> "Your IP(xx.xx.xx.xx) has been banned by administrator."
>
> I can fix it by going to the Vidalia Control Panel and changing identity,
> but it is a PITA. Is there any way to stop this from happening in the first
> place?
Yes, user education. Whenever someone tells you of their
idiotic exploits
> The script would fetch the the latest tor exit node fingerprints and loop
> through each one connecting to www.example.com.FINGERPRINT.exit via SOCKS5.A
> failed connection means the fingerprint is discarded whereas successful ones
> means it is added to a database of usable tor exit nodes.
>
> I never met someone from the YaCy project.
>
> and they are reallynice people.
Yeah, I heard those yacy guys are serial killin, drug dealin,
baby rapin, church burnin, terrorists. Better not use yacy.
Johnny's mom's is really nice, she can't code for shit though.
On to more useful comparison...
Mostly a summary...
> http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc1751
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/S/KEY
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OPIE_Authentication_System
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OTPW
These still work well for simple OTP systems.
The words are also simple English.
> http://www.sinic.name/docs/
> ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BELOW
> StopForumSpam report for LEASEWEB ASN16265
It seems pretty clear leaseweb signed themselves up to receive this
report. Or maybe sfs did, but then they'd be spamming leaseweb :)
> We have many other customers that operate anonymous VPN services
> and none of them had a
> The main problem, besides the overhead, is that padding doesn't work
> if an adversary can do something as trivial as very briefly delaying
> It is too easy for an adversary to put a traffic signature on a
> circuit in one place, and look for it elsewhere. If he owns, e.g., the
> first node and a
>>> It may take a while for a clientA to use said entry but when
>>> they do it seems it would be quite easy to time/count correlate
>>> or munge the HS traffic of clientA. And only require two nodes
>>> (hs, entry) and no GPA taps to do so.
>> That's why guards were introduced: They will not comp
> Robert Ransom wrote:
> Use Tor 0.2.3.x-alpha, give the user 10 or more SocksPorts and 10 or
> more DNSPorts to point things which really need to be anonymous at,
> and no TransPort.
I think both are useful. Using TransPort as a safety packet log
and proxy catchall for whatever apps might defy So
On Thu, Mar 1, 2012 at 11:31 PM, Andrew Lewman wrote:
> bittorrent trackers are fine, it's the bulk download of GB of data 7x24
> that loads up the network.
Wanted to add a bit here from another view.
I see no issue with bulk data transfer, so long as you give
back empty bandwidth equal to your
> Robert Ransom wrote:
> FreeBSD, apt, GPG, [etc]
Unfortunately, I know of none that do OpenPGP right. Such as signing
their git (sha-1 tree strength) repos upon init and each release tag,
distributing keys with said releases/announcements, and integrating
that so on down the chain, into updates,
> It's lame so or so. The exit node admins will have to deal with
> copyright infringement complaints.
'All bulk data' was the intended meaning. Assuming copyright is not
going away, certainly operators would want to see the complaint
generating portion of bulk move solely and natively to the unde
> It's my impression that signed packages aren't a priority
> for the BSDs in general.
It will happen when one of their mirrors gets rooted, or one of
their devs gets their machine, and thus their dev account, rooted.
The kernel.org, gnu/fsf and debian[?] incidents all come to mind.
Too bad it see
Nice graphic :)
Some small details not worth including...
site.com under HTTPS really means site-IP to various observers
between user and webserver. site-IP may or may not mean site.com
in the presence of virtual hosting schemes.
At the exit and beyond, knowing a site user is using Tor could
be
Does this ask for using a pre existing load balancer solution?
Can the host's firewall be configured to fan out (say round robin
or flow based) the streams (and dns) that it would normally capture
and send to a single TransPort and DNSPort... across multiple Tor's
providing same access ports?
I h
> The nodes must reside in commercial data centers
Subject only to Tor's defenses, such as CIDR block restrictions, a
node is a node. Going with the USA idea: what if the FBI, in the
normal course of business, calls up all their local cable/dsl/fiber/cell
providers and has a few lines run to each
> I think that it is important to differentiate national security
> and law enforcement here.
Yes. They are two separate camps. Who now more regularly talk with
each other to varying degrees, both in the office, and in the pub.
