For context, this change was introduced in
https://ubuntu.com/security/notices/USN-6719-2
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2064685
Title:
write says write: effective gid does not match
Thanks for reporting this issue - but it is strange since this update
has been published since 2024-02-27 and this is the first such report of
any issues.
Also given this update has been available for nearly 2 months it is
surprising you are seeing errors from it so much later - I wonder if
There should not be much risk of regression - this feature was only
supported on samba in mantic, not jammy etc so not many users will
upgrade from mantic to noble - and the current behaviour where this is
broken in noble is the same behaviour as we have in jammy etc. And then
even for users
Forwarded to debian in https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-
bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1069661
** Bug watch added: Debian Bug tracker #1069661
https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=1069661
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to
** Patch added: "samba_4.19.5+dfsg-4ubuntu9.1.debdiff"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/samba/+bug/2063079/+attachment/5769340/+files/samba_4.19.5+dfsg-4ubuntu9.1.debdiff
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
Public bug reported:
In mantic, the smbd.service unit file contained the line:
ExecStartPre=/usr/share/samba/update-apparmor-samba-profile
As such, the associated AppArmor profile for smbd etc would be
automatically updated to include permissions for the various shares etc
on the local files
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. Since the package referred to in this bug is in universe or
multiverse, it is community maintained. If you are able, I suggest
coordinating with upstream and posting a debdiff for this issue. When a
debdiff is
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. Since the package referred to in this bug is in universe or
multiverse, it is community maintained. If you are able, I suggest
coordinating with upstream and posting a debdiff for this issue. When a
debdiff is
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. Your bug report is more likely to get attention if it is made in
English, since this is the language understood by the majority of Ubuntu
developers. Additionally, please only mark a bug as "security" if it
shows
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. Since the package referred to in this bug is in universe or
multiverse, it is community maintained. If you are able, I suggest
coordinating with upstream and posting a debdiff for this issue. When a
debdiff is
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
I reviewed msgraph 0.2.1-0ubuntu3 as checked into noble. This shouldn't be
considered a full audit but rather a quick gauge of maintainability.
msgraph is a library written in C using the glib, libgoa, and libsoup
for providing access to the Microsoft Graph API services.
- CVE History
- None
Public bug reported:
After installing recent updates in 24.04, upon logging in the gnome-
shell based UI pops up saying that the login keyring was not unlocked
and asking for the users password to be input to unlock it.
Similarly a second, non-gnome-shell based UI is also present asking the
same
Given this has been reverted in Debian, it should not be synced into
Ubuntu.
** Changed in: xz-utils (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Won't Fix
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2059417
Ok whilst I still can't see the /StatusNotifierItem object listed via
d-feet I can reproduce the denials when launching element-desktop so I
have added some additional changes to the aforementioned PR which
resolve these as well. With all the changes from that PR in place all of
these mentioned
Ah although it seems I can reboot the VM at this point and whilst
Calamares appeared to run again again in the rebooted vm if I choose
Install Calamares closes and I see the installed kubuntu environment -
weird
Anyway I think I will be able to use this to debug the original issue
further -
The subsequent error is:
Main script file /usr/lib/x86_64-linux-
gnu/calamares/modules/automirror/main.py for python job automirror
raised an exception.
Is there any way I can debug this further?
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is
Yes I hit that exact issue in Calamares but after fixing it I then hit
another similar crash in a different script in calamares - will see if I
can reproduce and provide you with details.
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to
So I installed kubuntu-desktop on an up-to-date noble VM and then after
logging into the kubuntu session I was able to reproduce the issue for
Notifications but I couldn't see anything owning the /StatusNotifierItem
dbus path.
For notifications I submitted
Public bug reported:
Latest upstream release
https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/releases/v4.0.0-beta3
Contains only bug fixes since 4.0.0-beta2 which is currently in noble-
proposed thus does not require a FFe.
** Affects: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Importance: Undecided
Status: New
> Log: apparmor="DENIED" operation="dbus_method_call" bus="session"
path="/org/freedesktop/DBus" interface="org.freedesktop.DBus"
member="ListActivatableNames" mask="send" name="org.freedesktop.DBus"
pid=2950 label="snap.element-desktop.element-desktop"
peer_label="unconfined"
This is provided by
Uploaded to noble-proposed yesterday
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/apparmor/4.0.0~beta2-0ubuntu3
** Changed in: apparmor (Ubuntu)
Status: Triaged => Fix Committed
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2056458
Title:
upgrade to thunderbird snap, missing snapd depdency
To manage notifications
Ah fair enough ;)
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2055761
Title:
tracker-extract-3 crashed with SIGSYS in epoll_wait()
To manage notifications about this bug go to:
> Why do we keep having to fix these crashes one by one over such a long
period of time?
