Here's what I see on wily when making the following change:
--- /usr/bin/ubuntu-support-status 2015-10-08 22:07:36.0 -0700
+++ ./ubuntu-support-status 2015-10-23 14:49:44.092719697 -0700
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
# check the release date and show support information
# based on
Note that on a trusty host I have where ubuntu-support-status doesn't
throw a traceback, the following files exist:
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 64441 Oct 22 23:53
/var/lib/apt/lists/ubuntu-mirror.nxnw.org_ubuntu_dists_trusty-security_InRelease
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 63459 Oct 1 23:28
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Brian, I've also subscribed you to LP: #1504864, in which the
JournalErrors.txt contains some unfiltered zeitgeist entries as well as
an email address.
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Brian, I've subscribed you to LP: #1505626 which has an example of this.
Perhaps it affects vivid only?
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1505852
Title:
Public bug reported:
apport in Ubuntu 15.04 and 15.10 includes in bug reports a file
JournalErrors.txt that is the recorded output of the command 'journalctl
-b --priority warning'. Apport also makes a best effort attempt to
filter out information that bug reporters would like to keep private,
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A man page for aa_query_label(3) was included in the AppArmor 2.10
release.
** Changed in: apparmor
Status: Triaged => Fix Released
** Changed in: apparmor
Milestone: 2.9.3 => None
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Public bug reported:
libapparmor is missing the following manpages from upstream:
aa_query_label.2
aa_features.3
aa_kernel_interface.3
aa_policy_cache.3
aa_splitcon.3
** Affects: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Importance: Medium
Assignee: Steve Beattie (sbeattie)
Status
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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It looks like you're having problems with your hardware; from
JournalErrors.txt:
Sep 14 08:23:15 hostname kernel: ata1.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x20
SErr 0x0 action 0x0
Sep 14 08:23:15 hostname kernel: ata1.00: irq_stat 0x4008
Sep 14 08:23:15 hostname kernel: ata1.00: failed command:
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It looks like you're having hardware issues:
[ 274.192655] ata1.00: exception Emask 0x0 SAct 0x20 SErr 0x0 action 0x0
[ 274.192659] ata1.00: irq_stat 0x4008
[ 274.192662] ata1.00: failed command: READ FPDMA QUEUED
[ 274.192666] ata1.00: cmd 60/20:a8:40:02:18/00:00:00:00:00/40 tag 21
Packages to address the issue in lxc are currently building in the
ubuntu-security-proposed ppa: https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-security-
proposed/+archive/ubuntu/ppa/ ; please test these when they complete to
verify that there aren't any additional regressions that have cropped up
in this update.
I reproduced the issue with python-apt 1.0.1ubuntu0.1 in Wily, and can
confirm that the proposed version 1.0.1ubuntu0.1 solves the issue.
$ ubuntu-support-status
Support status summary of 'wily-amd64':
You have 2237 packages (85.3%) supported until July 2016 (9m)
You have 4 packages (0.2%)
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Mitre assigned CVE-2015-8709 for this issue.
** CVE added: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2015-8709
** CVE removed: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2015-8550
** CVE removed: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2015-8551
** CVE removed:
Brian, this patch both works for and looks good to me (not sure what
upstream thinks of it). Thanks.
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** Information type changed from Private to Public
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Title:
ifup crashed with SIGSEGV in main()
Status in ifupdown
** Also affects: libpng (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: libpng (Ubuntu Wily)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: libpng (Ubuntu Vivid)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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This was assigned CVE-2015-8768, see http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-
security/2016/01/12/8
** CVE added: http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-
bin/cvename.cgi?name=2015-8768
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I've pushed a version of binutils that in local testing fixes the
segfault in objcopy on pecoff binaries, addressing the sbsigntool FTBFS,
to the ubuntu-security-proposed ppa https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-
security-proposed/+archive/ubuntu/ppa/+packages . If people could test
these to confirm and
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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Yes, my apologies, the upstream libc fixes for CVE-2014-9761 did some
reworking of functions to eliminate some repeated vulnerable code, using
internal functions to do the work instead. Unfortunately, this did
introduce new function references between libc and libm, causing the
problems seen
This was disclosed in the whitepaper referenced in
https://www.nccgroup.trust/us/about-us/newsroom-and-
events/blog/2016/june/abusing-privileged-and-unprivileged-linux-
containers/ (written by the reporter), so there's no need for this bug
report to stay private.
** Information type changed from
Mathieu Trudel-Lapierre identified that the segfault is result of the patch
binutils-bz17512-misc.patch (aka
https://sourceware.org/git/gitweb.cgi?p=binutils-gdb.git;a=commit;h=32a9d621c3c480aa093a089a36e36c35f68a4010
). I've dug deeper into this and the issue is that stack gets corrupted in
Blinker (and anyone else), I have eglibc/glibc packages available in the
ubuntu-security-proposed ppa https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-security-
proposed/+archive/ubuntu/ppa that revert the problematic fix that added
references from the libm library to the new symbols, while keeping the
added
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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** Description changed:
- A kernel bug in user namespaces allows root in a container to ptrace
- host-root-owned tasks during a window of opportunity during lxc-attach /
- 'lxc exec', before they drop privilege by doing setuid to the container
- root uid.
