During the campaigns for the December 1980 elections, on candidate, Yoweri Museveni repeatedly said that if UPC won the elections, he would go to the bush.
That was a lie.
Museveni had been planning to go to the bush all the time. He had been training his own troops as Minister of Defence and placing them in units across the country.
His brother Salim Saleh, for example, was in Moroto barracks. So, immediately we came into government, Museveni launched the war. Although he claims to have begun with only 27 people, he actually began with many more than that – even in excess of 2,000 rebels.
However, our first priority as government was to deliver the promises in our election manifesto. Remember that it is only the UPC, which produced a manifesto in the 1980 campaign. The promises in the manifesto were reduced into a government programme, The Rehabilitation Programme.
Later Museveni plagiarised
our
program, renamed it the Recovery Programme in May 1987.
First, we withdrew the army from the streets of Kampala and thereby reduced insecurity in the city.
For security, we wanted to depend on the Ugandan Police; they were rather thin on the ground. But we depended on them to some extent and we reduced the scare of killings in Kampala.
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| I AM NOT RESPONSIBLE: Obote says under his administration, all those who committed atrocities were arrested and punished (Monitor photo). |
The killings were at a time when we had the Uganda army and police and the Tanzanian army and Police were all in Kampala. Fortunately President Nyerere withdrew Tanzania Police and then later he withdrew the Tanzanian army.
Muwanga wanted Tanzanian army to remain. I was not too sure. Muwanga travelled to Tanzania to plead with President Nyerere to leave the Tanzanian army, the president refused.
When I travelled to North Korea, I asked Kim III Sung for assistance. He gave some arms, the Katushka, and some instructors to train our army. We now prepared to follow Museveni in the bush and defeat him there.
By the time of the coup in 1985, Museveni had been so thoroughly defeated that he personally ran away to Sweden while what remained of his insurgents fl
ed to
Toro.
I was contacted by the government of Zaire and told that some Ugandans had entered their territory. I was in the process of negotiating with President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire to hand them over to UNHCR when Bazilio Okello, Tito Okello and other senior Acholi officers in the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) begun colluding to overthrow the government.
There is one accusation that has dominated all debate about my second administration, and that is the killings of innocent civilians in Luweero.
Although a lot of propaganda has been written accusing my government of orchestrating these massacres, the truth is that it was Museveni who is responsible. Museveni is a killer.
That is exactly what he has been doing in Gulu, in Kitgum, in Lira, in Pader, in Soroti, in Katakwi, Bundibugyo and Kichwamba for the last 19 years. Museveni would dress some of his insurgents in official army uniform and send them to attack villages, kill people so that
the
villagers would think it was the army.
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| SUPPORTERS AT A UPC RALLY: Obote says that after the 1980 elections, the government had reduced on the insecurity in Kampala (File photo). |
Then he would send another group of his insurgents wearing rags and would go to the ransacked village and say, “What has happened? It is the UNLA doing that. If you stay here they will kill all of you. Please come with us and we will protect you.”
I have hundreds and hundreds of testimonies from many families in Luwero who came to visit us at our home in Kololo when I was still president.
All of them told us these stories. I am very happy that Museveni’s own senior colleagues in the struggle have begun to boast about these killings.
At the burial of Adonia Tiberondwa recently, Maj. Gen. Kahinda Otafiire, for example, revealed that the National Resistance Army (NRA) rebels used to wear UPC colours and then go into villages in Luweero and kill people in order to make the people think these were actions of the UPC government. Otafiire was boasting of the “tricks” NRA employed to win support in Luwero, but was also revealing the sinister side of Museveni and his
insurgents.
My wife, Mama Miria, is a Muganda. She has many relatives in Luweero. They would come to my home in Kololo to see their sister. Unlike Museveni, I never used to live in State House when I was president.
I used to live in my small house in Kololo like all other ordinary Ugandans. We have testimonies of people from Luweero telling us how Museveni was recruiting child soldiers by first killing their parents.
Museveni has committed crimes against humanity. I could never allow the army to go to Luweero and kill innocent people.
Given that my wife is a Muganda, and my children therefore half Baganda, what type of muko would I be to kill Baganda?
The opposition led by Ssemogerere did not even help matters.
Instead of working with government to establish and expose the genocidal killings Museveni was conducting in Luweero, they began to accuse government of committing atrocities.
They even said they were writing a black book on gover
nment
atrocities. I ignored them because, what is a black book? Where is it now? It has never surfaced because there was no such black book in the first place for the simple reason that there were no government atrocities to document.
Let me be clear: I cannot deny that individual soldiers in UNLA committed atrocities. That would be a lie. However, I had given clear instructions to Oyite Ojok to punish anyone who violated civilian rights.
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| STABILISED ARMY: Oyite Ojok |
Each time there was a reported case of mistreatment of civilians by the army, we arrested those responsible and punished them severely. The truth is that most of the soldiers in the army who were committing atrocities were Museveni’s people. And whenever we zeroed in on them, they would run to join him in the bush in Luweero. Take the example of Pecos Kutesa. He had an interview with William Pike on Capital Radio in Kampala in 1995 in a program called Desert Island Discs. He told Pike that he was in UNLA but as an NRA infiltrator whose mission was to undermine the credibility of the army from within.