In this case I think this is a consequence of the allow-list nature of
the seccomp filters - as glibc changes to implement various functions
via different primitive system calls / or the kernel changes to add
As per
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/fontconfig/fontconfig/-/issues/409#note_2298588
this can also be fixed by adding an additional rule to
/etc/fonts/conf.d/70-no-bitmaps.conf of the form:
false
** Bug watch added: gitlab.freedesktop.org/fontconfig/fontconfig/-/issues #409
Relevant upstream issue https://github.com/fail2ban/fail2ban/issues/3487
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2055114
Title:
fail2ban is broken in 24.04 Noble
To manage notifications
So whilst in Ubuntu we do have python-pyasyncore which provides
asyncore, we don't have asynchat so this might need to be packaged
separately OR vendored into fail2ban
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
asynchat was removed in python 3.12, which just became the default
python3 in 24.04
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public
** Bug watch added: github.com/fail2ban/fail2ban/issues #3487
https://github.com/fail2ban/fail2ban/issues/3487
--
You received this bug
Turns out clamav-1.0.0 includes a transition from libclamav9 ->
libclamav11 so this is taking a bit longer than expected - but I will
keep plugging away.
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to the bug report.
Looking at the upstream repo for clamav I suspect the following commit
is required to be backported to clamav in lunar
https://github.com/Cisco-
Talos/clamav/commit/375ecf678c714623e6fb5c0119d1bec98dc700dd - or that a
merge is done of clamav-1.0.0+dfsg-6 to lunar.
The merge is likely the best
FWIW I can't reproduce this on a debian sid install of clamav which also
uses the same version of libtfm / tomsfastmath. However, Debian is using
a newer version of clamav than Ubuntu 23.04 so perhaps this may be fixed
by merging that version to Ubuntu (or perhaps even a no-change rebuild
of
This crash seems to be from libtfm
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to the bug report.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/2003864
Title:
freshclam assert failure: *** stack smashing detected ***: terminated
To manage
FWIW I was able to get the following backtrace from this crash:
(gdb) bt full
#0 s_fp_sub (a=0x7ffe3ea481a0, b=, c=0x7ffe3ea481a0) at
src/addsub/s_fp_sub.c:30
x =
oldbused =
oldused = 483582409
t =
#1 0x7fa0134db9e1 in fp_add (a=a@entry=0x7ffe3ea48640,
Thanks I have updated the status of this CVE in the Ubuntu CVE tracker.
** Changed in: tar (Ubuntu)
Status: Triaged => Fix Released
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to the bug report.
** Description changed:
Intel released version 20220510 / IPU 2022.1 earlier in May to address
multiple vulnerabilities, including:
- - CVE-2022-21151, INTEL-SA-00617
- - CVE-2021-0146, INTEL-SA-00528
- - CVE-2021-0127, INTEL-SA-00532
+ - CVE-2022-21151, INTEL-SA-00617
+
** Changed in: intel-microcode (Ubuntu Bionic)
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: intel-microcode (Ubuntu Focal)
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: intel-microcode (Ubuntu Impish)
Status: New => Fix Committed
** Changed in: intel-microcode (Ubuntu Jammy)
Public bug reported:
Intel released version 20220510 / IPU 2022.1 earlier in May to address
multiple vulnerabilities, including:
- CVE-2022-21151, INTEL-SA-00617
- CVE-2021-0146, INTEL-SA-00528
- CVE-2021-0127, INTEL-SA-00532
This version is already packaged in Ubuntu 22.10
Removing ubuntu-security-sponsors since there is no debdiff to sponsor.
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to the bug report.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1970228
Title:
Multiple vulnerabilities in Bionic, Focal and Jammy
To
Setting impish to Incomplete since there is no debdiff to sponsor at
this stage.
** Changed in: subversion (Ubuntu Impish)
Status: New => Incomplete
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to the bug report.
FYI I have rebuilt the version of bacula for jammy in a PPA -
https://launchpad.net/~alexmurray/+archive/ubuntu/lp1973322 - if anyone
could give this a test and let me know how it works for you, then we can
look at trying to release it via an SRU. Thanks.
--
You received this bug notification
I reviewed libfreeaptx 0.1.1-1ubuntu1 as checked into kinetic. This
shouldn't be considered a full audit but rather a quick gauge of
maintainability.
libfreeaptx is an implementation of the audio processing technology
(aptX) codec. It is a fork of the libopenatpx library (which is in
universe) -
@mardy I thought we had snapd.apparmor specifically to avoid this
scenario but I can't see that service mentioned at all in systemd-
analyze plot...