It's likely only a legal question as to what tools either may use.
Th
> Thanks to Mark Klein, we know that the NSA wiretaps in the US are
> passive in nature, not active.
We know that *back then* *one* of their possible tap systems was
passive. All thanks due of course.
> But who knows what they do [...]
... today, to whoever.
> I don't think The Man can correla
Assuming for the moment that aliens have better than brute force
knowledge [1] about certain algorithms but perhaps do not have said
knowledge regarding others...
Would it make some sense for humans to use a different stream
algorithm and key exchange method for each layer?
[1] But "this is more
On FreeBSD RELENG_4 i386 gcc 2.95.4+, I get this:
container.c: In function `smartlist_ensure_capacity':
container.c:72: `SIZE_MAX' undeclared (first use in this function)
container.c:72: (Each undeclared identifier is reported only once
container.c:72: for each function it appears in.)
SIZE_MAX i
Fixed here: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/3894
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> Hosting relays in Iceland is expensive due to the current monopoly
> arrangement on bandwidth and connections to Greenland and the
> UK, see http://www.farice.is/. If planning to host tor relays in Iceland,
Maybe a half year ago I posted some more info, and don't believe
there is a monopoly situ
> .If I told you it might give away my location.
> Look up "major internet outage in US" for today.
Right, which is why you tell us to search it and get the
same location info.
> Interesting, fios is a last mile solution from verizon.
Not sure if that was just a 'neato' but, for those not in tha
Seems over the course of a couple branches of Tor
that connecting to hidden services can be strange.
I often have two or more Tor's running.
One can connect to HS(a) just fine.
The other can't... but killing and restarting it
seems to always resolve the situation.
And they both might always connec
If anyone would like to volunteer for this small project, here is
an open invitation... :)
What is msmtp?
http://msmtp.sourceforge.net/
http://wiki.mutt.org/?LightSMTPagents/Msmtp
Coverage on msmtp-us...@lists.sourceforge.net ...
Hey all! Been using msmtp
> jaro...@dyne.org says:
> I'm very interested in this,
Hi :) I think the motivation is to make the use of SOCKS with msmtp
simple. Which generally means SOCKS being added to msmtp itself.
Certainly not only for Tor, but also for biz, edu, and gov firewalls
as well. Lots of good use cases there t
>>> or are you thinking of a shell script using socat?
>> Socat does not provde a SOCKS server, only a client, so it can't
>> be used. I mentioned it only as an example of an interesting shim-like
>> tool that might be out there. Not as one that could be used in this
>> case.
> I use msmtp + socat
On Mon, May 21, 2012 at 3:10 PM, Leandro Noferini
wrote
>>> I use msmtp + socat and they works fine together with a tor relay.
>>
>> Those of you saying you're using socat to allow msmtp to speak to
>> a SOCKS server... can you post an example of your invocation/config?
>
> socat -d -d -d -lu TCP4
>> Yes, but I'm pretty sure that would break TLS since msmtp sees localhost as
>> CN
>> in its config and the cert CN says realsmtp.net.
> No, msmtp could be configured not to check ssl certs with
> tls_certcheck off
> option in .msmtprc
Ok, sure with that, but well the presumption is that secur
> Well, what could we begin to do?
I guess draft the use case and usage spec, pick a socks5
library or write one. Taking some of this from what's been
posted by people so far. Get it to the msmtp list.
I'm not really any good at C at all, so someone would have
to tackle that. But wherever msmtp ma
>> msmtp's complement, fetchmail, speaks of SOCKS in its
>> docs, mentions a couple socks libs. But I've not tested
>> fetchmail with them yet, it should be.
>
> fetchmail leacks inesorably (?) dns requests also used through a proxy
> socks - this is my experience.
I don't see any leaks with tors
> If I run a Tor exit node and use Tor myself, is there any chance that my own
> traffic might exit my own node? Of course, if this were to happen, I'd
> still have plausible deniability since I'd be running an exit node but it
> would still be too close for comfort!
If your client is not also th
>> msmtp's complement, fetchmail, speaks of SOCKS in its
>> docs, mentions a couple socks libs. But I've not tested
>> fetchmail with them yet, it should be.
>
> fetchmail leacks inesorably (?) dns requests also used through a proxy
> socks - this is my experience.
