re: [tor-relays] Log warning : possible (zlib) compression bomb on middle relays

[Chris Dagdigian]

Same on my US exit relay:

Nov 02 04:03:50.000 [warn] Possible zlib bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 04:03:50.000 [warn] Possible zlib bomb; abandoning stream.





Christoph Graf 
November 2, 2020 at 11:59 AM

Same here on my bridge:

Nov  2 06:21:04 raspipfupf Tor[2556]: Possible zlib bomb; abandoning 
stream.
Nov  2 06:21:04 raspipfupf Tor[2556]: Possible zlib bomb; abandoning 
stream.


Time is UTC+1, nothing before and after

Cheers, Christoph

On 02.11.20 11:05, Guinness wrote:


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Guinness 
November 2, 2020 at 5:05 AM
Hi all,

We are at least 3 users running middle relays from 0.4.4.5 and after 
having

some logs like those :
```
Nov 02 05:30:55.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 05:30:55.000 [warn] Possible zlib bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 05:30:56.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 05:31:00.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 05:31:00.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 05:31:00.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 05:31:55.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
Nov 02 05:31:56.000 [warn] Possible compression bomb; abandoning stream.
```

I'm wondering if this is an attack or a new feature (haven't checked
yet) but I'd like to know how many users are impacted.

The interesting informations are :
* Number of warnings
* What kind of relay it is (middle, exit, entry)

After your answers, I'll complete the issue I have opened on the bug
tracker.


Cheers,


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[tor-relays] Best practice for tor-exit node when I switch internet providers?

[Chris Dagdigian]

Hello,

I've been running a tor exit node in the US since 2014 when I paid way 
too much for a comcast business internet circuit that came with static 
IPs and a TOS that allowed me to run servers at home.


It looks like I'm going to switch providers in a month or so as there is 
a fiber service I can get with symmetric bandwidth, the static IP count 
I want and theoretically also a TOS that is also amenable to server 
hosting.


What is the best practice if I want to keep my tor exit going but switch 
upstream carriers and IP addresses? I'm guessing this is going to trip a 
bunch of tor monitoring alerts if I just bring the server up at a new IP 
address.


Should I change the nickname? Totally wipe and reinstall tor itself? The 
goal is to bring back the same exit node but not set off any alarms when 
the exit node with the same IP for many years suddenly shows up with a 
new address.


-Chris
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