Re: [tor-talk] Call for alpha testing onionbalance for v3 onions

George Kadianakis writes: > Hello list, > > I'm glad to announce that onionbalance for v3 onions is now ready for > preliminary testing. > > Please see > https://github.com/asn-d6/onionbalance/blob/master/docs/alpha-testing-v3.txt > for more details, and don't hesitate t

Re: [tor-talk] .onion alt-svc issues?

Matthew Finkel writes: > Hello everyone, > > I'm curious if anyone has recently experienced issues with websites > offering .onion alternative services. We have a slightly old Tor Browser > ticket for "prioritizing" .onion alt-svc entries over non-.onions, but > in my testing I could not

[tor-talk] Call for alpha testing onionbalance for v3 onions

Hello list, I'm glad to announce that onionbalance for v3 onions is now ready for preliminary testing. Please see https://github.com/asn-d6/onionbalance/blob/master/docs/alpha-testing-v3.txt for more details, and don't hesitate to ask questions. I'm looking forward to your testing! Thanks a

Re: [tor-talk] Ports required for Tor and hidden services

Forst writes: > Dear list subscribers, > > Which ports are required for Tor and Tor hidden services though the > firewall if goal is to only allow traffic though Tor? > Hello, Tor hidden services are Tor clients and hence you don't need to forward any ports for them to work. They punch

Re: [tor-talk] Onioncat and Tor Hidden Services V3

"Bernhard R. Fischer" writes: > On 02.12.19 09:55, grarpamp wrote: >> >> Either HSv2 support must not be allowed to go away, >> or onioncat must be made to work with HSv3. >> Otherwise tor permanently loses a major onionland capability. >> > > Definitely. > > For v3 to integrate smoothly into

Re: [tor-talk] Hidden service persistent connections

Memory Vandal writes: > Hi, > > Are client connections to a hidden service .onion address that do not > disconnect for hours safe? > > It may be a big file download or multiple keep-alive transactions that uses > the established connection over and over for lets say few hours. > > If its not

Re: [tor-talk] circpathbias.c : Your Guard vs The Guard

Lars Noodén writes: > The log messages "Your Guard" make produce confusion, Looking at the > latest code base I see the string "Your Guard" recurring. > > Does this string actually refer to a Guard the user is responsible for > operating and maintaining? Or does it refer to the guard the Tor

Re: [tor-talk] onion balance needed by default

bo0od writes: > I see that from a safe hosting perspective to Tor Hidden services, That > Tor should maintain and ship onion balance by default. > > Which is sadly last ever maintained before more than 1 year or so, and > also it lacks the support of onion v3. > > This is really useful and

Re: [tor-talk] derive onion v3 key from mnemonic seed phrase?

Patrick Schleizer writes: > Hi, > > is it possible to derive an hidden service onion v3 private key from a > mnemonic seed [1]? > > Cheers, > Patrick > > [1] https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Seed_phrase I think that should be possible reading

Re: [tor-talk] V3 censorship ?

hi...@safe-mail.net writes: > I run both a V2 and V3 service on my Linux server. I'm using the same Tor > process with both. The torrc file is fairly standard, except I'm forcing > some custom entry nodes, and I compile Tor from source on Debian Stretch. > > The V2 service has worked flawlessly,

Re: [tor-talk] random onion non-reachability

Ben Tasker writes: > [ text/plain ] > On Fri, Jan 5, 2018 at 8:36 AM, Andreas Krey wrote: > >> Hi everyone, >> >> I keep noticing a phenomenon regarding onion sites reachability. >> Every now and then some onion site becomes unreachable from >> a given tor

Re: [tor-talk] Is there a limit to how many .onion addresses I can generate/advertise/use for one hidden service?

Fabio Pietrosanti - Lists writes: > On 29/11/2017 19:30, Allen wrote: >>> On 17/11/2017 05:51, Cyberpotato wrote: Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate

Re: [tor-talk] Is there a limit to how many .onion addresses I can generate/advertise/use for one hidden service?

