[twitter-dev] Re: Privacy issues with the proposed annotations feature

2010-04-19 Thread alexro
Brian,

not to ignore privacy issues but just to simplify the situation a
bit ...
What currently protects a user from a malicious (desktop) application
stealing all kinds of user data via submitting tweets through it's
proxy? And even by submitting such information directly to it's
website?

On Apr 19, 2:03 am, Raffi Krikorian ra...@twitter.com wrote:
  Right now the web UI exposes every piece of metadata in a tweet to
  end-users. That is, an end-user can use twitter.com to check the complete
  contents of tweet sent by an application. I didn’t see anything in the
  proposals regarding the annotation feature that says that users will be able
  to see all the annotations through the web UI. And, even if they could see
  them, chances are they couldn’t understand them. And, even if end-users
  could understand them, applications will be able to use encryption and other
  obfuscation to make them impossible to interpret. This reduces the amount of
  control users have over their tweets.

 this wasn't always true -- there was a period where the web client showed no
 geo information at all.  geo was an API only feature.  at current time, it
 is still a bit unknown how the twitter.com webclient will utilize
 annotations (just like its unknown how the ecosystem will utilize
 annotations).

  I think there must be some kind of control mechanism in place for
  annotations, or the web UI must present all the annotations of a user’s
  tweets to that user, or both, in order to prevent the annotations feature
  from becoming a side channel for applications to communicate users’ private
  information without users’ knowledge or consent. I would like to know more
  about how this is going to be done.

 at this point, we're not planning to have any elaborate control mechanisms
 over annotations, however, your point of being able to use twitter.com as a
 debugging interface is an interesting one.

 --
 Raffi Krikorian
 Twitter Platform Teamhttp://twitter.com/raffi

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[twitter-dev] Re: Privacy issues with the proposed annotations feature

2010-04-19 Thread Orian Marx (@orian)
I think Brian brings up some interesting points. What this reminds me
of is the machine identification codes secretly being including in
every page printed by personal use printers ( EFF article here:
http://www.eff.org/wp/investigating-machine-identification-code-technology-color-laser-printers
). Annotations could potentially be used to add a lot of tracking
information users might not be happy with. What happens when a
developer decides to attach the user's OAuth info to their tweets for
whatever dumb reason?

I think these are interesting questions, though I'm not sure Twitter
can do too much about them in advance without severely restricting
what annotations has the potential for. Twitter is taking a wait-and-
see approach to what developers do with annotations and I think that
it probably the right one for now.

@orian

On Apr 18, 8:23 pm, Brian Smith br...@briansmith.org wrote:
 Right now the web UI exposes every piece of metadata in a tweet to
 end-users. That is, an end-user can use twitter.com to check the complete
 contents of tweet sent by an application. I didn't see anything in the
 proposals regarding the annotation feature that says that users will be able
 to see all the annotations through the web UI. And, even if they could see
 them, chances are they couldn't understand them. And, even if end-users
 could understand them, applications will be able to use encryption and other
 obfuscation to make them impossible to interpret. This reduces the amount of
 control users have over their tweets.

 Right now an application cannot disclose the user's location in a tweet,
 except by putting the location information in the tweet text (which the user
 can see very clearly), or by putting the location information in the
 built-in geo feature. The ability for applications to expose the user's
 information is controlled by a preference that can be controlled only by the
 official web interface on twitter.com. However, with the annotations
 feature, applications will be able to expose the user's location-again,
 possibly encrypted or otherwise obfuscated-even when application access to
 the location feature is disabled. It doesn't make sense to disable an
 applications' access to the geo feature and then let it silently and
 undetectably disclose the user's location-perhaps in even more detail than
 the built-in geo feature allows.

 I think there must be some kind of control mechanism in place for
 annotations, or the web UI must present all the annotations of a user's
 tweets to that user, or both, in order to prevent the annotations feature
 from becoming a side channel for applications to communicate users' private
 information without users' knowledge or consent. I would like to know more
 about how this is going to be done.

 Thanks,

 Brian

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RE: [twitter-dev] Re: Privacy issues with the proposed annotations feature

2010-04-19 Thread Brian Smith
Alexro wrote:
 not to ignore privacy issues but just to simplify the situation a bit ...
 What currently protects a user from a malicious (desktop) application
stealing all
 kinds of user data via submitting tweets through it's proxy? And even by
 submitting such information directly to it's website?

That is a very good point. It is an unsolved problem that affects nearly all
installable software, and that is a problem that needs to be solved at the
operating system level. iPhone OS and the upcoming Windows 7 Phone do have
measures to protect against that kind of data theft and inadvertent
information disclosure; in fact, basically all of the API limitations in
Windows 7 Phone (no background apps, no access to the user's personal
information, warnings about GPS usage) can be traced back to privacy
protection. Similarly, even in desktop Windows, access to PIM information
(email and contacts in particular) is severely restricted with the official
APIs.

Location is a different because Twitter has special privacy protections for
its geo feature, including technical limitations that control whether
applications may use it, and a way to remove the location information from
tweets after the fact. I don't think it makes sense to have a lock for the
built-in location feature and at the same time allow applications to use
annotations to disclose the same (or even more precise) location information
regardless of that lock. If you can trust applications not to disclose
location information via annotations without the user's consent, why can't
you trust those same applications to not use the built-in geo feature
without the user's consent? If an application isn't trusted enough to be
able to flip the geo switch, why should it be trusted to not disclose the
user's location in a different way without the user's consent? At least with
the built-in geo feature, there is a built-in mechanism for the user to
remove the geo annotations, unlike other annotations.

It is the same deal with Twitter XAuth and website-only functionality. A
malicious Twitter XAuth application has full access to everything in the
user's account because it has the user's password. Meanwhile, the API
doesn't expose useful actions (sign up, approve followers, change password,
read email address) in an effort to prevent malicious applications from
using that functionality. But, of course, malicious applications don't
*need* any official API at all to perform those actions.

My conclusion is that the API restrictions punish well-behaved applications
due to fear that they may be malicious, but they don't actually prevent any
unwanted behavior by applications that actually are malicious. This is
something that Raffi touched on when he blogged about how he thinks that
every OAuth approval should be going through the Twitter website (i.e. no
Twitter XAuth). The annotations feature would compound that problem in a way
that can't be solved by disabling Twitter XAuth access to applications.

(Note that Twitter XAuth is different from, xauth.org XAuth.)

Regards,
Brian



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