+ ** DISPUTED ** kernel/ptrace.c in the
This was fixed in libav/precise in
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libav/+bug/980963 , closing
that task.
** Changed in: libav (Ubuntu Precise)
Status: Triaged => Fix Released
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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AF_UNSPEC is used in calls to getaddrinfo(3) to request either ipv4 or
ipv6 addresses. In the parser, we've been filtering out AF_UNSPEC as an
option. It's a simple enough patch to enable it:
Index: b/common/Make.rules
===
---
Thanks for reporting this. I have reported this upstream at
https://savannah.nongnu.org/bugs/index.php?47196 .
** Changed in: sysvinit (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Triaged
** Changed in: sysvinit (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided => Low
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Since it's not guaranteed that we'll ever get buildds booted into
kernels with the fix above, I'm proposing to disable -pie for bash. For
xenial, this will have no affect except for on s390x, as on all other
arches, pie is not the default anyway.
** Also affects: bash (Ubuntu)
Importance:
Thanks for taking the time to report this issue and help improve Ubuntu.
This specific issue is a duplicate of
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/webbrowser-app/+bug/1511439
which I believe has been addressed by the webbrowser-app package in
16.04.
However, I'm not marking it as such as it
Debdif to disable pie for bash builds
** Patch added: "bash_4.3-14ubuntu2.debdiff"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/linux/+bug/1518483/+attachment/4596747/+files/bash_4.3-14ubuntu2.debdiff
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Oh, I should point out, I aslo pushed this to the ubuntu-security-
proposed ppa https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-security-
proposed/+archive/ubuntu/ppa and that I've been using bash with this in
place for a couple of months now from my test pie build ppa.
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** Changed in: apparmor
Milestone: None => 2.11
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1210514
Title:
Default apache prefork profile doesn't allow chown
** Changed in: apparmor
Milestone: None => 2.11
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Title:
Apparmor Abstraction Prevents Firefox From Opening
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** Also affects: qa-regression-testing
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1528228
Title:
[ADT test failure]
I've verified that the the eglibc and glibc packages currently in
proposed (precise/2.15-0ubuntu10.14, trusty/2.19-0ubuntu6.8, and
wily/2.21-0ubuntu4.2) all trigger the reboot notification when
installing/upgrading.
(Note that these glibc updates are in proposed for wider testing before
being
** Also affects: glibc (Ubuntu Precise)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: eglibc (Ubuntu Precise)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: glibc (Ubuntu Trusty)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: eglibc (Ubuntu Trusty)
** Description changed:
** DISPUTED ** kernel/ptrace.c in the Linux kernel through 4.4.1
mishandles uid and gid mappings, which allows local users to gain
privileges by establishing a user namespace, waiting for a root process
to enter that namespace with an unsafe uid or gid, and then
)
Status: New => Invalid
** Changed in: gcc-4.8 (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Invalid
** Changed in: binutils (Ubuntu Trusty)
Status: New => In Progress
** Changed in: binutils (Ubuntu Trusty)
Assignee: (unassigned) => Steve Beattie (sbeattie)
** Changed in: gcc-4.8 (U
Public bug reported:
The version of gcc-4.8 in the 14.04 LTS release has a number of issues
that have been addressed in the gcc-4.8 SRU that landed in trusty-
updates. However, because they were not security related, it is not
available in the trusty-security pocket and thus not available to
I enabled the apparmor kernel debugging, and this is what shows up in
dmesg:
[ 3526.954133] AppArmor: unconfined exec no attachment
[ 3533.965480] AppArmor: unconfined attached to new label
[ 3533.965485] apparmor: clearing unsafe personality bits.
Okay, thanks to jj for providing kernels, I've now reproduced this in
zesty with his patch set applied.
It's failing in the 'confined/complain' tests. There's a bug in the
environ.c test that prevents the test harness from detecting/reporting
the failure correctly. When that's fixed, the output
On Thu, Feb 02, 2017 at 08:13:45AM -, John Johansen wrote:
> These kernels are working for me
The zesty 4.9.0 kernel (once I hacked around a problem I was having the
kernel modules not generating a working initrd) is solving the issue for
me, too.
Thanks John!
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Hi Colin,
stackprofile is just the last test in the for-loop, it's the make tests
target failing as a whole. It looks like for some reason the environ
test is failing.
What kernel are you running this on?
Thanks.
