Re: [tor-talk] NYC Event 2/15: Discussion Questions

2018-02-19 Thread Jim

Thanks for posting this information, George.  I was wondering if you
could expound a bit more on one point:

George wrote:

* Tor and The End of Net Neutrality: What Impact?

The bluntly honest answer was "who knows?" since each state seems to be
countering federal legislation. And as an overlay network, Tor users
might actually be a useful too to mitigate legislation.


By federal legislation are you referring to the FCC removing the Net
Neutrality requirement (which was only a rule change) or is there some
actual legislation about this?  W/o getting bogged down in details can
you give a general idea of what types of things states are doing?  And
how does Tor mitigate any of this?

Sorry if I am a little dense.

Thanks for any response.


Jim




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Re: [tor-talk] NYC Event 2/15: Discussion Questions

2018-02-18 Thread Anon Hyde
On 2/17/18, George  wrote:
> * Why is Tor {weak|underutilized} *there*?/What causes the waves and
> troughs in Tor usage in a particular country?
>
> This question arose in the context of certain countries which see
> significant jumps then declines in usage. The well-known cases of usage
> spikes is usually tied to political turbulence in a particular country,
> in which internet censorship becomes a tactic of repression. But in
> other cases, there might be the adoption of "real identity" tied to
> online accounts, or blocking of specific messaging applications.
>

I'm talking about this, and repeat:

 1) bad connection to some node, because "goodguys" to block it, or owned it.
 2) captcha/blacklist, because "goodguys" generated lot of bad traffic
 3) forged DNS by "goodguys", using dnscrypt is not simple
 4) turn traffic to hostile territory, where is "goodguys" could control it.

It is necessary to give to lamer the opportunity to manage this.

cheers,
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Re: [tor-talk] NYC Event 2/15: Discussion Questions

2018-02-17 Thread George
George:
> I thought it might be interesting for others to hear some of the
> questions that arose in the discussion at the NYC Tor event on Feb 15
> this past week.
> 
> https://blog.torproject.org/explore-tor-nyc-meetup-feb-15/
> 
> This list isn't exhaustive, but it may connect with others on this list,
> and could possibly provide more materials for the Tor Project FAQ
> (https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en). I didn't attempt to
> provide details on the answers and I did miss a part of the discussion,
> although I provide some comments. Any inaccuracies/commentary are
> attributable to me and me alone.
> 
> * Why is Tor {weak|underutilized} *there*?/What causes the waves and
> troughs in Tor usage in a particular country?
> 
> This question arose in the context of certain countries which see
> significant jumps then declines in usage. The well-known cases of usage
> spikes is usually tied to political turbulence in a particular country,
> in which internet censorship becomes a tactic of repression. But in
> other cases, there might be the adoption of "real identity" tied to
> online accounts, or blocking of specific messaging applications.
> 
> * Why do Akamai/CloudFlare and other man-in-the-middle type services
> block Tor?
> 
> There have been changes in the CloudFlare configuration where the "block
> Tor knob" is off by default. Blocking Tor isn't just based on the FUD of
> "Tor users are all bad" but often it's recognized as a tool of
> commercial competition.  For instance, firm's might be concerned about
> comment spam or derisive comments from a competitor.
> 
> * Do *they* know if I download TAILS/Tor Browser?
> 
> *They* in this case could be any wide-seeing adversary, which could be
> your ISP, corporate management or one three-letter government agency or
> another.
> 
> This is a common question in my experiences. But despite fumbling
> through an array of answers, Roger offered an elegant answer with: Are
> you more concerned about the adversary seeing you downloaded TAILS, or
> them seeing the www sites you visit?
> 
> * .onion sites
> 
> There was some discussion about perceptions about and use of .onion
> services, and why we say ".onion" as opposed to the hidden web/"Dark
> Net"/etc.
> 
> While many (particularly in the media) refer to the frequency of the
> "ugly" residing on .onion services, Facebook is actually the most
> visited site.  Some month in the past, some 1 million users accessed the
> .onion site, which represented 1/16 of that month's Facebook users. That
> may point to the future trajectory of .onion sites. Just because in
> absolute terms there's lots of loopy www sites there, they aren't
> representative of the full-scope of .onion traffic in relative terms.

Quick correction with full details later, but my Facebook .onion
statement is incorrect as-is, and needs some clarification.

> 
> * Tor and The End of Net Neutrality: What Impact?
> 
> The bluntly honest answer was "who knows?" since each state seems to be
> countering federal legislation. And as an overlay network, Tor users
> might actually be a useful too to mitigate legislation.
> 
> * Running an Exit Node
> 
> Much of the discussion is directly addressed by Tor documentation, but I
> can imagine that a meeting specifically on the topic may be relevant in
> the future, at least in a place where there is a significant
> concentration of non-exit relay operators wanting to take the plunge.
> 
> 
> 
> The discussion prompted a lot of other relevant questions and comments,
> but that's a quick survey of some I thought that were interesting.
> 
> g
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 


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