to use. If I type in
an OBFS4 address will Orbot/Tails know that it needs to connect to the bridge
using OBFS4?
Thanks everyone,
Justin.
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the commands and an
example that would be great.
> On Nov 1, 2015, at 7:55 AM, I <beatthebasta...@inbox.com> wrote:
>
>> ..because I am
>> visually impaired so I figured the screen reader will read the command
>> line to me because the graphical way is ina
ECC?
Thanks,
Justin.
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guys is, what would the filter be
doing to break Meek?
The funny thing is that I don’t think it’s breaking Meek on purpose.
Thanks,
Justin.
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Actually, you’re totally wrong. According to a top secret NSA document, which
you can view online:
Tor is the king of high secure, low latency anonymity. No contender awaits the
throne.
That would clearly indicate that you know absolutely nothing about Tor, Onion
routing, or anonymity in
Hello,
I’m not sure what the answer to your question about regular Tor is. When it
comes to Obfsproxy changing the 586 byte size, it’s to evade filters that use
that to help block Tor. The other packet length fluctuations would indicate
that Obfsproxy makes the sizes of packets different so
Ok? I’m just going to say that the article has nothing to do with Tor.
> On Nov 29, 2015, at 9:45 AM, Bob wrote:
>
> Dear list,
>
> A shocking incident in software industry has been reveled recently. I'm
> sharing it here so that more people can support the cause.
>
>
Hello,
You’re partially correct when you say don’t take the metrics as real users.
Some of them may be bots, but can you please give us a link to an article about
those events that you discussed? I really doubt that 1.5 million bots are
using Tor everyday by the way.
> On Jan 2, 2016, at
is going after me, I will use
Tails. That should certainly stop them.
> On Nov 20, 2015, at 4:33 PM, Ivan Markin <t...@riseup.net> wrote:
>
> Justin Davis:
>> Just to give more information, the
>> attack will be done by having every network user install a root cert
>&g
Allen,
SSH is probably more dangerous than OBFS4 because it coulee be detected with a
DPI fingerprint. They might question that. I think Tor with transports is
good.
> On Nov 20, 2015, at 5:16 PM, Allen wrote:
>
>> You should remove these CAs
>
> Or they might fire you.
<t...@riseup.net> wrote:
>
> Justin:
>> Also, I have no option but to keep the cert because if I don’t the
>> filter may use DPI to block TLS for me.
>
> Funny! I mean that you're already have no TLS, because actual TLS is
> terminated at your ITDep. You should
Hello,
I know. OBFS4 makes the traffic unrecognizable to a DPI unit. That’s why I
switched from Meek to it.
> On Nov 21, 2015, at 4:14 AM, Ivan Markin <t...@riseup.net> wrote:
>
> Justin:
>> I won’t get into trouble because I’m not using regular Tor. I’m
>> using
Hello,
You would be correct normally, but at school, I know the IT guy very well. I
have calculated that he is probably too lazy to check his logs. He usually
doesn’t check things out until someone tells him that a problem is occurring.
Even if Meek-Google is broken, I got more information
that the Amazon and Azure versions
may be broken. Should they all be broken, I will switch to another transport.
> On Nov 21, 2015, at 5:26 PM, Ivan Markin <t...@riseup.net> wrote:
>
> Justin:
>> I have calculated that he is probably too lazy to check his logs.
>
>
Hello,
I won’t get into trouble because I’m not using regular Tor. I’m using
pluggable transports, which hide the Tor traffic and make it unrecognizable to
a DPI box. This should be good enough even if Meek’s TLS is broken.
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Hi,
I was wondering does anyone have a list of countries that are currently
blocking Tor?
I know China, Ethiopia, Iran are doing it but I think I may have missed one or
two others.
Thanks,
Justin.
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Wow. I wonder if they’re going to ask Bluecoat for help on that so they can
nail the vanilla bridges next? I hope not. Thanks.
> On May 25, 2016, at 5:04 PM, Green Dream wrote:
>
> It's been reported here that Mexico's largest ISP is blocking exits and
> directory
Are they using DPI? If so, what company sold them the filter?
> On May 25, 2016, at 5:55 PM, Chris wrote:
>
>
>> I was wondering does anyone have a list of countries that are
>> currently blocking Tor?
>> I know China, Ethiopia, Iran are doing it but I think I may have
Hi,
That’s not surprising. Wonder if we’ll see other filtering companies start
blocking Meek this way.
