On 2012-02-26, Anne Magarey anne...@adam.com.au wrote:
Please, what does this mean, and can I do something about it?
It is in the tor Iran obfsproxy bridge log file. I had to turn off my
computer and on reboot have this repeatedly in the file. It's been
waiting for ~45 minutes so far.
[warn]
mail.app i the one I use, and it is sad that it does not support its own proxy;
it must be system-wide. :(
this is why i ask.
--
Jerzy Łogiewa -- jerz...@interia.eu
On Feb 25, 2012, at 8:45 PM, Chris Wheeler wrote:
This would be application specific. From the looks of it you are trying to
Dr Fu,
About the paper you sent, particularly the section on the simulation
using continuous-time mix, by the looks of it much of your degradation came
from packets arriving in the wrong order. I know the TCP doesn't handle
this well natively but what if a wrapper was written? The TCP stream
You can use freecap with your application.
http://www.freecap.ru/eng/?p=download
On Sun, Feb 26, 2012 at 12:08 PM, Jerzy Łogiewa jerz...@interia.eu wrote:
mail.app i the one I use, and it is sad that it does not support its own
proxy; it must be system-wide. :(
this is why i ask.
--
Jerzy
that looks good but this is mac osx!
--
Jerzy Łogiewa -- jerz...@interia.eu
On Feb 26, 2012, at 12:57 PM, Chris Wheeler wrote:
You can use freecap with your application.
http://www.freecap.ru/eng/?p=download
On Sun, Feb 26, 2012 at 12:08 PM, Jerzy Łogiewa jerz...@interia.eu wrote:
Hi Chris,
On Sun, Feb 26, 2012 at 12:09 PM, Chris Wheeler grin...@gmail.com wrote:
Dr Fu,
About the paper you sent, particularly the section on the simulation
using continuous-time mix, by the looks of it much of your degradation came
from packets arriving in the wrong order. I know the TCP
Sorry, TCP over TCP is believed not a good idea in terms of performance.
On Sun, Feb 26, 2012 at 1:30 PM, Xinwen Fu xinwe...@gmail.com wrote:
Hi Chris,
On Sun, Feb 26, 2012 at 12:09 PM, Chris Wheeler grin...@gmail.com wrote:
Dr Fu,
About the paper you sent, particularly the section on
Is it still advisable for users of bridges to host hidden services?
Especially for private obfuscated bridges. The bridge users have only a
limited number of non-blocked bridge IP addresses.
And if the bridge is compromised, isn't the the risk for de-anonymizing
the hidden service higher?
I imagine that you would only need to reorder packets end-to-end since
those are the points on the network where
a correlation attack compromises identity. If the packets being sent from a
public web server on the internet travel through the tor network in
a different order than they were seen