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Incomplete
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Okay. Can you attempt to run the environ test individually with
VERBOSE=1 set in the environment? e.g.:
$ sudo sh -c "VERBOSE=1 bash ./environ.sh"
ok: ENVIRON (elf): ux & regular env
ok: ENVIRON (elf): ux & sensitive env
ok: ENVIRON (elf): Ux & regular env
ok: ENVIRON (elf): Ux & sensitive env
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
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>From the dpkg terminal log, the error that's occurring is:
Processing triggers for initramfs-tools (0.103ubuntu4.7) ...
update-initramfs: Generating /boot/initrd.img-3.13.0-108-generic
E: /usr/share/initramfs-tools/hooks/casper-memdisk failed with return 1.
update-initramfs: failed for
Wily has reached end of support, closing as Won't Fix.
** Also affects: ntp (Ubuntu Xenial)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Changed in: ntp (Ubuntu Wily)
Status: New => Won't Fix
** Changed in: ntp (Ubuntu Xenial)
Status: New => Triaged
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Also, in order to run apt-get update, you will need to have
administrative privileges, usually gained through the sudo command, like
so:
sudo apt-get update
sudo apt-get upgrade
This should prompt you for your password, if your account is considered
to be an admin on this system.
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Thank you for using Ubuntu and taking the time to report a bug. Your
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better find the source of the bug and work to resolve it.
Submitting the bug about the proper source package is essential. For
help see
This seems to be the problem (from the dpkg terminal log):
Configurando click-apparmor (0.3.13.1) ...
Cannot start click due to a conflict with a different locally-installed Python
'click' package. Remove it using Python packaging tools and try again.
dpkg: erro ao processar o pacote
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
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Title:
package udev 229-4ubuntu10 failed to
** Information type changed from Private to Public
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Title:
systemd-resolved crashed with SIGABRT in
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Title:
systemd-resolved assert failure: *** Error in
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Title:
systemd-resolved crashed with SIGSEGV in
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Title:
systemd-journald crashed with SIGABRT in
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Title:
systemd-resolved crashed with SIGABRT in
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Title:
systemd-resolved crashed with SIGSEGV
Status in systemd
FYI, I've pushed xenial and yakkety systemd packages with Jorge's
proposed fix from https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/4237 in the
ubuntu-security-proposed ppa at https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-security-
proposed/+archive/ubuntu/ppa/ for people to test.
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CVE request: http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2016/09/28/9
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Title:
Assertion failure when PID 1 receives a
** Also affects: systemd (Ubuntu Xenial)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
** Also affects: systemd (Ubuntu Yakkety)
Importance: Undecided
Status: Confirmed
** Changed in: systemd (Ubuntu Xenial)
Status: New => Confirmed
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Martin, if you can point me at the xenial branch, we can push this
through the security pocket. I wanted to wait and see if there were any
further issues addressed (and to not release an update on a Friday).
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*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1598759 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1598759
This issue is a duplicate of bug 1598759, the rejection is due to the
dns resolver attempting to do lookups over dbus to systemd-resolved. If
you can, please test the fix in yakkety-proposed in the apparmor
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1598759 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1598759
Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
Ubuntu better. This particular bug has already been reported and is a
duplicate of bug 1598759, so it is being marked as such. Please
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1598759 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1598759
Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
Ubuntu better. This particular bug has already been reported and is a
duplicate of bug 1598759, so it is being marked as such. Please
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1598759 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1598759
Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
Ubuntu better. This particular bug has already been reported and is a
duplicate of bug 1598759, so it is being marked as such. Please
Thanks for taking the time to report your issue. In this case, the tools
you're highlighting do not use sudo, but instead use policykit-1 to
verify privileges. In order to require the root password instead of your
user's password to operate those utilities, you'll need to modify your
policykit
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
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Title:
Arbitrary code execution through crafted
it
Niraj, the binary package is named 'auditd', only the source package
name is 'audit'. You'll need to do 'apt-get install auditd' instead.
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** Changed in: apparmor
Milestone: None => 2.11
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Title:
Evince's Apparmour profile prevents opening docs from
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Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Similarly to bug 1654194, your problem seems to be:
Setting up libunity-scopes1.0:amd64 (1.0.7+16.10.20160921-0ubuntu2) ...
Cannot start click due to a conflict with a different locally-installed Python
'click' package. Remove it using Python packaging tools and try again.
dpkg: error
Your problem (from the DpkgTerminalLog) seems to be:
Cannot start click due to a conflict with a different locally-installed Python
'click' package. Remove it using Python packaging tools and try again.
dpkg: error processing package url-dispatcher:amd64 (--configure):
subprocess installed
Hi, thanks for reporting your issue. I think this is actually the fix
for CVE-2015-5180 (due to an internal ABI change around T_UNSPEC). I
have uploaded a test version of eglibc with the commit to address that
issue reverted to https://launchpad.net/~ubuntu-security-
proposed/+archive/ubuntu/ppa/
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