Thanks for your feedback Michael,
We're not going to be updating to mainline OpenSSL in Ubuntu on their
release schedule. Every minor point release from OpenSSL invariably
includes either ABI changes that would require recompiling all software
that links against OpenSSL or other regressions that
** Changed in: openssl (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Invalid
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Title:
OpenSSL version is not dependable
Status in
Vyacheslav, as long as your APT is properly configured, sources
downloaded with apt-get source are trusted via the same mechanism used
for binary packages.
If you attempt to download modified contents you'll get error messages
like this:
$ apt-get source dash
Reading package lists... Done
Julian, do you have any ideas how this could be handled better? I'm
short on ideas here. The gpgv output seems useful but it's also
potentially misleading.
Thanks
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Thanks for the bug report.
This isn't as dire as it looks:
APT's security model is based on signed InRelease files that have
sha256sums of all archive contents. In this case, the InRelease file
will have a sha256sum for one of the Sources files, and that file will
have a sha256sum for the linux
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** Package changed: ubuntu => apt (Ubuntu)
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Title:
*** This bug is a security vulnerability ***
Public security bug reported:
Hi Dustin,
Some recent changes introduced what looks to be a serious problem:
http://launchpadlibrarian.net/296647523/base-
files_9.6ubuntu7_9.6ubuntu8.diff.gz
-SERVER="https://motd.ubuntu.com;
+# White space separated
Niraj, it looks like work was done to make running auditd in containers
actually make sense: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=893751
What parts of the work are we missing, if any?
Thanks
** Bug watch added: Red Hat Bugzilla #893751
Incidentally your kernel is nearly five months old; I strongly recommend
installing updates as they address both security and reliability issues.
Thanks
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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nivlac, 'nobody' is a poor choice: the intended use of user 'nobody'
(and group 'nogroup') is for NFS.
If daemons start using 'nobody' (or 'nogroup') then they can interfere
with the proper operation of NFS or other daemons that also use 'nobody'
(or 'nogroup').
Thanks
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** Changed in: audit (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Incomplete
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1646015
Title:
update-rc.d: warning: start and stop actions
Does it make sense to install auditd in a container?
Thanks
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Title:
update-rc.d: warning: start and stop actions are
Hello Hadmut, thanks for the feedback.
This is a tricky situation -- chromium-browser's new sandboxing code
requests a large number of system capabilities inside a user namespace.
The current AppArmor profile language and enforcement engine has no way
to describe "these capabilities are only
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Confirmed
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Title:
usr.bin.chromium-browser terribly outdated
By the way you may also have hardware errors:
[ 312.837872] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED
[ 312.837891] ata1.00: cmd 60/08:e8:70:20:80/00:00:0f:00:00/40 tag 29 ncq 4096
in
res 41/04:00:38:20:80/00:00:0f:00:00/40 Emask 0x1
(device error)
[ 312.837901]
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks Vincas, I thought for sure we already had a bug for this but I
can't find it now.
** Also affects: ubuntu
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Package changed: ubuntu => apparmor (Ubuntu)
** Changed in: apparmor
Status: New => Confirmed
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Thanks Simon,
Committed revision 3590.
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1507469
Title:
Evince's Apparmour profile prevents opening docs from other apps
Michalje, Kristijian, note that this bug was opened before systemd was
used as a system init. If you're still having trouble please file a new
bug.
Thanks.
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xb5i70, ureadahead gets a list of files accessed during boot using the
debugfs filesystem and the linux kernel's tracing mechanism. You can see
the sources at http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~canonical-
scott/ureadahead/trunk/view/head:/src/trace.c#L115 for the raw details.
Thanks
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Nish, the trouble with this bug is these lines:
DuplicateSignature: package:libnss3:2:3.23-0ubuntu0.14.04.1 [modified:
usr/share/doc/libnss3/changelog.Debian.gz]:trying to overwrite shared
'/usr/share/doc/libnss3/changelog.Debian.gz', which is different from other
instances of package
Julian, I modified the script.sh to include the following line:
sudo LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$PWD/build/bin/ ./build/bin/apt-get update -o
Dir::Bin::Apt-Key="$PWD/build/bin/apt-key" -o
Dir::Bin::Methods="$PWD/build/bin/methods/" 2>&1 | tee update.log
When run from remotes/julian/for-1.2/apt-key I get
Julian, looks like you win this year's remote-debugging-via-crystal-ball
award!
$ find /etc/apt -ls | grep sarnold
2572875 4 -rw--- 1 sarnold sarnold 1740 Mar 23 2016
/etc/apt/trusted.gpg.d/ddebs.gpg
Well done :D
Thanks
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Julian, thanks for your patience. I'm not able to offer a shell on the
affected machine, so debugging this is just going to have to go at a
snail's pace.