> On Jul 24, 2016, at 3:04 AM, David Fifield wrote:
>
> Recently, we had reports of Cyberoam firewalls blocking meek by TLS
> signature:
>
TLS signature. Meek-Amazon gets
stopped at 25% of bootstrapping, and I’m not sure what Cyberoam is
fingerprinting. Any ideas?
Thanks,
Justin.
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Meek works on Orbot still. I wonder why?
> On Aug 1, 2016, at 8:36 AM, Nathan Freitas <nat...@freitas.net> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Aug 1, 2016, at 09:31 AM, Justin wrote:
>> I’ve been conducting some more tests against a Cyberoam with Meek, and
>> over the past t
Hi,
From what I know, you’re correct. The Chinese use a lot of people to get
bridges, or maybe they created a bonnet that can do it for them, either way
they’ve done exactly what you said. They have managed to block the automated
bridge distribution methods.
> On Jul 8, 2016, at 10:49 AM,
is recognized and blocked by DPI equipment from Cyberoam. Keep in
mind this is Vanilla Tor, no PT are used.
Thanks very much,
Justin.
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Hi,
I think Dpi boxes are fingerprinting OBFS4 because of it’s randomness. A paper
was published a wile ago that talked about the same type of attack. It’s on
https://sensorbib.nymity.ch <https://sensorbib.nymity.ch/>
Thanks,
Justin.
> On Aug 18, 2016, at 11:34 AM, Ivan Markin <t..
Hi,
Not too long ago, a paper was published that talks about how Tor users can be
deanonymized through their DNS lookups. Is this something I should be concerned
about?
Thanks,
Justin.
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mode 1 and
2 worked no matter how much load the bridges had on them.
Hopefully this information can help people understand a little more about how
these transports are filtered.
Thanks,
Justin.
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016, at 3:13 PM, Flipchan <flipc...@riseup.net> wrote:
>
> Did u only try to connect to a bridge and proxy data throw it?
>
> Justin <davisjustin...@gmail.com> skrev: (17 november 2016 12:16:49 CET)
>> Hi everyone,
>> I’ve been doing research to see how some of
Hi,
I’m curious about the iat-mode in obfs4. What is the difference between
iat-mode 1 and 2?
Thanks,
Justin.
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I've been running Japnonymous on a 10.4 ppc machine using this
package for some time now. Haven't run into any issues yet (Full
disclosure, I don't use Polipo at all, only Tor and Vidalia).
~Justin Aplin
On Mar 31, 2011, at 12:18 PM, Erinn Clark wrote:
Hello everyone,
I hear mixed
.6297b13a687b521a59c6bd79188a2501ec03a065.exit
~Justin Aplin
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/latest/722/addon-722-latest.xpi?src=browse
And TorButton:
https://www.torproject.org/dist/torbutton/torbutton-current.xpi
~Justin Aplin
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On Jul 10, 2011, at 11:12 PM, hi...@safe-mail.net wrote:
Original Message
From: Justin Aplin jap...@gmail.com
HTTPS transport should prevent the type of modification you're talking
about, so just double-check your URIs before downloading anything.
For example,
I
, but the result should be worth it if you use
both often.
~Justin Aplin
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On Aug 15, 2011, at 9:37 AM, Joe Btfsplk wrote:
On 8/14/2011 7:47 PM, Justin Aplin wrote:
something like an option / preference don't close TBB when Firefox closes
sounds like a solution. Technically, it'd be don't close Tor / Vidalia
wouldn't it, because TBB includes Tor?
Firefox in TBB
and
beta branches tend to include new features, and since the majority of new
features in Tor are geared toward improving security, the same logic as above
applies.
~Justin Aplin
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the --nt-service tag, and adding -f
C:\blah\torrc to the tail end of it. Alternatively, you could guess where Tor
is looking for the torrc (probably Application Data\Vidalia in the service
account's home directory) and try placing a copy of your torrc there.
~Justin Aplin
On Tue, Sep 20, 2011
Not Found [IP: 86.59.30.36 80]
What should I change my update source to?
Use the Lucid repos, or use the instructions here to build your own .debs:
https://www.torproject.org/docs/debian.html.en#source
~Justin Aplin
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to specify
a particular *exit* in the address bar, check out the AllowDotExit entry
in the manual. Picking a particular *entry* node, as far as I know,
would require you to use the Bridge and UseBridges entries in your
torrc, which isn't nearly as flexible.
~Justin Aplin
Best,
Kamyar,
On Sat
option pointing to your custom torrc?
~Justin Aplin
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is really the best way to go here.
~Justin Aplin
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, or that Vidalia's just waiting for the
shutdown timeout to run its course?
