[Touch-packages] [Bug 2019496] Re: Security implications of SUDO_ASKPASS

2023-07-22 Thread Launchpad Bug Tracker
[Expired for sudo (Ubuntu) because there has been no activity for 60 days.] ** Changed in: sudo (Ubuntu) Status: Incomplete => Expired -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to sudo in Ubuntu.

[Touch-packages] [Bug 2019496] Re: Security implications of SUDO_ASKPASS

2023-05-23 Thread Marc Deslauriers
If an attacker can edit ~/.bashrc they can simply modify the path and point to a malicious sudo binary that does whatever it wants with the password. I don't think this is a SUDO_ASKPASS issue. If you disagree with our reasoning, it would be best to file this bug with the upstream sudo project

[Touch-packages] [Bug 2019496] Re: Security implications of SUDO_ASKPASS

2023-05-23 Thread Heinrich Schuchardt
Anything running in the user context can edit ~/.bashrc and set aliases. But with aliases you don't get root access. sudo goes to great lengths to ensure that the password is directly passed from the console and not passed through a pipe. SUDO_ASKPASS can circumvent this security. So this badly

[Touch-packages] [Bug 2019496] Re: Security implications of SUDO_ASKPASS

2023-05-17 Thread Seth Arnold
Hello Heinrich, I suspect once you can set aliases in shells used by people with sudo privileges, the game is already over regardless of environment variables used. Is there something I'm missing where setting aliases in someone else's shell is fine except for this variable? Thanks -- You

[Touch-packages] [Bug 2019496] Re: Security implications of SUDO_ASKPASS

2023-05-17 Thread Seth Arnold
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security -- You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to sudo in Ubuntu. https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2019496 Title: Security implications of SUDO_ASKPASS