I read strace and ltrace logs from both 1.2.12-ish and 1.2.15 apt
packages and narrowed it down to /usr/bin/apt-key.
When I use the
Turns out the valgrind messages aren't regressions either.
Here's the older apt packages again which seemed to work okay:
==25043==
==25043== HEAP SUMMARY:
==25043== in use at exit: 13,118,211 bytes in 170,033 blocks
==25043== total heap usage: 626,066 allocs, 456,033 frees, 69,255,845
On a whim I ran apt-get update through valgrind:
==22064==
==22064== HEAP SUMMARY:
==22064== in use at exit: 695,606 bytes in 7,018 blocks
==22064== total heap usage: 67,584 allocs, 60,566 frees, 18,503,180 bytes
allocated
==22064==
==22064== LEAK SUMMARY:
==22064==definitely lost: 0
The files in partial/ don't look too damning:
root@hunt:/var/lib/apt/lists/partial# file *
ftp.debian.org_debian_dists_jessie-updates_contrib_source_Sources:
empty
ftp.debian.org_debian_dists_wheezy-updates_contrib_source_Sources:
empty
Based on the funny git results, I re-installed the packages:
3243aa899fcf2f09b910b7429eeae6205a71c379a45c0e8e31723836bb094163
apt_1.2.12~ubuntu16.04.1_amd64.deb
5b9a82b1dc1f82fc3655038336d099410d643d5188629aba475050d7f9bd99c3
apt-transport-https_1.2.12~ubuntu16.04.1_amd64.deb
I reinstalled the latest xenial packages:
ii apt 1.2.15 amd64commandline
package manager
ii apt-transport-https 1.2.15 amd64https download
transport for APT
ii libapt-inst2.0:amd64 1.2.15 amd64deb
I'm skeptical of the git bisect results:
$ git checkout cde5b485c9cdf0bfd5b6ea8e4973abe378270e60^
Previous HEAD position was cde5b48... fail instead of segfault on unreadable
config files
HEAD is now at 235347e... Release 1.2.12
$ make fast
Compiling cachefile.cc to
And the results of git bisect, thanks for the excellent instruction and
script!
cde5b485c9cdf0bfd5b6ea8e4973abe378270e60 is the first bad commit
commit cde5b485c9cdf0bfd5b6ea8e4973abe378270e60
Author: David Kalnischkies
Date: Fri May 20 09:37:24 2016 +0200
fail
sarnold@hunt:/var/lib/apt$ sudo mv lists lists.old
sarnold@hunt:/var/lib/apt$ sudo apt-get update
Get:1 http://mirrors.kernel.org/ubuntu xenial InRelease [247 kB]
Get:2 http://mirrors.kernel.org/ubuntu xenial-updates InRelease [95.7 kB]
Get:3
393c61b8e29bd1923a5fe8abf4690c24e7f498aa8a4f5954a6a87da7d05a0bef apt-
etc-and-var.tar.xz
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Title:
At least one invalid
Tarball of /etc/apt and /var/lib/apt
** Attachment added: "Tarball of /etc/apt and /var/lib/apt"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/+bug/1642386/+attachment/4778362/+files/apt-etc-and-var.tar.xz
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apt-get update -o Debug::Acquire::gpgv=1
** Attachment added: "apt-get update -o Debug::Acquire::gpgv=1"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/+bug/1642386/+attachment/4778350/+files/debug-gpgv
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I was too hasty -- apt appears to still function (e.g. apt-get install
expat, apt-get purge expat, installed an expat from the -updates pocket
and removed it again). It's just insanely ugly warnings on the apt-get
update step, and maybe(?) new lists can't be downloaded.
Anyway it's more nuanced
The full run, showing apt working a few seconds before it fails, and no
errors in dmesg.
** Attachment added: "terminal-log"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apt/+bug/1642386/+attachment/4778315/+files/terminal-log
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Public bug reported:
Hello, a recent apt update appears to have broken apt entirely.
A coworker reported seeing troubles: http://paste.ubuntu.com/23487135/
To test, I upgraded my laptop then immediately re-ran apt-get update &&
apt-get -u dist-upgrade:
sarnold@hunt:~/Downloads$ sudo apt-get
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
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Title:
unattended-upgrade fails to
reason: sudo dpkg-reconfigure ca-certificates
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Title:
During upgrades, new certificates will be
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
It may be worth trying Mozilla's recommendations for e.g. Intermediate
Compatibility if you need some clients with older crypto toolkits to be
able to connect:
https://mozilla.github.io/server-side-tls/ssl-config-generator/
Thanks
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Sorry Andrej; you may be the only one experiencing this issue, and it
sounds extremely frustrating. But I don't know what to suggest next to
debug why it's happening.
