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The ceasefire agreement that was to be signed by the Uganda government and the LRA on the December 31, 2004 has stalled. We do not want to enter the debate whether some parties within UPDF are gaining from the continuation of the war and the possibility that they may have sabotaged the process.
This is a truism, which all Ugandans know about the UPDF. The UPDF itself knows that there were some officers who were benefiting from the war in the form of maintaining "ghost soldiers" on the army pay role, which is a criminal offence. We have not received a report from the General Tinyefuza inquiry and so the UPDF is in no position to deny the EU representatives allegations on this matter.
The important thing for Ugandans is that the peace process must continue and the suffering of the people of Acholi ended. It is
heartening that Ms Betty Bigombe is maintaining the contacts with the LRA and Kony in particular. The efforts to restart the process should be pursued as a matter of urgency and it is to be hoped a comprehensive agreement can be signed early 2005.
What is troubling is that President Yoweri Museveni saw it fit to order the immediate resumption of military operations without giving the LRA time to consult on a legal document, which the government took time to draft with the help of lawyers, particularly when the document was delivered just a day before they were expected to sign it.
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| Internal affairs minister Dr Ruhakana Rugunda shares a light moment with chief negotiator Betty Bigombe |
Surely fairness and a sense of natural justice demands that they be given equal opportunity like the government to consult their legal experts to enable them to reach a conclusion that can result in a comprehensive agreement with the government.
Moreover, the President in his New Year statement put forward what appeared to be new preconditions for negotiations. He said that the resumed operations "would not cease again until Kony's group irreversibly commit themselves to come out of the bush."
Surely that precludes any possibility of a general ceasefire, which is a precondition to negotiated settlement through peace talks. Moreover, Kony and his rebel army cannot "irreversibly commit themselves to come out of the bush" before negotiations are successfully concluded and a peace agreement signed.
In our
opinion, such rush decision taken by the President on the very day the agreement was supposed to be signed even without hearing from the other side suggests that the NRM government does not want to pursue peace talks but instead wants to persist in their wrong policy of trying to "defeat" the rebels militarily. This has proved impossible so far and there is no evidence that the President has a new plan to enable him to perform better against the rebels.
Furthermore, his two-pronged new strategy of "talking outside and fighting inside," is contradictory. In the first place, it demonstrates a lack of trust in the process of negotiation that is bound to poison the atmosphere of any successful peace talks.
The approach undermines the peace process in its tracks. Furthermore, in order to talk to the rebels outside the country, requires third-party mediation and not just a
peace negotiator such as Betty Bigombe. For such a mediator to agree to get involved will require a demonstration that the government seriously wants the peace talks to take place and a general ceasefire would be required before they can agree to mediate.
The President also indicated what he called four "issues of substance" involved to be recognized as a basis for any relations with the LRA. The first was for Kony to stop violence and accept the democratic process in place, including the transition towards multipartysim.
The second was "how to bring about reconciliation between Kony's group on one hand and the Acholi people, especially the victims of Kony's terror campaign."… In this respect, he entertained the possible use of the traditional method Mato Oput, which he promised would be looked into. In this respect, he tried to avoid the issue of reconciliation between
the parties in combat, which is the real purpose of the traditional technique.
The third issue, he said, is "the settlement package for the victims of Kony and for Kony's group." He added that: "Our plan is to help those who are young to go back to school, those who are young and are fit to join the army… 105 Battalion … and the ones who want to settle in civilian life to be assisted with a modest package to do so as well as for the victims."
The issue of recruiting LRA soldiers into the UPDF should be the result of a settlement and should not be unilaterally determined. Moreover, it has been questioned by a number of human rights organisations.
The fourth issue, he added, would be "how to convince the ICC, after the Kony's group has come out of the bush and reconciliation has been effected, to drop the indictment against them, as we would have found a solution to
the problem." This, he finally said, would create the conditions for addressing "the wider issue of rehabilitation, not only in that part of Uganda, but also in the Luweero Triangle…"
This issue requires to be handled conjointly with the second issue of reconciliation. In the first place the ICC has not indicted Kony or any of his officers of any offence. The process is still at the investigation level. Moreover, there are demands that at this level, the UPDF ought to be investigated as well. Therefore, this matter is still open-ended.
In our considered opinion, these "issues of substance" need to be negotiated and not dictated to the opposing side if real peace is to be realized. Moreover the government itself must be committed to the peace process and to the need for them to undergo reconciliation with the rebels and not only with the "Acholi people" and LRA victims. The
"packages" to be paid to the victims of the LRA atrocities ought to be part of the modified technique of Mato Oput.
For the negotiations to be comprehensive, they must include the following elements: Firstly, the international community must continue to monitor the peace process and ensure a successful cessation of the conflict and provide the logistics for the post-conflict management; Secondly, the government must agree to the holding of a national political conference, which should involve the LRA so that they can present their political grievances and ensure a democratic transition from the one-party rule of the NRM "No party democracy" to a genuine multiparty democracy in which there is no manipulation of the democratic process such as the attempt to amend Article 105 (2), which limits presidential term limits to allow for a possible life presidency for the incumbent;
Thirdly, after the peace agreement, both parties must embark on the demobilisation, disarmament and reintegration of the LRA rebels into society and, concurrently, to resettle and rehabilitate the people in IDP camps, so that the over 2 million displaced people are enabled to return to their homes; (iv) embarking on the process of community reconciliation, including the use of traditional techniques of reconciliation such as Mato Oput.
This would require looking at the involvement of the ICC in the process since no lasting peace can be assured if the Kony and his officers are to be prosecuted. Even Justice P.K.K Onega of the Amnesty Commission has argued that the trial of Joseph Kony and his commanders would make reconciliation and national unity difficult. In his view, "the best thing would be to go for a peaceful settlement and reconciliation." |
