When I start ttdnsd with my Tor client in bridge mode, ttdnsd terminates
within a few minutes. The last output before terminating is:
###
selecting peer
peer selected: -1
connecting to 94.75.228.29 on port 53
watching 2 file descriptors
1 file descriptors became ready
received request of 34
Hi folks,
Over the past few months the number of bridge users has spiked, most
prominently in Italy, but also plenty in Spain, Brazil, Israel, and
others.
https://metrics.torproject.org/users.html#bridge-users
Over the past few months the number of bridge users has spiked, most
prominently in Italy, but also plenty in Spain, Brazil, Israel, and
others.
It seems clear that somebody's unofficial Tor bundle automatically grabs
some bridges for its users, and that this somebody didn't understand
the
On 9/2/2011 4:46 PM, and...@torproject.org wrote:
On Fri, Sep 02, 2011 at 01:31:53PM -0400, col...@averysmallbird.com wrote 4.5K
bytes in 109 lines about:
: According to a number of bloggers(1), torproject.org was include among those
Here's another blogger for your list,
On 2011-09-03 15:39 , Joe Btfsplk wrote:
On 9/2/2011 4:46 PM, and...@torproject.org wrote:
On Fri, Sep 02, 2011 at 01:31:53PM -0400, col...@averysmallbird.com
wrote 4.5K bytes in 109 lines about:
: According to a number of bloggers(1), torproject.org was include
among those
Here's another
Joe Btfsplk wrote:
I'm just asking here - other than entities (gov'ts?) targeting anonymity
software (for now) what prevents this issue from becoming widespread?
If I download an update from MS - how do I know it's the authentic pkg
from the real MS? There's no authentication (or even check
I'm just asking here - other than entities (gov'ts?) targeting anonymity
software (for now) what prevents this issue from becoming widespread?
If I download an update from MS - how do I know it's the authentic pkg
from the real MS? There's no authentication (or even check sums) for
d/l
On 03/09/11 15:59, Jim wrote:
I don't have a solution to this problem but I am raising it in case
somebody else does. It's great that you not only sign your packages but
that the page above also lists the fingerprints of the signing keys.
But in case of a man-in-the-middle attack (or a
On 9/3/11, Joe Btfsplk joebtfs...@gmx.com wrote:
[.. snip stuff addressed to others ..]
Lee:
These are all rhetorical questions - right?
No. I understand Tor Project's main concern is Tor / TBB. I fail to
understand why the issue / problem being discussed is in any way limited
to Tor or a
