[Touch-packages] [Bug 1839415] Re: Fully user controllable lock file due to lock file being located in world-writable directory

2019-10-30 Thread Francis Ginther 
** Tags added: id-5d640fd329dff226b88f059a

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https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1839415

Title:
  Fully user controllable lock file due to lock file being located in
  world-writable directory

Status in Apport:
  New
Status in apport package in Ubuntu:
  Fix Released

Bug description:
  Author: Sander Bos, 

  Date: 2019-07-30

  
  In data/apport, Apport creates a lock file:

   35 # create a lock file
   36 lockfile = os.path.join(apport.fileutils.report_dir, '.lock')
   37 try:
   38 fd = os.open(lockfile, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | 
os.O_NOFOLLOW)

  The value of "apport.fileutils.report_dir" is /var/crash/, which is a
  world-writable (but sticky) directory.

  Placing the lock file in a world-writable directory as done here
  effectively makes the lock file fully controllable by any user, at least
  as long as the lock file does not already exist, i.e., in case Apport has
  not been executed before (but a different issue exists which completely
  defeats this precondition).

  This issue can be exploited in several ways, with various impacts.

  Probably being its most severe impact, a simple shell one-liner like
  the following will lead to a complete system DoS, i.e., DoS on the OS
  resource level (e.g., memory):

 $ mkfifo /var/crash/.lock && while sleep 100 & do sleep 1; kill -11
  "$!"; kill -9 "$!"; done

  This will make the os.open() in data/apport stall forever due to the FIFO
  file, as well as create more than one and up to an indefinite amount of
  (root owned) Apport processes due to the failing of the locking mechanism,
  which should normally prevent subsequent Apport processes from running,
  because the lock is not yet set at that point.  The "kill -9" prevents
  the user from hitting its "RLIMIT_NPROC" limit, and "RLIMIT_CORE" itself
  does not apply to the root user.

  The locking mechanism failing when using a FIFO file, i.e., circumventing
  the locking mechanism thus making it possible to run more than one
  Apport process at the same time (even when they are in a stalled state)
  is an impact on its own, not just in the OS DoS scenario in which it is
  abused up to the point creating many Apport instances ultimately leading
  to OS DoS.

  Also, the issue in the first place leads to DoS for Apport both for
  individual instances as well as it as a service as a whole, i.e., making
  Apport unable to function, as one user could create a /var/crash/.lock
  FIFO file and prevent Apport from doing its work in case of program
  crashes of other users.

  This issue when used with a FIFO file can also be abused to "time"
  Apport, i.e., let Apport stall for some period of time (and do whatever
  is needed to control the further flow of Apport during that time, e.g.,
  as part of a larger exploit scenario) and have it continue at a specific,
  user defined moment by then reading out the FIFO file.

  As a different method of exploitation of this issue, a user can simply
  create /var/crash/.lock (as a regular file) and put an indefinite lock
  on it, thereby preventing Apport from succesfully doing its work, again
  leading to service DoS for Apport.  Apport DoS could also be achieved by
  for example creating /var/crash/.lock as a directory or as a socket file,
  meaning Apport can't os.open() /var/crash/.lock as a file, again making
  Apport fail (i.e., service DoS).

  The above scenarios prevent legitimate Apport processes from creating,
  opening and / or locking the lock file, leading to DoS for both invidual
  Apport instances as well as Apport as a whole, i.e., service DoS.

  Note that the impact of this issue might be even worse on systems without
  sysctl(8)'s "fs.protected_symlinks=1" set, which in default installations
  provides effective protection due to /var/crash/ being a sticky directory,
  or without "fs.protected_hardlinks=1" being set.

  Also note that, besides all of the impacts above due to /var/crash/
  being world-writable, /var/crash/ isn't a logical location to place a
  lock file to begin with; using a more appropriate location like /var/lock/
  would make more sense, and is also the proposed fix for this issue.