>
> I found fdm (http://fdm.sour
> windows... VoIP clients I use Phonerlite, it use UDP.
> because of TOR is TCP based, I will use openvpn to
> transferring udp packet through TOR network.
> ...
> I will use tor network only without hidden services.
For hidden to hidden, consider using onioncat.
> to connect openvpn and tor i us
I've noticed OS vendors taking up the FireFox ESR
train in their ports for the same valid maintenance reasons.
Though they do seem to track ESR and most current, with
ESR getting the real work, and current only to compile.
Probably comes down to when to make the time investment
porting to the next
So I'm about to bump this to 1024.
Are there any upper limits within tor on this, 2k, 4k?
Are proxy clients given a reset/closed when tor has hit
this limit?
getinfo circuit-status shows 1100+ in BUILT state,
Guess that's some other limit or is not limited.
"
We'd like to launch a circuit to han
> which is on average the traffic overhead of Tor traffic respect to
> non-tor traffic?
> I mean, if i make a 1MB transfer in an HTTP session without Tor, how
> much data will be transferred with Tor, so in % which is the overhead?
I'm sure you could make your system quiet, watch your packet/byte
Really? Why do people insist on posting
these silly shortened links. It's not really
cool or hip, doesn't hide anything or
protect anyone. And now lots of people
have to go click it to see what it is and wade
through a steaming pile of html/js/cookies,
etc instead of evaluating it on its face.
Cou
http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2012/06/19/torwallet-sparks-trust-without-jurisdiction-debate/
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> There are like 20 "the hidden wiki" pages all of them claiming to be
> "the" real one.
Sure. But given the nature of kpvz7's shoddy ops, the
post late-2011 battle/outage forkage and the
complete untrustability of any commerce link across
them all, there probably isn't a real/best anymore...
such
> or get "hacked".
Hah, we already let brick and morter get away with
that excuse and more, these webs will be no different.
> you don't need services like this website
Completely true. Yet watching it all is good for some laughs :)
"World's 2nd gold rush hits, miners pull off mass land grab, h
> Anbody have any information on; vwfws4obovm2cydl.onion ?
You must have obtained the address from somewhere.
So what did the ad copy or context associated with it say?
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>> harvested from malware... contained; vwfws4obovm2cydl.onion
>> It contained a script file named; poclbm120222.cl
> So from what it seems, the malware included a bitcoin miner
> that perhaps is to report found blocks to ... this site in question.
And surely the contents of any wallet it
/// Meanwhile, on bitcoin-devel...
Hello everyone,
a few days ago we merged Tor hidden service support in mainline. This means
that it's now possible to run a hidden service bitcoin node, and connect to
other bitcoin hidden services (via a Tor proxy) when running git HEAD. See
doc/Tor.txt for mor
> Reading https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin/blob/master/doc/Tor.txt
> Is bitcoin software going to incorporate tor binaries within the
> application standard application and automatically create a Tor Hidden
> Service on behalf of end-user?
>
> Are there any direction regarding this kind of integ
>> Regarding the addressing, why not use directly the .onion address?
>
> https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/Protocol_specification#Network_address
>
> Unfortunately, this addressing scheme apparently cannot accommodate
> other anonymous networks, such as I2P, that uses 256 bits for its
> Base-32 addresses
>> 256 bits - A tough interop problem for sure. It seems maybe
>> a worthy long term goal for the projects to sort out.
>
> It can be probably solved on the I2P side. The 256-bit address is a
> SHA-256 of the full 3072-bit address (2048-bit public key + 1024-bit
> signing public key) + a few extra
>> can these chips be used to spying and identifying people
The summary is probably...
Only those with access to the chip masks, or an equally serious
amount of reverse engineering gear, knows what goes into a chipset.
Therefore anything is possible. And if you're not proxying the output
of suspe
>>> can these chips be used to spying and identifying people
>
> The summary is probably...
Meant largely as to the nebulous 'spying' by 'them'.
Not as to Seth's good post regarding the possibilities
with known technologies.
Hopefully it threaded that way.
> When using Tor in a local network, what the network administrator can see if
> he checks my activity on the network??
Generally speaking, a network admin can see that you are using Tor
(the packets moving), not what you're doing over it (the packet
contents).