About all I can suggest is that I gave up on the keychain script myself
~five years ago, but I can't recall why. You may
This computer may have hardware problems; please install the mcelog
package and see what the /var/log/mcelog file reports:
[ 1800.75] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check events logged
[ 1840.847894] CPU0: Core temperature/speed normal
[ 1950.41] mce: [Hardware Error]: Machine check
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
** Package changed: git (Ubuntu) => apt (Ubuntu)
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Title:
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
** This bug is no longer a duplicate of bug 1598759
AppArmor nameservice abstraction doesn't allow communication with
systemd-resolved
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dino99, please note, this bug is for writing to the journald socket,
which is unrelated to the dbus system socket that is referenced in the
other bug.
Thanks
** This bug is no longer a duplicate of bug 1598759
AppArmor nameservice abstraction doesn't allow communication with
systemd-resolved
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1634418 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1634418
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1634418
In 16.10, several apps want write access to /run/systemd/journal/socket
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** This bug is no longer a duplicate of bug 1598759
AppArmor nameservice abstraction doesn't allow communication with
systemd-resolved
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Hans, note that this bug was opened before systemd was used as a system
init.
A quick skim of this bug's history suggests that it's been polluted
beyond use.
If you're having trouble, please file a new bug. With luck, it'll be
focused on one thing and therefor fixable.
Thanks
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
I think you're right that adding the nslcd socket to the
abstractions/nameservice probably makes sense; I didn't see anything in
the nslcd manpages that suggested nscd was the only way to use the
module.
Thanks
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Dixon, I think the apt configuration needs to be debugged:
ntp version 1:4.2.6.p3+dfsg-1ubuntu3.11 is built for 12.04 LTS; apt
shouldn't have selected it for install on 14.04 LTS release.
Thanks
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Hi Nikita, it's always nice when you can test directly if a known bad
input has been handled correctly, but not all security fixes come with
sample inputs to see the issue. So when you can find them, that's always
welcome, but not necessary.
But it is necessary to make sure that programs that use
Hasse, could you please share the rules you add to your profiles, once
you're finished?
Thanks
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Title:
dove-lda
Our openjpeg and openjpeg2 packages have far more than this one flaw
unaccounted for:
http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/pkg/openjpeg.html
http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/pkg/openjpeg2.html
(I suspect that most issues that apply to one also apply to the other;
Nikita, if you have time and care for OpenJPEG, please consider
reviewing the crashing inputs I reported to the OpenJPEG team:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/openjpeg2/+bug/711061/+attachment/4586223/+files/openjpeg-crashers.tar.gz
sles, thanks for the excellent reproducer.
Christian, I'd love the 'magic' version:
> b) when adding an include, check if all variables are defined.
Of course the user interface might be a bit awkward, especially if the
intended use of the abstraction is for the profile author to provide the
The ufw frontend to iptables has an easy 'limit' command that automates
much of the tedium of installing firewall rulesets by hand. This will
address specific IPs doing brute-force login attempts but distributed
brute-force login attempts won't be affected.
There's also a pam_faildelay(8) module
Pheeble, this bug is ancient and grown far too many complaints to be
usefully addressed. Please file a new bug with ubuntu-bug gnupg2.
Thanks
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** Information type changed from Public to Public Security
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1628687
Title:
Assertion failure when PID 1 receives a
I reviewed capnproto version 0.5.3-2ubuntu1 as checked into xenial. This
should not be considered a full security audit but rather a quick gauge of
maintainability.
- There are four CVEs: CVE-2015-2310 CVE-2015-2311 CVE-2015-2312 CVE-2015-2313
These were handled in what is perhaps the finest
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Please upload a new zmqpp soon; 3.2.0-0ubuntu4 fails to build from
source for me. I fixed the first mistake with this patch:
--- a/src/tests/test_socket.cpp
+++ b/src/tests/test_socket.cpp
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@
BOOST_AUTO_TEST_CASE( socket_creation_bad_type )
{
zmqpp::context context;
-
Can you provide some more details? USN-3087-1 was released just a few
hours ago; if your software stopped working last week, it'd be worth
investigating what packages changed last week, rather than today.
Thanks
** Changed in: openssl (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Incomplete
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Hello, fixed packages are currently being copied to the mirrors. A USN
will be released shortly, it will be at http://www.ubuntu.com/usn/ and
the ubuntu-security-announce mail list when the mirror network shows the
updated packages are widely available.
