On Wed, 16 Oct 2013 19:42:41 +, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
...
One thing jumps out, Tor doesn't know for sure who's running Guard or
exit nodes - can't unless they start doing (regular, repeated)
extensive personal interviews, background checks, giving polygraph
tests, injecting sodium
On Thu, Oct 17, 2013 at 10:46:57AM +0200, Andreas Krey wrote:
On Wed, 16 Oct 2013 19:42:41 +, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
...
One thing jumps out, Tor doesn't know for sure who's running Guard or
exit nodes - can't unless they start doing (regular, repeated)
extensive personal interviews,
On Wed, 16 Oct 2013 19:42:41 -0500
Joe Btfsplk joebtfs...@gmx.com allegedly wrote:
On 10/16/2013 4:50 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 10:10:56PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Yep. They're part of the Tor research community. I have plans for
writing a blog post about
On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 10:10:56PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 11:35:22AM +1000, Erik de Castro Lopo wrote:
Hi all,
Heads up on a new paper suggesting that its possible to unmask
Tor users using traffic correlation:
On 10/16/2013 4:50 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
On Sun, Sep 01, 2013 at 10:10:56PM -0400, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Yep. They're part of the Tor research community. I have plans for writing
a blog post about the paper, to explain what it means, what it doesn't
mean, what we should do about it,
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 03:22:33PM +, adrelanos wrote:
Roger Dingledine:
And we really should raise the guard rotation period. If you
do their compromise graphs again with guards rotated every nine months,
they look way different.
TBB releases are more frequent than every nine
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On 09/03/2013 02:09 PM, Roger Dingledine wrote:
Longer term, the right answer is to use the Firefox update mechanism in
TBB 3.0 to update, in place, only the parts that need updating.
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/4234
Roger Dingledine:
And we really should raise the guard rotation period. If you
do their compromise graphs again with guards rotated every nine months,
they look way different.
TBB releases are more frequent than every nine months. With each TBB
release, people are getting new entry guards. Are
Hi all,
Heads up on a new paper suggesting that its possible to unmask
Tor users using traffic correlation:
http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf
Code here:
http://torps.github.io/
Would be interested in hearing the opinions of the core Tor
develpoment team on
On Mon, Sep 02, 2013 at 11:35:22AM +1000, Erik de Castro Lopo wrote:
Hi all,
Heads up on a new paper suggesting that its possible to unmask
Tor users using traffic correlation:
http://www.ohmygodel.com/publications/usersrouted-ccs13.pdf
Code here:
http://torps.github.io/
Our analysis shows that 80% of all types of users may be de-
anonymized by a relatively moderate Tor-relay adversary within six
months. Our results also show that against a single AS adversary
roughly100%ofusersinsomecommonlocationsaredeanonymized
within three months (95% in three months for a
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