If 'network admin' also means 'syst
> 1. What are the main aims and the strategy of the Tor Project?
You can find the answer to this by reading the Tor Project website:
https://www.torproject.org/
https://blog.torproject.org/
https://media.torproject.org/
Ony of many answers to questions 2, 3, 4 might be:
Users don't know, mixed wi
> anonymously donate
Well, very few places take cash or money order in the mail. Call
them stupid to not take the money. Then there's AML with bitcoin,
etc.
> a persistent nym
Building a persistent nym is handy if you wish to establish such a
personage for compartemented tasks, etc. However, the
>> like the NSA for example, consider that they haven't yet managed to track
>> down the guys running the Silk Road drug site (http://silkroadvb5piz3r.onion)
Call me stupid, but I actually think the NSA does have the capability to
locate Tor hidden services, even if only those existing within the
>> Thank you for the response. Unfortunately, it looks like this might be
>> an impossible problem to solve, since they followed it up and said it's
>> forum spam and hack attempts, not just email spam. Basically, my node
>
> So they're keep changing their story. It seems they want to get rid of y
Fetchmail, msmtp, etc can all connect to a host,
take that cert fingerprint, compare it to the one you've
configured, and drop the connection if they differ.
Doesn't FF support this kind of fingerprint scheme?
Or even simply storing the site's cert for comparing.
__
>> Fetchmail, msmtp, etc can all connect to a host,
>> take that cert fingerprint, compare it to the one you've
>> configured, and drop the connection if they differ.
>
> That may work against some adversaries but not against very clever
> adversaries. He can let the first connection alone and tam
>> >> Fetchmail, msmtp, etc can all connect to a host,
>> >> take that cert fingerprint, compare it to the one you've
>> >> configured, and drop the connection if they differ.
>> >
>> > That may work against some adversaries but not against very clever
>> > adversaries.
>> He can let the first con
>> And what about FF's 'are you sure want to connect
>> to this strange cert'... 'accept one time' or 'add and accept
>> forever' option? So why not dump the cert in the forever file?
>> But if that's not checking _at least_ the fingerprint, and hopefully
>> the cert chain, then it's useless for s
> Why don't we propose a clean solution for this time mess anyway?
Is this that big of a deal? If a would be Tor user doesn't
know what time it is and/or can't set their clock manually,
they've got bigger issues to worry about.
And given 90% of these users use windows, they're set
via ntp by defa
> they should create an official clear net discussion f0rum.
>
> "The idea is to share more with the community and give people a chance to
> ask questions directly of the people doing the work."
>
> that is the purpose of a F0RUM, not another MAILING LIST used by the 1%.
> The 1% of what set of pe
Torsocks docs are woefully in need of work to match the code. And you may find
yourself better off if you ignore the scripts and write your own. All
you really need is:
LD_PRELOAD=/.../libtorsocks.so TORSOCKS_CONF_FILE=/.../torsocks.conf
TORSOCKS_DEBUG=1 "$@"
local = 10.0.0.0/255.0.0.0
local = 12
>From what I recall, some mapping of these addresses is
required fo make FTP work. I also remember FTP working
without that with the old tsocks, and not with torsocks. But
it's been so long that even I must consider my own memory
as rumor.
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I'm seeing hundreds of these. The current M seems to exceed the m,
for which m is increased, then M exceeds that... repeat.
ver: branch 0.2.3.x as of jul 17.
Should I ticket this or append more info?
[warn] circuit_send_next_onion_skin(): Bug: Unexpectedly high
circuit_successes (M/m) for guard .
> Ticket and assign it to me. Cc nickm (if you can).
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/6475
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> Riseup has been recommend by (imho) trustworthy and honest people.
RiseUp is that place that makes you fill out *why* you want
one of their free accounts, your activism. What do you guys put in there?
Can you just leave it blank? Or say 'not applicable',
no reason, unspecified. Do you have to sa
> Sounds a little harsh. Any reason * whatsoever *?
It's called covering ass, and not having to debate with you who's
definition of 'abuse' is right. If you cause them problems, they
can drop you. Doesn't mean if you send death threats they drop
you, only that they can. This is actually a pret
> The only way I've been able to create a Gmail account recently was through an
> Android tablet. I installed Orbot and Orweb APKs so all traffic was through
> Tor at the time, then created the account through Settings > Acounts & Sync >
> Add Account.