Cyberpotato writes: > Is there any sort of limit (artificial, performance, or otherwise) to the > number of hidden service descriptors or .onion addresses i can generate > and/or use to access a single hidden service? The use case would be to > generate a unique

Re: [tor-talk] Layer-7 DoS Attack Against WWW Tor Hidden Service

bob1983 writes: >>> Is there a way to limit resource usage originated from a single Tor circuit? > >> There is no such functionality right now I'm afraid. People have been >> wanting some sort of functionality like that for a while: >>

Re: [tor-talk] Layer-7 DoS Attack Against WWW Tor Hidden Service

bob1983 writes: > Hi. > > I'm the sysadmin of an unnamed computer club, we support online security and > privacy, so our website is available via a Tor hidden service. Recently, we > found a surge of CPU and RAM usage as soon as Tor has been started. A closer > look >

Re: [tor-talk] Need a stable .onion address hosted by the Tor project.

x9p writes: > Hi, > > I believe you should not trust just 1 .onion address, there are latency > problems, AS problems, circuit congestion, I believe much more. > > You should compile a list of different public .onion addresses hosted in > different AS/countries and try them in a

Re: [tor-talk] Do onion services have forward secrecy?

Jeremy Rand writes: > -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- > Hash: SHA512 > > My understanding is that the communication between circuit hops has > forward secrecy, but I've been unable to find any documentation on > whether forward secrecy exists for traffic sent between a

Re: [tor-talk] Possible solution to next-gen onion services UX disaster

Lolint writes: > Hi, > > I just thought about a possible (partial) solution to solve the "UX disaster" > of next-gen onion services, namely the very long addresses. Tor Browser > already ships with HTTPS > Everywhere, and one can easily write rules that redirect from

[tor-talk] State of bad relays (March 2017)

Hello list, in this email we will present you the current state of bad relays on the Tor network. It should be no surprise that the Tor network is under constant attack. As part of critical Internet infrastructure, people have been attacking our network in various ways and for multiple reasons.

Re: [tor-talk] Massive Bandwidth Onion Services

Alec Muffett writes: > I would post this to the tor-onions list, but it might be more generally > interesting to folk, so I'm posting here and will shift it if it gets too > technical. > > > I'm working on load-balanced, high-availability Tor deployment > architectures,

Re: [tor-talk] large increase in .onion domains

Spencer writes: > Hi, > >> >> Roger Dingledine: >> more improvements in the field of >> privacy-preserving statistics and >> measurements >> > > Like what? > Potentially systems using Multi-Party Computation, or maybe approaches similar to PrivEx. For example see:

[tor-talk] New hidden service operators mailing list: [tor-onions]

Hello, we would like to inform you of [tor-onions], a new mailing list that we just launched: https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-onions The idea is that it will become a place to discuss anything about operating and administrating hidden services. We figured that with all

Re: [tor-talk] Load Balancing/High Availability Hidden Services

Donncha O'Cearbhaill donn...@donncha.is writes: On 11/03/15 17:40, George Kadianakis wrote: MacLemon t...@maclemon.at writes: Hoi! I'm looking into ideas for creating “load balanced” or “high availability” hidden services. Mostly pertaining to web servers serving large-ish static files

Re: [tor-talk] Load Balancing/High Availability Hidden Services

MacLemon t...@maclemon.at writes: Hoi! I'm looking into ideas for creating “load balanced” or “high availability” hidden services. Mostly pertaining to web servers serving large-ish static files. (Let's say 5-100MB each.) Load balanced as in not all requests end up at the same box to

Re: [tor-talk] Funded search engine for onionspace?

grarpamp grarp...@gmail.com writes: On Wed, Mar 4, 2015 at 12:16 PM, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: I find their concern very valid Respectfully... invalid. Onions are going to be mined, shared, leaked, indexed, and copied anyways. And most certainly by your adversaries. Do

Re: [tor-talk] Funded search engine for onionspace?

Hello Virgil, I have received mails from a few people who are feeling bad about the disallowed.html list of onioncity. Some of them are afraid that it might list their private hidden service, just because an inexperienced user accidentally tried to access it over tor2web. I find their concern

Re: [tor-talk] Obfsproxy: Multiple ServerTransportListenAddr lines obfs4

MegaBrutal megabru...@gmail.com writes: Could someone please help me with this? I think ticket #11211 might be related to what you want. It's still open. As a start, the wanted behavior should be specified and we should update the PT spec accordingly.