Thanks
** Information type changed from
Hello Bryan, thanks for contacting us; the ntp fixes are in our queue
but currently behind other higher-priority fixes. We track CVEs in the
Ubuntu CVE Tree, a web front-end is available:
http://people.canonical.com/~ubuntu-security/cve/pkg/ntp.html
Thanks
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Is it possible to relax these rules without also bringing in apt-get
dist-upgrade's unfortunate ability to uninstall packages when it thinks
that's the shortest solution? We've seen cases where dist-upgrade
sometimes tries to remove sudo or the signed shim.
Thanks
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Public bug reported:
It looks like openjpeg packages openjpeg 1.5.2, while openjpeg2 packages
openjpeg 2.1.1. I don't think we want both packaged. It looks like
Debian has removed openjpeg from testing and unstable.
Thanks
** Affects: openjpeg (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Shivaprasad reported this last week in the #apparmor irc channel. What I
think we figured out at the time:
- The 4.7.0-based kernel may or may not be missing fixes from Ubuntu kernels
- 9663676416 is suspiciously larger than 32 bit integer
- the profile didn't mention rlimits, so they should not
Here's the bit from the logs about the looping triggers, this is the
longest chain I recall seeing recently:
dpkg: cycle found while processing triggers:
chain of packages whose triggers are or may be responsible:
gnome-menus -> ca-certificates
packages' pending triggers which are or may be
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
I reviewed zeromq3 version 4.1.5-2 as checked into yakkety. This shouldn't
be considered a full audit but rather a quick check of maintainability.
zmq is a networking and related utilities library. However, it has a
broad, almost obsessive, vision of how the sockets API should look;
calling it a
Public bug reported:
The following function looks like it will access a 32-bit data element
that is improperly aligned:
void zmq::socket_base_t::monitor_event (int event_, int value_, const
std::string _)
{
if (monitor_socket) {
// Send event in first frame
zmq_msg_t msg;
>From the terminal log:
Can't locate object method "new" via package "Text::Iconv" (perhaps you
forgot to load "Text::Iconv"?) at /usr/share/perl5/Debconf/Encoding.pm
line 65.
** Also affects: debconf (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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Jamie, note that we added /etc/ld.so.preload to in
the upstream project:
http://bazaar.launchpad.net/~apparmor-dev/apparmor/master/revision/3497
It's a pity AppArmor SRUs take so much effort. :(
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Public bug reported:
Hello, the zmq::mechanism_t::socket_type_string function in
./src/mechanism.cpp appears to have an off-by-one mistake:
const char *zmq::mechanism_t::socket_type_string (int socket_type) const
{
static const char *names [] = {"PAIR", "PUB", "SUB", "REQ", "REP",
eproust, could you run dmesg | grep DENIED to see if there are AppArmor
denials blocking your server?
Thanks
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1186662
Title:
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1591797 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1591797
Nikita, thanks for the report; there's an openssl update currently in
the -proposed pocket that removes this fledgling FIPS support, including
the slow startup tests. Please see
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1591797 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1591797
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1591797
Only run FIPS self tests when FIPS is enabled
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Public bug reported:
Hello; I have a process that uses enough memory that the 'RES' column
picks an unfortunate display mode:
PID USER PR NIVIRTRESSHR S %CPU %MEM TIME+ COMMAND
11279 libvirt+ 20 0 36.080g 0.011t 3060 S 0.0 8.8 76036:51
qemu-system-x86
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** Package changed: ubuntu => apparmor (Ubuntu)
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: Expired => Won't Fix
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: Won't Fix => New
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Could you run apport-collect 1618537 to add some system logs to this
report?
Thanks
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Title:
Apparmor update breaks
This is a problem with using cat(1) or tail(1) to inspect potentially
malicious files; less(1) does not interpret the control chars by
default, so it's safer to use. Something like:
less +F /path/to/file
will behave similar to:
tail -f /path/to/file
For more information, see:
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
** Package changed: policykit-1 (Ubuntu) => rsyslog (Ubuntu)
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
I suggest something like:
sudo dpkg --purge openssh-server
sudo rm -f /etc/rc*/*02ssh /etc/init.d/ssh
sudo apt-get install openssh-server
With the release of 16.04 LTS, some packages, including openssh-server,
are started via systemd unit files rather than the sysv-init
compatibility scripts.
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1605950 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1605950
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as
Brian, is the dmesg output from the machine in question captured
anywhere?
Thanks
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1528230
Title:
[ADT test failure]
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
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