I'd be wary of that approach. It would be
> 4. Tor and hidden services are good enough for an ecommerce platform.
Be careful the words... this is like saying the US Gov is doing great
at preventing 'terrorist' attacks simply because there haven't been any.
And although I might trust Tor, it's not wise to trust a GPA such
as the NSA, nor
>>No offense to the weirdos, though. You guys are my people :).
> Really? You don't come across as very friendly to the 'weirdos'.
Oh, but he is! You see, I'm an astrophysicist with minor in geology
and ancient history. I lose three jobs and eventually were committed to
green sanitarium b
> .onion is another thing that is tragically failing to reach its
> potential because no one tries to make it useful for normal stuff. I
> rather intensely dislike the way it is being used now, but I also know
> that good use cases exist, and amazing ones are possible.
Ditto. Onionland is mostly d
> expand the network instead of just using it as a proxy. Make everyone
> a relay (even if low-bandwidth relays are not useful, and even if
> there are theoretical issues — solve the issues instead) and have a
> hidden service address by default. Work with file sharing software
> developers to have
> Still, it is a little surprising they can't trace bitcoin yet, though.
> Maybe they can.
If you're using an anonet, a new address for every transaction, a
good mix that at least guarantees lack of per session taint, and
are willing to accept a random variance in your input and output BTC
amount
> I ask again, because I want the answer to improve us:
>> > How would you have us promote Tor?
Setting aside for the moment those possibly arguing illegal cases...
I don't think you can do much different, or better.
Even if you repeat the historical wisdom that the current
presumed good parts of
> Very interesting read.
"
Resnick: The recent article in Wired describes where and how the NSA plans to
store its share of collected data. But as the article explains, the Utah
facility will have another important function: cryptanalysis, or
code-breaking, as much of the data cycling through
When trying to fetch about 50 onions at a time, Tor eats up all of
a P4 1.8GHz CPU. And only about a tenth of the HTTP requests that
are expected to resolve and return data ever do return said data.
Further, using Tor as an exit (whether via polipo or SOCKS) also
becomes less than useful.
I'm not
> haha!
Beware that youtube now embeds unique identifiers
in each downloaded video. Be careful when you share
content these days, it might just be haha on you.
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OnionLand now has well over 500 known onions online :)
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> - Log fewer lines at level "notice" about our OpenSSL and Libevent
> versions and capabilities when everything is going right.
The version confirmation was handy when you're compiling
static and want to know what actually made it into the binary
without using strings. Doesn't matter to
I noticed this when trying multiple SocksPort's. I ended up with
the following circuits, listed in order of command invocation:
port 8051 circ 35 nodes R1 R2 E1
port 8052 circ 34 nodes R3 R4 R5 E1
Note the same exit was selected.
Also, the second circuit was longer.
I don't think either of these
>> The typical use case is wanting to use multiple accounts on the
>> same site at once, with a guarantee that you're not appearing to
>> be from the same exit and thus are not as easily linked.
> This doesn't make sense to me. If you've got two requests open from
> the same exit to the same site
> Tor's hidden service protocol
I get most of the protocol.
> Patient: `Doctor, it hurts when I do this.'
> Doctor: `Don't do that then.'
Though I might agree, more perhaps from the humor aspect :) We all
know telling users not to do something, that is at least marginally
possible, doesn't work.
> I think you aren't considering how much cpu load is added by
> opening a new circuit ...
> This latency you will experience is exactly the sort of thing
> that will get worse if people start overloading the network with
> extra circuits.
As with the current count of onions, it's not intentional
> If anonAccountA and anonAccountB are run by different users, I'd
> expect them to use the same exit 1/N of the times that they both log
> in.
>
> But if, over time, I see that anonAccountA and anonAccountB both
> sometimes use some of the same exits, but they never use the same exit
> at the same
> The version stuff is thill there in the first line of the output.
I think you meant the tor version/git up top and I meant compiling
whichever versions of libevent/ssl with their version lines farther down.
I'm used to access times, strings, trace, ldd if dynamic... so any
way is fine with me. (
Although I don't speak for Tor, allow me to summarize...
