Re: [tor-talk] torsocks is broken and unmaintained

2012-12-01 Thread John Case
On Fri, 2 Nov 2012, grarpamp wrote: I don't agree. torsocks is still useful to prevent identity correlation through circuit sharing. Pushing all traffic through Trans- and DnsPort is not the answer. Also, I don't want all of my applications using Tor -- just some of them. Using Tails or

Re: [tor-talk] Can we come up with a lighter, easier torified client apps ?

2012-10-04 Thread John Case
Tom, Andrew, On Thu, 4 Oct 2012, Tom Ritter wrote: Of course those are the huge, monolithic cases. Take simpler apps like gpg, ssh, putty, pidgin (god help us), git, svn. While tracking upstream would certainly be a problem, having a statically linked tor and a modified binary that sent

Re: [tor-talk] Can we come up with a lighter, easier torified client apps ?

2012-10-03 Thread John Case
I don't want to lamely bump this posting, but I wonder if there is some flaw in my reasoning below ? Is this not a use case that is interesting to folks ? Thanks. On Mon, 1 Oct 2012, John Case wrote: Date: Mon, 1 Oct 2012 04:10:44 + (UTC) From: John Case c...@sdf.org Reply-To: tor

[tor-talk] Can we come up with a lighter, easier torified client apps ?

2012-09-30 Thread John Case
My only use for tor is to set up plain old interactive ssh logins. If I want to do this, I need to install the full blown tor package, and run tor (and quality assure it, sanity check my local installation, perform regular maintenance, etc.) just so I can run ssh with a netcat proxy command

[tor-talk] some clarifications on hidden services ...

2012-02-12 Thread John Case
I've read through /docs/hidden-services.html.en a few times over and I need some points clarified, if someone would be so kind ... - Can I choose more than 3 random relays to announce my hidden service to ? These are the entry guards that the doc refers to later, right ? - If all of the

[tor-talk] Differences between real exit traffic and exit-generated traffic ?

2011-12-30 Thread John Case
Let's say I have an exit node handling average traffic and number of connections (whatever that is). Let's also say that port 22 is included in my exit policy. Now let's say that I, as the administrator, log onto the exit node and: ssh u...@host.com I understand that a global observer

Re: [tor-talk] Differences between real exit traffic and exit-generated traffic ?

2011-12-30 Thread John Case
Robert, On Fri, 30 Dec 2011, Robert Ransom wrote: On 2011-12-30, John Case c...@sdf.org wrote: Let's say I have an exit node handling average traffic and number of connections (whatever that is). Let's also say that port 22 is included in my exit policy. Now let's say that I

Re: [tor-talk] Automatic vulnerability scanning of Tor Network?

2011-12-29 Thread John Case
Hello Gozu, On Wed, 28 Dec 2011, Gozu-san wrote: On 28/12/11 03:42, John Case wrote: Don't run Tor from an IP with your name attached to it. Anonymous server rental is nontrivial. What degree of non-attachment is sufficient, in your opinion? I disagree. Once you move past the big

Re: [tor-talk] Automatic vulnerability scanning of Tor Network?

2011-12-27 Thread John Case
On Tue, 27 Dec 2011, Andrew Lewman wrote: John Case c...@sdf.org wrote: This is the Godwins law of tor-talk - all threads eventually lead to some moron running a relay from their home Internet connection. Apparently I'm a moron that runs a relay from home. If it doesn't violate the ISP

Re: [tor-talk] Automatic vulnerability scanning of Tor Network?

2011-12-26 Thread John Case
On Thu, 22 Dec 2011, Lee wrote: While I totally get both sides of this argument *in theory*, all of this sounds a lot to me like getting pissed off about someone ringing your doorbell because they didn't mail you an opt-in form first. Nope. The probes were annoying, but the killer was my

Re: [tor-talk] tor-exit running ntop

2011-12-19 Thread John Case
On Mon, 19 Dec 2011, grarpamp wrote: Maybe they are running sniffers or just traffic statistics? Cute. However, it is certainly safe to assume that many nodes, many ISP's and many 'other' are running such things transparently for equally known and unknown reasons. So this is of no particular

Re: [tor-talk] HS relay enforcement

2011-12-14 Thread John Case
On Wed, 7 Dec 2011, grarpamp wrote: HS (server) and client (user) can share an access key. Yada. But some HS want to enforce user is running non-exit relay. So relay must somehow sig client, or the reverse, and publish to DHT for query by HS before grant access. Yet broker so relay IP in DB !=

[tor-talk] variable speed limits on ports ...

2011-12-14 Thread John Case
Let's say I run an exit node, and I have a 10 Mb/s connection. I join up, run for a while, get qualified as a good exit, speed checks out at 10, and so on. All is well. But then let's say that, at the OS level, I rate limit one of the TCP ports I allow to exitto a much lower level - let's

Re: [tor-talk] tails on Microsoft Virtual PC

2011-12-04 Thread John Case
On Sun, 4 Dec 2011, Eugen Leitl wrote: On Sun, 4 Dec 2011, Eugen Leitl wrote: I've just tried tails in a Microsoft PC VM and it's quite nice. Anyone knows how to switch the screen resolution, as the default debian doesn't seem to know the virtual hardware? Hmm... in recent vmware, I

Re: [tor-talk] Better Privacy for Tor Node Operators

2011-04-28 Thread John Case
On Sun, 24 Apr 2011, tagnaq wrote: As a tor user you gain anonymity - as a Tor node operator you loose anonymity. I would call this a valid statement under certain circumstances. The positive site effect of a dynamic IP address (lease 1d or even 1w) is, that your IP is of less use to people