This bug was fixed in the package linux-kvm - 4.4.0-1026.31
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linux-kvm (4.4.0-1026.31) xenial; urgency=medium
* Xenial update to 4.4.118 stable release (LP: #1756866)
- kvm: [config] Add CONFIG_DST_CACHE=y
* getlogin will fail to open /proc/self/loginuid (LP: #1770245)
- Config: Enable CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL
[ Ubuntu: 4.4.0-127.153 ]
* CVE-2018-3639 (powerpc)
- powerpc/pseries: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
- powerpc/powernv: Support firmware disable of RFI flush
- powerpc/rfi-flush: Move the logic to avoid a redo into the debugfs code
- powerpc/rfi-flush: Make it possible to call setup_rfi_flush() again
- powerpc/rfi-flush: Always enable fallback flush on pseries
- powerpc/rfi-flush: Differentiate enabled and patched flush types
- powerpc/rfi-flush: Call setup_rfi_flush() after LPM migration
- powerpc/pseries: Add new H_GET_CPU_CHARACTERISTICS flags
- powerpc: Add security feature flags for Spectre/Meltdown
- powerpc/pseries: Set or clear security feature flags
- powerpc/powernv: Set or clear security feature flags
- powerpc/64s: Move cpu_show_meltdown()
- powerpc/64s: Enhance the information in cpu_show_meltdown()
- powerpc/powernv: Use the security flags in pnv_setup_rfi_flush()
- powerpc/pseries: Use the security flags in pseries_setup_rfi_flush()
- powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v1()
- powerpc/64s: Wire up cpu_show_spectre_v2()
- powerpc/pseries: Fix clearing of security feature flags
- powerpc: Move default security feature flags
- powerpc/pseries: Restore default security feature flags on setup
- SAUCE: powerpc/64s: Add support for a store forwarding barrier at kernel
entry/exit
* CVE-2018-3639 (x86)
- SAUCE: Clean up IBPB and IBRS control functions and macros
- SAUCE: Fix up IBPB and IBRS kernel parameters documentation
- SAUCE: Remove #define X86_FEATURE_PTI
- x86/cpufeature: Move some of the scattered feature bits to x86_capability
- x86/cpufeature: Cleanup get_cpu_cap()
- x86/cpu: Probe CPUID leaf 6 even when cpuid_level == 6
- x86/cpufeatures: Add CPUID_7_EDX CPUID leaf
- x86/cpufeatures: Add Intel feature bits for Speculation Control
- SAUCE: x86/kvm: Expose SPEC_CTRL from the leaf
- x86/cpufeatures: Add AMD feature bits for Speculation Control
- x86/msr: Add definitions for new speculation control MSRs
- SAUCE: x86/msr: Rename MSR spec control feature bits
- x86/pti: Do not enable PTI on CPUs which are not vulnerable to Meltdown
- x86/cpufeature: Blacklist SPEC_CTRL/PRED_CMD on early Spectre v2
microcodes
- x86/speculation: Add basic IBPB (Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier)
support
- x86/speculation: Add dependency
- x86/cpufeatures: Clean up Spectre v2 related CPUID flags
- x86/cpuid: Fix up "virtual" IBRS/IBPB/STIBP feature bits on Intel
- SAUCE: x86/speculation: Move vendor specific IBRS/IBPB control code
- SAUCE: x86: Add alternative_msr_write
- SAUCE: x86/nospec: Simplify alternative_msr_write()
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Concentrate bug detection into a separate function
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Concentrate bug reporting into a separate function
- arch: Introduce post-init read-only memory
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Read SPEC_CTRL MSR during boot and re-use reserved bits
- SAUCE: x86/bugs, KVM: Support the combination of guest and host IBRS
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Expose /sys/../spec_store_bypass
- SAUCE: x86/cpufeatures: Add X86_FEATURE_RDS
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Provide boot parameters for the spec_store_bypass_disable
mitigation
- SAUCE: x86/bugs/intel: Set proper CPU features and setup RDS
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Whitelist allowed SPEC_CTRL MSR values
- SAUCE: x86/bugs/AMD: Add support to disable RDS on Fam[15,16,17]h if
requested
- SAUCE: x86/KVM/VMX: Expose SPEC_CTRL Bit(2) to the guest
- SAUCE: x86/speculation: Create spec-ctrl.h to avoid include hell
- SAUCE: prctl: Add speculation control prctls
- x86/process: Optimize TIF checks in __switch_to_xtra()
- SAUCE: x86/process: Allow runtime control of Speculative Store Bypass
- SAUCE: x86/speculation: Add prctl for Speculative Store Bypass mitigation
- SAUCE: nospec: Allow getting/setting on non-current task
- SAUCE: proc: Provide details on speculation flaw mitigations
- SAUCE: seccomp: Enable speculation flaw mitigations
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Honour SPEC_CTRL default
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Make boot modes __ro_after_init
- SAUCE: prctl: Add force disable speculation
- SAUCE: seccomp: Use PR_SPEC_FORCE_DISABLE
- selftest/seccomp: Fix the flag name SECCOMP_FILTER_FLAG_TSYNC
- SAUCE: seccomp: Add filter flag to opt-out of SSB mitigation
- SAUCE: seccomp: Move speculation migitation control to arch code
- SAUCE: x86/speculation: Make "seccomp" the default mode for Speculative
Store Bypass
- SAUCE: x86/bugs: Rename _RDS