Re: [tor-talk] Funded search engine for onionspace?

Virgil Griffith i...@virgil.gr writes: I present: http://onion.city currently searching ~348,000 pages according to site:onion.city on GOOG. -V Ah, exciting! The use of a custom google search is an interesting idea. I also like the motto and the logo! (although search engine logos are

Re: [tor-talk] Hidden Services - how to implement something like Round Robin DNS?

Dmitry Alexandrov dimzon...@gmail.com writes: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Round-robin_DNS The goal is to place Hidden Service in multiple data centers to prevent single point of failure. It's not so easy (to implement something like Round Robin DNS for HSes). It requires complicated

Re: [tor-talk] About bandwidth weights selection

saurav dahal dahal.sau...@gmail.com writes: Hello, While choosing a possible guard, a client multiplies Wgg with the bandwidth weight of a possible relay having guard flag. But if a client wants to choose a relay, for guard position, having both Guard and Exit flag (EE), then will it

Re: [tor-talk] About bandwidth weights selection

saurav dahal dahal.sau...@gmail.com writes: Under which condition, the client will choose Guard flagged node and Guard+Exit flagged node for guard position? Tor will consider any node with the Guard flag during guard selection (this also includes Guard+Exit nodes). As you noticed, it will

Re: [tor-talk] How to add Obfs3 Bridges to Network Settings?

andr...@fastmail.fm writes: I'm not sure if I'm setting up Network Settings correctly. I got the Obfs3 Bridges from the BridgeDB site and added them to Network Settings under Enter Custom Bridges. Is that all that's needed to add and use the Obfs3 bridges or must the Connect with provided

Re: [tor-talk] Meek bridges request

Mateus Meyer Jiacomelli meyer...@live.com writes: Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2014 16:50:36 -0700 From: da...@bamsoftware.com To: meyer...@live.com CC: tor-talk@lists.torproject.org Subject: Re: [tor-talk] Meek bridges request On Wed, Jun 18, 2014 at 10:29:05PM +, МΞYΞЯ - Meyer wrote: Thanks

[tor-talk] On recent and upcoming developments in the PT universe

Hello friends, this is a brief post on recent and upcoming developments in the PT universe. What has happened: TBB 3.6: As many of you know, the TBB team recently started releasing TBB-3.6 with built-in PT support. This is great and has taken PT usage to new levels [0].

Re: [tor-talk] Setting up an IPv6-supporting obfs3 bridge?

Roman Mamedov r...@romanrm.net writes: Hello, The [1] page currently does not mention anything about IPv6 at all; after following the instructions in it, the bridge only listens on IPv4. If I add an IPv6 ORPort as described in [2], this does make Tor itself listen on IPv6, but still the

Re: [tor-talk] Orbot v14 alpha: obfsclient, Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha

Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: On 05/04/2014 05:18 AM, George Kadianakis wrote: Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: On May 3, 2014 4:18:28 PM EDT, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes: Nathan Freitas nat

Re: [tor-talk] Orbot v14 alpha: obfsclient, Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha

Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: On May 3, 2014 4:18:28 PM EDT, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes: Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: Nathan

Re: [tor-talk] Orbot v14 alpha: obfsclient, Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha

Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help. Great news! Thanks! BTW, how are obfs3 bridges supposed to be used? I installed Orbot-v14.0.0-ALPHA-2a.apk and checked the Preferences menu. There used to be an option called

Re: [tor-talk] Orbot v14 alpha: obfsclient, Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha

Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help. Great news! Thanks! BTW, how are obfs3 bridges supposed

Re: [tor-talk] Orbot v14 alpha: obfsclient, Tor 0.2.5.3-alpha

George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net writes: Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: On May 3, 2014 6:10:58 AM EDT, George Kadianakis desnac...@riseup.net wrote: Nathan Freitas nat...@freitas.net writes: Orbot now supports Obfs3 and Scramblesuit, thanks to Yawning's help. Great news

Re: [tor-talk] Obfsproxy on Raspberry Pi

Patrick ZAJDA patr...@zajda.fr writes: Le 11/02/2014 15:56, Lunar a écrit : Patrick ZAJDA: I want to set an obfuscated bridge on my Raspberry Pi. When I do sudo apt-get source obfsproxy apt notices me it needs python-pyptlib which cannot be found. How can I install python-pyptlib on

Re: [tor-talk] Pluggable transports for other projects...

