Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

On 6/2/16, Aymeric Vitte top posted without trimming: > Yes: https://github.com/Ayms/node-Tor#convergence > > Let's imagine that one Tor circuit reaches a P2P network (here browsers) > and is splitted between different peers (UDP) circuits before > reasynching to a relay

Re: [tor-talk] Two Questions about the TBB.

I can answer the first question, but I can't say for sure on the second. No, the Tor Browser does not use any blacklists of any kind. Sure, anti-phishing and anti-malware warnings can have great value to an inexperienced user. However, they are a direct form of "good censorship". As we've

Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

On 6/2/16, Georgi Guninski wrote: > On Thu, Jun 02, 2016 at 12:13:10AM -0400, grarpamp wrote: >> deanonymise Tor users by examining the timing of connections going in >> and out of the Tor network. >> ... > > isn't this well known, especially if they inject delays in

Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

On 6/2/16, Allen wrote: > another alternative would be random packet sizes, ie, the packet size > transmitted to the next hop would not be the same as the size received What does this help / enable? Nodes are known to GPA's, there is no way to hide them. If GPA counting

[tor-talk] argentina y chile: Que ajifilms deje de estafar

Even if this is not related with Tor please sign my petition Hey, I just started the petition "argentina y chile: Que ajifilms deje de estafar" and wanted to see if you could help by adding your name. My goal is to reach 100 signatures and I need more support. You can read more and sign the

Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

> > Fixed packet sizes seem to help. > another alternative would be random packet sizes, ie, the packet size transmitted to the next hop would not be the same as the size received -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to

Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

That sounds rly good , Dont u mean more like a random time or date ,sure u could pic a random number what if the number is to high? Or to low,anyhow cool idea Allen skrev: (2 juni 2016 17:39:32 CEST) >> >> There's nothing you can do about it but >> - start researching and

Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

Yes: https://github.com/Ayms/node-Tor#convergence Let's imagine that one Tor circuit reaches a P2P network (here browsers) and is splitted between different peers (UDP) circuits before reasynching to a relay or end point, then the reconciliation from the source to the end point is quite unlikely

Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

On Thu, 2 Jun 2016 11:32:45 -0400 grarpamp wrote: > It is those out of control self aware self preserving entities You mean, the government : the very same self-serving-and-preserving entity that created and runs tor. > with their secret games

Re: [tor-talk] meek-google suspended for terms of service violations

On Wed, Jun 1, 2016, at 09:32 PM, David Fifield wrote: > In the meantime, you can use meek-amazon or meek-azure. If you set up > your own CDN instance and point it to the origin domain > https://meek.bamsoftware.com/, it will be faster than the default meek > bridges that come in Tor Browser. (The

Re: [tor-talk] Tor (and other nets) probably screwed by Traffic Analysis by now

Something like this is what I feared when days ago I sent a message to this list... If you allow Tor Browser to have all hops from the same country, or the Tor network relies only on a few countries to host their nodes (Germany, US, France) then Tor will be useless soon...