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
Thanks for the updated patches - they look a lot better. Note, one thing
we try and do is to add references to the patch files to indicate where
they came from as per https://dep-team.pages.debian.net/deps/dep3/ - as
an example see the update in
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
Ubuntu better. Unfortunately we can't fix it, because your description
didn't include enough information. You may find it helpful to read 'How
to report bugs effectively'
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/bugs.html.
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
As can be seen at
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/bacula/+publishinghistory bacula
was removed from Ubuntu during the jammy development cycle as it failed
to compile:
> FTBFS, removed from Debian testing, blocks libssl transition; Debian
bug #997139
The process to get this back into jammy
doko can you please provide more details on why you think this should be
done in dpkg instead of gcc (as we have done for almost all the other
hardening options)? As Kees says, adding it to gcc means not only does
this benefit Ubuntu archive packages, but also any software which is
built on a
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
I believe this is caused by debootstrap - it only uses packages from the
release pocket (and this is frozen from the time Ubuntu 20.04 LTS was
originally released). This is a known issue
https://askubuntu.com/questions/744684/latest-security-updates-with-
debootstrap but I am not sure if there is
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
I am not sure I agree with the statement that this is "harmless" for the
user service to be running if remote desktop sharing is not enabled - on
my jammy system I can see the RDP port open thanks to gnome-remote-
desktop:
$ ss -tlp | grep gnome-remote
LISTEN 0 10
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. Your bug report is more likely to get attention if it is made in
English, since this is the language understood by the majority of Ubuntu
developers. Additionally, please only mark a bug as "security" if it
shows
+1 from the Security team on this - looks like a good easy win for
security with no overhead or other impact from what I can see.
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1972043
Title:
Please
I uploaded
https://launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/libseccomp/2.5.4-1ubuntu1 earlier
today.
** Changed in: libseccomp (Ubuntu)
Status: New => Fix Committed
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thank you for using Ubuntu and taking the time to report a bug. Your
report should contain, at a minimum, the following information so we can
better find the source of the bug and work to resolve it.
Submitting the bug about the proper source package is essential. For
help see
Thank you for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make
Ubuntu better. Unfortunately we can't fix it, because your description
didn't include enough information. You may find it helpful to read 'How
to report bugs effectively'
http://www.chiark.greenend.org.uk/~sgtatham/bugs.html.
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
Yep with this patch applied I can no longer reproduce the crash and the
valgrind output is clean - have just uploaded this as 2.9.4-1ubuntu1 to
jammy-proposed.
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
Ok so this looks to be the same as https://github.com/storaged-
project/udisks/pull/926 which was fixed upstream - and according to the
comment there causes exactly the type of issue we are seeing:
"leading to memory corruption causing random failures of further atexit
handlers such as cryptsetup
Sadly running it under valgrind doesn't detect this memory corruption -
we see an invalid memory read on shutdown but that is all:
$ sudo valgrind /usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd
==567833== Memcheck, a memory error detector
==567833== Copyright (C) 2002-2017, and GNU GPL'd, by Julian Seward et al.
I can reproduce this by just running `sudo systemctl restart
udisks2.service` - will see if I can perhaps run it under valgrind and
see where the memory corruption is happening.
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
** Information type changed from Private Security to Public Security
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1968043
Title:
Open CVE-2021-4048 with critical severity
To manage notifications
Thank you for using Ubuntu and taking the time to report a bug. Your
report should contain, at a minimum, the following information so we can
better find the source of the bug and work to resolve it.
Submitting the bug about the proper source package is essential. For
help see
Thanks for the heads up @jdstrand - I am seeing this too - I also have
one more - fsetid:
$ journalctl -b0 -t audit --grep DENIED.*snap-confine
Apr 06 08:48:06 graphene audit[3733]: AVC apparmor="DENIED" operation="capable"
profile="/usr/lib/snapd/snap-confine" pid=3733 comm="snap-confine"
Nice - thanks @sdeziel
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1452115
Title:
Python interpreter binary is not compiled as PIE
To manage notifications about this bug go to:
I reviewed python-xmlschema 1.4.2-1 as checked into jammy. This shouldn't
be considered a full audit but rather a quick gauge of maintainability.
python-xmlschema is a python package which provides XML schema support to
allow XML schemas to be parsed/loaded and queried etc. It also allow XML
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1964442 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1964442
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1964442
[jammy][regression] gnome-shell PolicyKit password prompt sends
keys to the terminal
--
You received this bug notification because you are a
Public bug reported:
As per LP: #1452115 enabling the python interpreter to be compiled as a
position independent executable (PIE) has been a long standing request
for Ubuntu. Various testing[1] has shown this to have a minimal
performance impact for amd64. However, due to ongoing concerns around
Thanks @doko :)
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1452115
Title:
Python interpreter binary is not compiled as PIE
To manage notifications about this bug go to:
I reviewed nftables 1.0.2-1ubuntu1 as checked into jammy. This shouldn't
be considered a full audit but rather a quick gauge of maintainability.