As far as I know, the red icon indicates the former, as my nodes have a 30
second wait time, but frequently only sit in the red phase for 10-15 seconds.
~Justin Aplin
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On 2/15/2012 3:31 PM, eliaz wrote:
Thanks, this gives me someplace to start.
On 2/15/2012 1:52 PM, Justin Aplin wrote:
On Feb 15, 2012, at 12:48 PM, eliaz wrote:
I've set ShutdownWaitLength to 30 minutes in torrc.
If this is actually set to 30 minutes, and not 30 seconds, I believe
that's
The link to the win32 expert bundle on the project website is broken and
should be corrected to
https://www.torproject.org/dist/win32/tor-0.2.3.12-alpha-win32.exe
Thanks,
~Justin Aplin
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as in the data directory of every running
client. There's nothing secret about it. As far as blocking exit nodes,
the Tor DNSBL is publicly provided for this reason precisely.
~Justin Aplin
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to the site itself occurs at the exit node.
~Justin Aplin
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internet activities (in which case, I'd set it to, say, 80% of your
provider's advertised bandwidth, or whatever else you find appropriate,
which will limit Tor enough to leave your internet connection usable,
but still run up against the limit set by AccountingMax eventually).
~Justin Aplin
per IP (or even several nodes per box, if CPU
core usage is topping out before bandwidth usage) isn't terribly uncommon.
~Justin Aplin
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used to randomize port selection seems to
trigger an inordinate number of antivirus warnings.
~Justin Aplin
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descriptors (which will result in
odd behavior, like your hidden service only being reachable some of the
time). If you plan to continue running a Tor node on the old hardware, a
new set of keys and a new fingerprint will automatically be generated.
~Justin Aplin
like to know the solution if there is one, though.
[1] https://www.torproject.org/docs/tor-hidden-service.html.en
~Justin Aplin
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On Sep 5, 2012, at 3:15 AM, Andreas Krey wrote:
On Wed, 05 Sep 2012 02:15:21 +, Justin Aplin wrote:
...
ExitPolicy accept 127.0.0.1:*
ExitPolicy reject *:*
This will allow exiting (connecting) to the local machine (where the hidden
service should be listening) on all ports
] This version of Tor (0.2.4.11-alpha) is newer than any
recommended version, according to the directory authorities.
Recommended versions are:
0.2.2.39,0.2.3.24-rc,0.2.3.25,0.2.4.5-alpha,0.2.4.6-alpha,0.2.4.7-alpha,0.2.4.8-alpha,0.2.4.9-alpha,0.2.4.10-alpha
Anything to worry about?
~Justin Aplin
won't show up on Vidalia's map. Traffic won't be affected in any way.
[1] https://gitweb.torproject.org/tor.git/blob_plain/HEAD:/src/config/geoip6
~Justin Aplin
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)
ns2bru.europa.eu (158.169.131.32)
ns1lux.europa.eu (158.169.9.11)
ns2eu.bt.net
ns1.bt.net
ns1.be.colt.net
Keys:
Please visit www.eurid.eu for more info.
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Best Regards,
Justin Bull
E09D 38DE 8FB7 5745 2044 A0F4 1A2B DEAA 68FD B34C
-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version
It would appear PRISM-proof is the new military grade.
Brace yourselves, snake oil is coming.
Sent from mobile.
On 2013-10-28 1:47 AM, Michael Wolf mikewol...@gmail.com wrote:
It still runs in a VM on stock x86 hardware... what stops the
NSA/provider from viewing the virtual CPU's state,
in that matter.
I've CC'd the list on the chance others interpreted my curt, snarky reply
the same way.
[0]: With the exception of one-time pads, of course ;-)
On Tue, Oct 29, 2013 at 2:24 PM, Oded Horovitz o...@privatecore.com wrote:
Justin,
If you are interested to hear more about our architecture
Hello,
When I try to use FTE bridges from the bridge db email service, they
don't work. Keep in mind I've only tried this once, but has anyone
else had this issue with FTE or any other pluggable transport bridges
given out from bridge db?
Thanks,
Justin.
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so I figured the screen reader will read the command
line to me because the graphical way is inaccessable with Orca.
Thanks,
Justin.
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Hello,
I just learned that the IT department of an organization where I am
will begin mass decryption on TLS traffic. Would this effect the use
of the Meek pluggable transport? Just to give more information, the
attack will be done by having every network user install a root cert
in our
provements they are welcome.
Thanks,
Justin.
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provements they are welcome.
Thanks,
Justin.
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