TheMindwareGroup themindwaregr...@gmail.com writes: Bypassing DPI filters is a constantly evolving art form and entire field of research all on its own, and just like encryption extremely difficult to do well (check out bit torrent and emule obfuscation for example, a nice effort but when

Re: [tor-talk] Improved HS key management

Qingping Hou dave2008...@gmail.com writes: On 12/28/2013 06:46 AM, Gregory Maxwell wrote: One of the current unfortunate properties of hidden services is that the identity of the hidden service is its public key (or the equivalent hash, in the current setup), and this key must always be

Re: [tor-talk] ScrambleSuit is ready for testing: help needed!

Philipp Winter identity.funct...@gmail.com writes: Over the past months, we have been working on the ScrambleSuit pluggable transport protocol [1]. The code has now reached some maturity and it's time to test it! I set up a dedicated bridge and compiled a set of installation instructions

Re: [tor-talk] Risks of using custom .onion addresses

bm-2d8jtri23dyth7whmaldhsvhdfwp91z...@bitmessage.ch writes: Hi, I'm wondering how safe is it to use custom hidden service names (.onion). I'm not asking this for public hidden services but for private ones (only for myself or for friends). Using an easy to remember address just for using

Re: [tor-talk] Flattor: A practical crowdfunded Flattr-like incentive scheme for Tor relays

Adrelanos said: Overall I like the idea, since it forces no one to participate. Nodes not interested in getting bitcoin donations, just don't get any. What about bridges? Any way to reward them as well? George Kadianakis: As a simplified example, if the Tor network has 4 relays

[tor-talk] Flattor: A practical crowdfunded Flattr-like incentive scheme for Tor relays

==tldr (Too Long, Didn't Read) Where will Tor's bandwidth come from in 20 years? Will solo volunteers still exist, or will all the bandwidth come from Tor-friendly organizations? Tor incentive schemes are interesting. There are many proposed schemes but their crypto needs to be reviewed and lots

Re: [tor-talk] obfsproxy failure: obfs3

Hi lee, it seems like you are using an old version of obfsproxy which does not support obfs3. obfsproxy was recently rewritten in Python and that's the version you want to use (the version you are currently using is written in C). That is, you are currently using obfsproxy-0.1.4 but you should be

Re: [tor-talk] Research paper The Parrot is Dead: Observing Unobservable Network Communications

The Parrot is Dead: Observing Unobservable Network Communications http://www.cs.utexas.edu/~shmat/abstracts.html http://dedis.cs.yale.edu/2010/anon/papers/parrot-abs That paper made me even more doubtful that we can emulate a popular implementation of a non-trivial protocol without

Re: [tor-talk] Pluggable Transports metrics?

Hi, would it be possible to have metrics for pluggable transports? Sure. However, much of the work in pluggable transport metrics is currently under development and not ready for end-users. I will answer the general pluggable transport questions and leave the flashproxy stuff for David.

Re: [tor-talk] Blocked HTTPS

sy00963-gen at yahoo.fr wrote: I have a question about Obfsproxy... If I correctly understood the function of this package, I tried to use it in Blocked HTTPS network... but when I try to put the proxy of the network I got You have configured more than one proxy type and return me to

Re: [tor-talk] Tor client pushing large amounts of data?

Sebastian Lechte s...@stian.lechte.net wrote: tl;dr Did you by any chance compile tor with bufferevents enabled (--enable-bufferevents)? Yes, I did. I see. We've noticed this issue some months ago with bufferevents enabled, but it's not easy to reproduce or track down [0]. I left a

Re: [tor-talk] Tor client pushing large amounts of data?

tl;dr Did you by any chance compile tor with bufferevents enabled (--enable-bufferevents)? Let's see the path of the sent bytes string: The heartbeat code (src/or/status.c) receives the bytes sent in log_heartbeat() using 'uint64_t get_bytes_written(void)' and stores it into a uint64_t. Then it