In a thread...
https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-talk/2018-December/044709.html
on...
> http://kgg2m7yk5aybusll.onion/
> http://axqzx4s6s54s32yentfqojs3x5i7faxza6xo3ehd4bzzsg2ii4fv2iid.onion
(noting that all onions can be physically located by determined
adversaries, thus failing
One simple line: how is that related to be bad for invidious ?
- You talked about JS been bad (agreed), but its unrelated/invalid to
invidious case. Protonmail cant operate/login without the JS and most
likely their JS is closed source but that has nothing to do with invidous
- You mentioned
On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 6:26 AM bo0od wrote:
> - Connecting to Youtube directly , then you are putting your security on
> the SSL/TLS encryption. Whereas using in invidous hidden services your
> security is through the Onion hidden services design
>
One of the points made earlier though, is that
Imagine that an .onion site is compromised. This could be by the owner who
wishes to expose visitors or by the police who want to target the
clientele.
(I remember, in the later case, reading something on Deep Dot Web about
when the FBI took over a CP site and installed malware).
The goal is to
If an onion site is compromised, you can serve the user malicious content and
with a Tor Browser Vulnerability can harm it's users.
If your private key is compromised, your only recourse is to go create a new
onion address.
We don't know what vulnerabilities exist in the current version of Tor
Hello,
bo0od wrote:
> I2P and Tor comparison:
>
> https://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor
>
> Kovri and I2Pd C++ bloody war:
>
> https://i2p.rocks/blog/kovri-and-the-curious-case-of-code-rot-part-1.html
>
> I2P by design safer than Tor. but due to the usage and rapid development
> of Tor , I2P
On 12/06/2018 01:51 PM, Nathaniel Suchy wrote:
> If an onion site is compromised, you can serve the user malicious content and
> with a Tor Browser Vulnerability can harm it's users.
>
> If your private key is compromised, your only recourse is to go create a new
> onion address.
>
> We don't
On Thu, 6 Dec 2018 03:25:05 -0500
grarpamp allegedly wrote:
[ some snippage throughout ]
>
> > - Its free software and the code is available for install/checkup.
>
> That assertion is irrelevant in the security context
> of the thread so far, and it's dangerous advice.
>
> As with
I am asking for recommendations of Tor friendly email services.
The two problems I've noticed are:
1. Demanding SMS verification e.g. ProtonMail.
2. Having impossible CAPTCHAs.
VFEmail used to work but the last time I tried it just got stuck and could
never create an account.
Any suggestions?
> instead of continuing to throw [government] money
Sorry, didn't mean to imply it was theirs...
https://www.youtube.com/results?search_query=taxation+is+theft
Carry on.
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>> I was curious for Monero dev's rationale to pick I2P over Tor
>> Whatever I've seen online doesn't strike me as particularly convincing.
Same could be asked of Zcash strong cryptographic ZKP style
currencies users often using Tor. As well as a handful of other
cryptocurrencies explicitly
> Tutanota open sourced their client. You could use the source and run your
> own version of the Tutanota client if that's your threat model. It's true
> the email provider could serve different users different versions of the app
> and there is no possible way to audit it in real time
A
> - I2P can be attacked with far less resources than Tor;
Moot when $10k is probably enough to Sybil at least
some small fraction of either of them.
> - Tor is deeply researched and various attack types and problems have
> already been solved;
So if Tor is done, why don't you start writing
> Imagine that an .onion site is compromised. This could be by the owner who
> wishes to expose visitors or by the police who want to target the
> clientele.
> How would it
> be possible for a visitor to be in danger?
Other posts covered technical code exploits.
Other risks are trust changes...
I was curious for Monero dev's rationale to pick I2P over Tor, and then even
forking I2P as Kovri.
Whatever I've seen online doesn't strike me as particularly convincing.
Is there published research in regards to deanonymization attacks against both
Tor
and I2P, and given the design changes
Eugen Leitl:
> I was curious for Monero dev's rationale to pick I2P over Tor, and then even
> forking I2P as Kovri.
>
Kovri is just a new implementation of i2p that anonimal is working on
and Monero intends to use, not a fork of the i2p project. It still is
using the existing i2p network.
>
> As with protonmail and all the other fakeass encrypted email
websites... the JS code is loaded by the browser from the web
service itself, there is currently NO trusted way for the user to
independantly audit that the code they end up executing in
real time *from* the service matches the code
I2P and Tor comparison:
https://geti2p.net/en/comparison/tor
Kovri and I2Pd C++ bloody war:
https://i2p.rocks/blog/kovri-and-the-curious-case-of-code-rot-part-1.html
I2P by design safer than Tor. but due to the usage and rapid development
of Tor , I2P left behind many steps which needs long
check this list:
clearnet
https://www.whonix.org/wiki/E-Mail#Anonymity_Friendly_Email_Provider_List
Onion link
http://www.dds6qkxpwdeubwucdiaord2xgbbeyds25rbsgr73tbfpqpt4a6vjwsyd.onion/wiki/E-Mail#Anonymity_Friendly_Email_Provider_List
enjoy :)
mimb...@danwin1210.me:
> I am asking for
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