- Tor is a transport only. As a matter of both policy and law, and because
all data along the hops is encrypted anyways by design... it has no ability
to and will not be modifying any data in transit even if it could.
- Tor has no plans to
Some easy ones...
src/common/util.c:3903: warning: preprocessing directive not
recognized within macro arg
src/common/util.c:3904: `#else' not within a conditional
src/common/util.c:3906: unbalanced `#endif'
*** Error code 1
3900 log_notice(LD_GENERAL, "Failed to terminate process with
> (can hardly be the first, can it?)
We've all had conversations over the past five plus
years about how Tor would be useful for botnets.
I'm amazed it hasn't really shown up at all. Maybe
the lack of speed and larger footprint hurts more
than being taken offline does.
>>> What compiler is that, and version? The code in main.c has been like
>>> this for a while, I wonder why it didn't come up before.
See 3894. Because nobody uses it anymore :)
> Should be fixed in e4ce8cd9691708d9bc0bcc9904d656fe35001946.
Yes, master works now. Thx.
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rend-spec...
"permanent-id" is the permanent identifier of the hidden service,
consisting of 80 bits. It can be calculated by computing the hash value
of the public hidden service key and truncating after the first 80 bits:
permanent-id = H(public-key)[:10]
https://trac.torproject.org/projects/to
> Is it possible to access the hash table
Yes. But you're still facing 2^80, among other things.
> I tried sniffing my own traffic
There used to be some other things you could "sniff" to
do this, but they're almost entirely phased out. These
days you'd only get a few services dumb enough not
to
Update: My nutty fruit bat now tells me I had 'trackhostexits .'
turned on in the original example. I think that explains the growth
of the matching exit (4th node) onto the second circuit.
Without that I get (with SessionGroup as default)...
r1 r2 r3
r4 r5 r6
r1 r2 r3
r4 r1 r5
r1 r2 r3
r1 r4 r
> look correct to me. Hope this helps
Yes. Robert noted my former sleepy state
totally messed the use of string functions
which affected length and values. But I never would
have guessed your hint that there was some
sort of common header being deleted from
the key itself... I have no idea what it
>> similar features to facilitate indexing of visited TorHs by 3rd
> If you do this, please honour peoples robots.txt files.
No, they are publishing a list of onions/urls visited, not doing
the indexing themselves, robots has nothing to do with t2w.
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> That code comes from another thread that you missed:
Less than a month ago too, that's pretty funny :)
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> People use robots.txt to indicate that they don't want their site to
> be added to indexes.
They use it to indicate that they don't want their site to be crawled.
Tor2Web isn't crawling anything, thus they have no need or obligation
to fetch and consider anyone's robots in the first place.
Nobo
> In almost all cases (99% or higher), robots.txt is used to indicate
> that a site shouldn't be crawled, *because* they don't want it
> to be indexed. The intention is painfully clear...
Not really, maybe they could care less about the index, but don't
want crawlers looping through all their band
>>> I've met some people who tell me they run a relay
>>> which records every hidden service descriptor. They don't
>>> tell me more than that.
>> As to being any specific relay [the RP?], not sure. But if so, the
>> domain view there is going to be narrow and slow going. Someone
>> who has read t
> Not a bad idea, except the repressive governments with which I'm most
> familiar also
> ban Skype. (The ban on Skype isn't just for censorship, but to maximise
> revenue
You might want to try something like this...
https://jitsi.org/
Perhaps over something like these (which might be a bit fas
> When one phone connects to another, it "knows" that the device it's
> connecting to is running the hidden service that it is trying to send
> a message to. However, the other phone, (the one running the hidden
> service), has no idea who is connecting to it.
You can use ping pong handshakes. Or
Allow me to combine some quotes from this recent thread alone...
> I've had an idea for a while for a killer service for...
> I'd be very much interested to see it in reality. I guess the
> delays will be more then acceptable.
> it would be cool to have a more general protocol for P2P use
> thro
> While we don't need a very complex p2p design (in short, we are mostly
> just talking about simple HTTP servers running on each device, behind
> a hidden service .onion), I am concerned in the long run about
> scalability and reliability of this.
Is, or can Tor be, useful or optimal? On which pl
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