Pecos Kutesa’s testimony is instructive of how Museveni personally orchestrated the killings of innocent people and the harassment of civilians not just in Luwero but other parts of Uganda as well during the 1980s.
His testimony is also important because it fits very well with what Otafiire and Lt. Gen. Elly Tumwine have confessed.
Let us listen to Pecos Kut
esa,
whose interview on Capital Radio I have kept as my evidence. He told Pike that he used to be at a roadblock in Konge. As a lieutenant, he was the man in charge of that roadblock.
According to Pecos Kutesa’s own testimony on Capital Radio, Konge roadblock was the most notorious in harassing civilians, robbing them of their money and killing some. Kutesa says reports reached army headquarters of his harassment of the civilians and Oyite Ojok summoned him to Kampala for disciplinary action. He ran to the bush.
Kutesa’s story on Capital Radio has many lessons, mainly because he gave it as personal congratulations for a job well done.
First of all it is a testimony that the army under my second administration officially did not condone harassment of civilians and whenever such cases were reported, soldiers were punished, just like he had been summoned to Kampala to be questioned and punished.
Second that it is Museveni who employs atrocities against civilians to achieve military victory, but in a more subtle way by ensuring that his adversary instead takes blame for Museveni’s atrocities.
Kutesa’s story directly fits into the same story I have illustrated above regarding the killings in Luweero – the revelations by Otafiire at the funeral of Tiberondwa and the testimonies of visitors and relatives of my wife from Luweero.
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| IGNORANT: Tito Okello |
The more important lesson from Kutesa’s story is that Museveni wanted to grab political power by the gun having failed dismally to convince the people of Uganda to vote for him. It did not matter what methods he employed to get power – cold blooded murders of UPC chairmen in Luwero, robberies of banks, mass killings of civilians; he employed all these.
People like Mugisha Muntu, Kiiza Besigye and Eriya Kategaya are going to find out, or have already found out, especially Besigye, how far Museveni is willing to go to hold and retain political power.
He will employ any level of violence, commit any amount of atrocities to block a democratic process that may get him out of power. That is what he did in Luwero to get power. That is what he is doing right now in Acholi to retain political power.
Museveni has for the last twenty three years fought different enemies in different regions of Uganda: Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA) in Luwero, Uganda People’
s
Democratic Army (UPDA) in the north, West Nile Bank Front in West Nile, Uganda People’s Army (UPA) of Peter Otai in Teso, Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) in western Uganda, and the (Lord’s Resistance Army) LRA.
In all these wars, the adversaries are different, the theatre of war different, the periods different.
There are only two elements that are constant: Museveni on the one hand and massive atrocities against civilians on the other.
What does this tell us? How can it be that all Museveni’s adversaries in the different regions of Uganda, under different political organisations, and at different historical times fight the same way? Is it not logical that since Museveni and atrocities are the only constants, that it is Museveni who employs atrocities to win wars?
I think that Joseph Kony is only a very good student of Museveni’s methods, and that is why he has survived longest.
After 1980 elections, the Commonwealth observer team gave the process a
clean
bill of health. Ssemwogerere made a lot of noise that he was going to high court, to question the election irregularities. He did not prosecute any of them. Up to 1984, he was not progressing.
We in UPC also filed 26 petitions. We did not prosecute any. It was difficult to prosecute any of the petitions. Amin had virtually killed the judiciary, the laws were bad, witnesses were difficult to find, and so the chief justice in 1984, threw away all the petitions, which had not been prosecuted including ours.
Ssemwogerere was a weak leader. Although I commend him for taking the right decision to go and challenge me in parliament, I condemn him because in 1985 and 1986, he joined gunmen, first Tito Okello, and later Museveni. In the process, he aided Museveni to cripple the Democratic Party.
I used to meet him as leader of the opposition. There was a time when he went to Gulu. He campaigned there.
He came back and wrote me a very good letter saying he wa
nted
co-operation which I accepted and I gave the schedule to Otema Alimadi, the Prime minister to follow it up.
Now, problems arose in Ssemwogerere’s party. Tiberio Okeny wanted to break off from the DP which he did and formed another party, the National Liberal Party.
Sometime in 1983, I was in India on a state visit and Paulo Muwanga rang me to say he was giving me sad news.
He said, “We have lost Oyite Ojok in Luweero, it is a helicopter crash”. Then he explained the details. I stopped him.
I said, “Paul, stop there, go back to the beginning.” So he started again from the beginning. He explained, I understood.
Then he said, “I am sending you a cable,” which he did. That same day I informed Indira Ghandi, the prime minister of India and a close personal friend and political ally that we could not continue with the state visit and she graciously accepted the state visit to stop and we returned to Uganda the same day.
