Steven wrote:
> So, I've concluded that these little bursts of packet loss are really
> just some failed equipment of the backhaul carrier, and that it isn't
> fixed yet is most simply explained by incompetence.
At first all I read in your graph was the latency drop.
But yes now I see the
Expanding some aspects touched on in the WebIron thread...
> https://check.torproject.org/cgi-bin/TorBulkExitList.py
> https://check.torproject.org/exit-addresses
> https://www.torproject.org/projects/tordnsel.html.en
> contrib/or-tools/exitlist
Publishing, operating, advertising and promoting
On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 12:10:05PM -0500, Philipp Winter wrote:
> On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 02:32:32PM +0100, BVpTuvb AVMV wrote:
> > What is preventing an attacker to start up a few mid-nodes and
> > enumerating all IPs and substracting those from the list of publicly
> > known entry-nodes to get a
On Wed, Feb 15, 2017 at 02:32:32PM +0100, BVpTuvb AVMV wrote:
> What is preventing an attacker to start up a few mid-nodes and
> enumerating all IPs and substracting those from the list of publicly
> known entry-nodes to get a list of (all) unlisted bridges?
That is indeed a problem. Section
On Wed, Feb 15, 2017, at 01:45 PM, Geoff Down wrote:
>
>
> On Wed, Feb 15, 2017, at 01:32 PM, BVpTuvb AVMV wrote:
> > What is preventing an attacker to start up a few mid-nodes and
> > enumerating all IPs and substracting those from the list of publicly
> > known entry-nodes to get a list of
On Wed, Feb 15, 2017, at 01:32 PM, BVpTuvb AVMV wrote:
> What is preventing an attacker to start up a few mid-nodes and
> enumerating all IPs and substracting those from the list of publicly
> known entry-nodes to get a list of (all) unlisted bridges?
>
> Seems a lot cheaper than dpi and except