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/apport/+bug/1839415/+subscriptions

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[Touch-packages] [Bug 1839415] Re: Fully user controllable lock file due to lock file being located in world-writable directory

2019-10-30 Thread Alex Murray 
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security

-- 
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Touch seeded packages, which is subscribed to apport in Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1839415

Title:
  Fully user controllable lock file due to lock file being located in
  world-writable directory

Status in Apport:
  New
Status in apport package in Ubuntu:
  Fix Released

Bug description:
  Author: Sander Bos, 

  Date: 2019-07-30

  
  In data/apport, Apport creates a lock file:

   35 # create a lock file
   36 lockfile = os.path.join(apport.fileutils.report_dir, '.lock')
   37 try:
   38 fd = os.open(lockfile, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | 
os.O_NOFOLLOW)

  The value of "apport.fileutils.report_dir" is /var/crash/, which is a
  world-writable (but sticky) directory.

  Placing the lock file in a world-writable directory as done here
  effectively makes the lock file fully controllable by any user, at least
  as long as the lock file does not already exist, i.e., in case Apport has
  not been executed before (but a different issue exists which completely
  defeats this precondition).

  This issue can be exploited in several ways, with various impacts.

  Probably being its most severe impact, a simple shell one-liner like
  the following will lead to a complete system DoS, i.e., DoS on the OS
  resource level (e.g., memory):

 $ mkfifo /var/crash/.lock && while sleep 100 & do sleep 1; kill -11
  "$!"; kill -9 "$!"; done

  This will make the os.open() in data/apport stall forever due to the FIFO
  file, as well as create more than one and up to an indefinite amount of
  (root owned) Apport processes due to the failing of the locking mechanism,
  which should normally prevent subsequent Apport processes from running,
  because the lock is not yet set at that point.  The "kill -9" prevents
  the user from hitting its "RLIMIT_NPROC" limit, and "RLIMIT_CORE" itself
  does not apply to the root user.

  The locking mechanism failing when using a FIFO file, i.e., circumventing
  the locking mechanism thus making it possible to run more than one
  Apport process at the same time (even when they are in a stalled state)
  is an impact on its own, not just in the OS DoS scenario in which it is
  abused up to the point creating many Apport instances ultimately leading
  to OS DoS.

  Also, the issue in the first place leads to DoS for Apport both for
  individual instances as well as it as a service as a whole, i.e., making
  Apport unable to function, as one user could create a /var/crash/.lock
  FIFO file and prevent Apport from doing its work in case of program
  crashes of other users.

  This issue when used with a FIFO file can also be abused to "time"
  Apport, i.e., let Apport stall for some period of time (and do whatever
  is needed to control the further flow of Apport during that time, e.g.,
  as part of a larger exploit scenario) and have it continue at a specific,
  user defined moment by then reading out the FIFO file.

  As a different method of exploitation of this issue, a user can simply
  create /var/crash/.lock (as a regular file) and put an indefinite lock
  on it, thereby preventing Apport from succesfully doing its work, again
  leading to service DoS for Apport.  Apport DoS could also be achieved by
  for example creating /var/crash/.lock as a directory or as a socket file,
  meaning Apport can't os.open() /var/crash/.lock as a file, again making
  Apport fail (i.e., service DoS).

  The above scenarios prevent legitimate Apport processes from creating,
  opening and / or locking the lock file, leading to DoS for both invidual
  Apport instances as well as Apport as a whole, i.e., service DoS.

  Note that the impact of this issue might be even worse on systems without
  sysctl(8)'s "fs.protected_symlinks=1" set, which in default installations
  provides effective protection due to /var/crash/ being a sticky directory,
  or without "fs.protected_hardlinks=1" being set.

  Also note that, besides all of the impacts above due to /var/crash/
  being world-writable, /var/crash/ isn't a logical location to place a
  lock file to begin with; using a more appropriate location like /var/lock/
  would make more sense, and is also the proposed fix for this issue.

To manage notifications about this bug go to:
https://bugs.launchpad.net/apport/+bug/1839415/+subscriptions

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More help   : https://help.launchpad.net/ListHelp