nftables is a replacement for iptables etc - it provides userspace tooling
to control the Netfilter packet classification system within the Linux
Attaching the updated debdiff in case we do decide we want this (even in
the broken state)
** Patch added: "nftables_1.0.2-1ubuntu2.debdiff"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/nftables/+bug/1966017/+attachment/5572129/+files/nftables_1.0.2-1ubuntu2.debdiff
--
You received this bug
Turns out I wasn't looking closely enough at the autopkgtest logs from
my local testing - I was trying to run the tests with the pre-built
binary packages and whilst it would indicate the internaltest-py.sh
tests were passing, they were actually completely failing without any
error indication:
** Patch added: "nftables_1.0.2-1ubuntu2.debdiff"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/nftables/+bug/1966017/+attachment/5572061/+files/nftables_1.0.2-1ubuntu2.debdiff
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
Public bug reported:
Currently the upstream python-based testsuite for nftables is disabled
in the autopkgtests in debian/tests/control as follows:
# Disable test until we decide what to do with the nftables python module
#Tests: internaltest-py.sh
#Depends: @, python
#Restrictions: needs-root,
Upstream bug filed https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-
shell/-/issues/5242
** Bug watch added: gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-shell/-/issues #5242
https://gitlab.gnome.org/GNOME/gnome-shell/-/issues/5242
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is
I personally don't think this should be low priority - this affects any
application which ends up causing the gnome shell prompt dialog to
appear - so in my case when reading my email and opening a GPG encrypted
email I get prompted for my GPG passphrase - whilst this is happening my
email client
Public bug reported:
Recently I have noticed that when I am being prompted for the passphrase
for to unlock a GPG/SSH key via the gnome-shell prompter, whilst the
prompt is visible the requesting window seems to get spammed by input -
this can be reproduced via running the following (but replace
If it is not clear from the video - watch the terminal window in the
background when the prompt for the passphrase appears - it keeps
scrolling as though getting input by newlines all the time - and this
then persists even after the prompt is dismissed until I manually
provide some input myself.
This looks to be the same as LP: #1955758
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1964532
Title:
/usr/libexec/udisks2/udisksd:malloc_consolidate(): unaligned fastbin
chunk detected
To
See attached - it looks like the crash happens during shutdown - see
line 11443
** Attachment added: "journalctl-udisks-crash.log.gz"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/udisks2/+bug/1964532/+attachment/5571201/+files/journalctl-udisks-crash.log.gz
** Changed in: udisks2 (Ubuntu)
*** This bug is a duplicate of bug 1964923 ***
https://bugs.launchpad.net/bugs/1964923
** This bug has been marked a duplicate of bug 1964923
list-oem-metapackages crashed with AttributeError in
packages_for_modalias(): 'Cache' object has no attribute 'packages'
--
You received this bug
Thanks for taking the time to report this bug and helping to make Ubuntu
better. We appreciate the difficulties you are facing, but this appears
to be a "regular" (non-security) bug. I have unmarked it as a security
issue since this bug does not show evidence of allowing attackers to
cross
The priority of this bug is Low but since Wayland is now the default
session this means chromium runs via XWayland and then when doing
window/screen sharing on say Google Meet I can only share windows which
are also using XWayland, not native ones - which is the majority of the
rest of the
I have proposed a fix for this upstream -
https://gitlab.com/apparmor/apparmor/-/merge_requests/861 - once that is
reviewed then we can include the fix in jammy.
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is subscribed to Ubuntu.
** Patch added: "squid-deb-proxy_0.8.15+nmu1ubuntu2.debdiff"
https://bugs.launchpad.net/ubuntu/+source/squid-deb-proxy/+bug/1963590/+attachment/5565432/+files/squid-deb-proxy_0.8.15+nmu1ubuntu2.debdiff
--
You received this bug notification because you are a member of Ubuntu
Bugs, which is
Public bug reported:
squid-deb-proxy comes with the existing ppa.launchpad.net entry
commented out in mirror-dstdomain.acl.d/10-default but does not include
the new ppa.launchpadcontent.net that also supports https -
https://blog.launchpad.net/ppa/new-domain-names-for-ppas
ProblemType: Bug
@ahayzen - thanks for the impish debdiff - I was going to sponsor it but
I notice you have used a separate set of patches than those linked to by
debian and NVD for CVE-2022-21682 - does this also need:
https://github.com/flatpak/flatpak/commit/445bddeee657fdc8d2a0a1f0de12975400d4fc1a
?
Also
1 - 100 of 1161 matches
Mail list logo