I still think it was Museveni’s guns that shot the aircraft, but other people think it was an accident. Even in government there were two views; there were people who thought it was Museveni’s guns, there were people who thought it was an accident. Peter Otai knows the details better than me.
Then the Ministry of Defence did not immediately produce a replacement. I was not running the Ministry of Defence; the suggestions should have come from the Ministry of Defence for a replacement.
I used to write to them asking them to propose a name. Paulo Muwanga used to reply only informally, “You know I have only two names and I can not propose one.”
There was only Smith Opon and Bazillio Okello both of whom were brigadiers. Muwanga used to say that he could not propose Bazillio Okello because he had been promoted above his level of education and training and Smith Opon was good on paper qualifications but weak in administration and command.
Later, after one
and a
half years, the two names were brought to the Defence Council, which I chaired, and included Otai, Samwiri Mugwisa, Tito Okello and Muwanga. In the middle of the vetting of the candidates, Muwanga and Okello asked to be excused to go out and consult.
They returned to the meeting and proposed that we drop Bazillio Okello and consider only Smith Opon Acak which we all accepted.
Some people then began to claim that I appointed Acak because he was a fellow Langi.
My only contribution to his appointment was ceremonial i.e. that I chaired the Defence Council, and that it is the commander in chief who was the appointing authority.
I personally did not know Acak. At least I knew Oyite Ojok and he was a personal friend. I did not appoint Oyite Ojok as army chief of staff. I found him in that job just like I found Tito Okello army commander.
Tito Okello was an ignorant person, he should not have remained army commander. I accept that to have been a mistake,
actually a fatal one, we made.
By the time Oyite Ojok died, the army had been stabilised and there was some understanding within the army that we have got to try civil administration rather than military administration, hence less likelihood of a coup.
On allegations of corruption during my second administration, the first thing Museveni did was to appoint a commission of inquiry of each minister. Have you ever seen any report? None! No minister was found to be corrupt. A commission was appointed for Obote alone. There was no report. None! I was not found to be corrupt.
People seem to forget that Museveni appointed a commission of inquiry about the corruption of each minister in Obote II. None was found to be corrupt. And Museveni had no liking for all those ministers including me.
A man like Emmanuel Cardinal Nsubuga supported insurgents. When Andrew Kayiira’s rebels of the Uganda Freedom Movement attacked Kampala in 1982, his arms were hidden in Rubag
a, I
don’t remember whether inside the cathedral itself. But it was within the vicinity of the Rubaga and when he withdrew he withdrew through Rubaga.
So Nsubuga used the Catholic Church to support armed rebellion, give them sanctuary and even propagate their cause. We lived with that provocation from Rubaga.
I assembled a good team of ministers. I am not one of those who appoints ministers on the radio. I call a minister, and I offer him a job and I say you will have to do the following things, if they are a problem let me know.
Each one of them I discussed the portfolio with him and each one of them did not disappoint me. I would give them tasks and the time frame to achieve the tasks.
I also used to look at peoples’ qualifications and experience. My economic team was the best in Africa: Ephraim Kamuntu, Richard Kaijuka, Yona Kanyomozi, Leo Kibirango, Robert Ekinu, Joseph Okune, Henry Makmot. Look at those names and tell me that Obote was a tribalist!
I
appointed Oyite Ojok the chairman of the coffee marketing board because when we came to government, we found that Uganda government had no money. There was no fuel in the country and we needed foreign exchange, and coffee was the main foreign exchange earner.
I wanted a Coffee Marketing Board plant to work 24 hours, day and night. There was need for security at the plant, so I appointed Oyite Ojok as chairman of the coffee marketing board to give that security at the plant in Kampala for over night work, which we did and we immediately got fuel in the country. That is how I solved the problem of fuel.
With the African countries I wanted friendly relations and I started with Kenya because Kenya was our gateway to the sea and I found President Daniel Arap Moi accommodating. We contacted Mobutu and he helped us just like Juvenal Habyarimana in Rwanda who was very co-operative. It was only Burundi, which was a headache to us because its president, Jean Baptist Bag
aza was
supporting Museveni in Luwero.
Gen. Jaffer Nimeri of Sudan was becoming weak because the insurgency in the south had become too powerful.
I retained excellent relations with Julius Neyerere. I would visit him and he would visit me. I would call him on phone often and he would call me often. However, one time Nyerere wrote to me a letter, which was very surprising. The letter was brought by his brother or cousin called Joseph.
The letter said I should transfer $10m to Tanzania. We did not have that type of money and Nyerere should have known that we had no capacity to have in Uganda coffers $10m just sitting there.
The cost of war was always undermining the relationship between Uganda and Tanzania.
We used to pay US$ 5m or 2m every month through coffee sales. But it was not enough for Tanzania, they would ask for more.
There was a time when I thought we had paid the whole lot only to find a new bill, which returned the cost back to the begin
ning.
Even Museveni has not finished payment I think.
Tomorrow in Monitor, Obote talks Uganda’s economic performance under his second
administration. |
