Re: [tor-talk] You Can Now Watch YouTube Videos with Onion Hidden Services
On Thu, Dec 6, 2018 at 6:26 AM bo0od wrote: > - Connecting to Youtube directly , then you are putting your security on > the SSL/TLS encryption. Whereas using in invidous hidden services your > security is through the Onion hidden services design > One of the points made earlier though, is that this isn't entirely accurate. If you're talking about security, there's still a SSL/TLS link between invidious and Youtube over which your content must pass. The user has to assume (and I *hope* it's true) that Invidious will properly verify the cert that Youtube presents to ensure that there isn't a MiTM. But, added to this, what you as the user are doing is inserting a third party into the mix who's acting as a deliberate MiTM. Invidious could (probably isn't, but has the ability) be injecting something nasty at any point. That's no reflection on the intentions of the Invidious' operator, they may simply get compromised by someone who sees them as a juicy target - After all it seems unlikely that they've got the resources to put into security that Google has. So, whilst your initial connection has potentially gained some security (by going over Tor), your security posture is weakened because you've inserted a new potential attack vector, and just moved the point of origin for the original one (the SSL/TLS connection) as well as also outsourcing the task of verifying that TLS connection to a third party (who may very well be ignoring invalid/expired certs for all you know at time of connection). What you _have_ gained is some level of privacy. Youtube cannot see your source IP, and neither can Invidious. But that's not the same thing as increasing security - that's obviously ignoring any profiling that Youtube still manage to do on you, though. TL:DR - Security is weakened, Privacy is (potentially) strengthened -- Ben Tasker https://www.bentasker.co.uk -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] You Can Now Watch YouTube Videos with Onion Hidden Services
Im not the operator of the service but here are the advantages: - Youtube is made by a dick company to humanity called Google, which is funding their services by stealing/collecting users data. So the JS which is closed source in case of YB prevent you from watching the videos unless you allow the JS. in case of invidous the JS used already licensed and the source code you can find it here: https://invidio.us/licenses Plus you can watch the videos without the need to allow any JS. - Connecting to Youtube directly , then you are putting your security on the SSL/TLS encryption. Whereas using in invidous hidden services your security is through the Onion hidden services design more you can watch Roger Dingledine speech at defcon: http://kgg2m7yk5aybusll.onion/watch?v=Di7qAVidy1Y or just normal youtube link if you like https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Di7qAVidy1Y - Its free software and the code is available for install/checkup. You are referring to FB which is completely the opposite of anything mentioned here. Hope that clarify the differences. Seth David Schoen: > bo0od writes: > >> This is another front end to YouTube: > > Hi bo0od, > > Thanks for the links. > > This seems to be in a category of "third-party onion proxy for clearnet > service" which is distinct from the situation where a site operator > provides its own official onion service (like Facebook's facebookcorewwwi, > which the company has repeatedly noted it runs itself on its own > infrastructure). > > Could you explain how this kind of design improves users' privacy or > security compared to using a Tor exit node to access the public version > of YouTube? In this case the proxy will need to act as one side of > users' TLS sessions with YouTube, so it's in a position to directly > record what (anonymous) people are watching, uploading, or writing -- > unlike an ordinary exit node which can at most try to infer these > things from traffic analysis. Meanwhile, it doesn't prevent YouTube > from gathering that same information about the anonymous users, meaning > that this information about users' activity on YouTube can potentially > tbe gathered by wo entities rather than just one. > > The proxy could also block or falsely claim the nonexistence of selected > videos, which a regular exit node couldn't do, and if its operator knew > a vulnerability in some clients' video codecs, it could also serve a > maliciously modified video to attack them -- which YouTube could do, but > a regular exit node couldn't. > > Are there tradeoffs that make these risks worth it for some set of > users? Maybe teaching people more about how onion services work, or > showing YouTube that there's a significant level of demand for an > official onion service? > -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] You Can Now Watch YouTube Videos with Onion Hidden Services
I agree with Seth, this particular YouTube frontend/proxy seems to be more focused on offering an alternative viewing experience rather than privacy. One interesting thing I have noted which may improve privacy (but still does not outweigh the risk involved) is that this site provides video playback without requiring JavaScript, so it maybe suitable for general purpose use for users who do not wish to have JavaScript enabled. On 06/12/18 11:17 AM, Seth David Schoen wrote: > Seth David Schoen writes: > >> if its operator knew a vulnerability in some clients' video codecs, > (or in some other part of Tor Browser, since the proxy can also serve > arbitrary HTTP headers, HTML, CSS, Javascript, JSON, and media files of > various types) > >> it could also serve a maliciously modified video to attack them -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] You Can Now Watch YouTube Videos with Onion Hidden Services
Seth David Schoen writes: > if its operator knew a vulnerability in some clients' video codecs, (or in some other part of Tor Browser, since the proxy can also serve arbitrary HTTP headers, HTML, CSS, Javascript, JSON, and media files of various types) > it could also serve a maliciously modified video to attack them -- Seth Schoen Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
Re: [tor-talk] You Can Now Watch YouTube Videos with Onion Hidden Services
bo0od writes: > This is another front end to YouTube: Hi bo0od, Thanks for the links. This seems to be in a category of "third-party onion proxy for clearnet service" which is distinct from the situation where a site operator provides its own official onion service (like Facebook's facebookcorewwwi, which the company has repeatedly noted it runs itself on its own infrastructure). Could you explain how this kind of design improves users' privacy or security compared to using a Tor exit node to access the public version of YouTube? In this case the proxy will need to act as one side of users' TLS sessions with YouTube, so it's in a position to directly record what (anonymous) people are watching, uploading, or writing -- unlike an ordinary exit node which can at most try to infer these things from traffic analysis. Meanwhile, it doesn't prevent YouTube from gathering that same information about the anonymous users, meaning that this information about users' activity on YouTube can potentially tbe gathered by wo entities rather than just one. The proxy could also block or falsely claim the nonexistence of selected videos, which a regular exit node couldn't do, and if its operator knew a vulnerability in some clients' video codecs, it could also serve a maliciously modified video to attack them -- which YouTube could do, but a regular exit node couldn't. Are there tradeoffs that make these risks worth it for some set of users? Maybe teaching people more about how onion services work, or showing YouTube that there's a significant level of demand for an official onion service? -- Seth Schoen Senior Staff Technologist https://www.eff.org/ Electronic Frontier Foundation https://www.eff.org/join 815 Eddy Street, San Francisco, CA 94109 +1 415 436 9333 x107 -- tor-talk mailing list - tor-talk@lists.torproject.org To unsubscribe or change other settings go to https://lists.torproject.org/cgi-bin/mailman/listinfo/tor-talk
