Unfortunately that option is very specifically disallowed as it's
considered as trying to hide the source IP.
Cheers.
On 6/16/2022 1:33 AM, Gary C. New via tor-relays wrote:
Eddie,
When experiencing similar issues, the recommended solution I received,
from this list, and that seems to work
On 6/15/22 20:17, Eddie wrote:
I have been running the relay for almost 5 years without any previous
flagging.
There are block list providers which have Tor exit relays lists and
sells those lists to their customers.
Mayve they extend their algorithm to all Tor relays.
Anyway, "Do not run a
On Wednesday, June 15, 2022 8:17:54 PM CEST Eddie wrote:
> Have a question about how a server I connect to can tell I am running a
> guard/middle relay. All I can think of is that they check the published
> list of tor nodes against the IP.
Unfortunately, many people do this, often because they
Eddie,
When experiencing similar issues, the recommended solution I received, from
this list, and that seems to work best is a VPN for affected traffic.
With dnsmasq, iptables or reverse proxy, and a dedicated split-tunnel vpn, I
shunt affect traffic over the split-tunnel vpn without end-users
Hi Eddie
> but the vendor mis-identified our relay as an exit, hence
> blocking it
The vendor or a service provider for its inbound protection might think:
Hey, this relay claims to be a non-exit but why do we receive a
connection from a non-exit? Bottom line they don't distinguish between
an IP
Have a question about how a server I connect to can tell I am running a
guard/middle relay. All I can think of is that they check the published
list of tor nodes against the IP. Or (maybe, but unlikely) portscan the
IP and probe any open ports to determine the service. Are there any
other
