By Timothy Kalyegira
Mar 6 - 12, 2005
| Over the course of the last three weeks writing a brief series on the history of Uganda's security services, several comments, interest by readers, and a number of questions resulted.
Of all the surprises, the main one was on the record of the Special Branch, the intelligence arm of the Uganda Police Force. Most of the public had given up on the police because of the images of inefficiency, under-funding, and poor working and living conditions.
A few voices raised some concerns. A very senior intelligence officer pointed out that the third part of the series, which ran last Sunday, created the impression that the two civilian counterintelligence agencies – Internal Security Organisation and External Security Organisation – were created and as such exist primarily to serve the political ends of the NRM government, President Museveni, and the ruling political elite. That is not the case, said the intelligence officer who asked not to be named. The ISO and ESO, according to him, work for the overall security of Uganda and even if it falls under their assignment to protect the nation's President, to view this protection of President Museveni and the strengthening of his political power as their main duty, is unfair. Also, he maintained that ISO and ESO do far more strategic thinking and planning for Uganda's security than the third part gave them credit for. Since this officer's concerns, particularly given his very high position in the national intelligence apparatus, reflect those of the wider Ugandan intelligence community, it would only be proper to address them and other such queries in this appendage to the three-part series. Successes of ISO and ESO It cannot be said that ISO and ESO have achieved nothing all through their 19-year existence. If nothing else, their efforts have kept the NRM government in power longer than any other administration in Uganda's post-independence history. On the evening of January 16, 2001, most of the world was still confused about the gunfire that had been heard in the DR Congo's capital Kinshasa and the silence over President Laurent Kabila's whereabouts. Uganda's ESO along with French and Belgian intelligence were the first sources to definitively state that Kabila had, in fact, been assassinated. In July 2003, a South African stowaway named Patrick Fello Lithekol, who worked for the Gauteng News Directory, made his way past the Secret Service security net and onto the press aircraft accompanying President George W. Bush's Boeing 747-400 jet or Air Force One. He ended up at Entebbe International Airport with Bush from Pretoria in South Africa. It was the ISO agents who became suspicious of Lithekol and arrested him, later taking him for interrogation at the Entebbe Police Station. "In South Africa police spokesman Senior Superintendent Selby Bokaba said the security lapse was on the US side," reported the French news agency AFP on July 16, 2003, indicating that, in this instance, ISO had proven itself as competent as any security service in the western world. (It is well worth pointing out, though, that when Col. Kizza Besigye left Uganda in August 2001, he managed to elude Ugandan security. It was Tanzanian intelligence that informed Museveni that Besigye had slipped into Tanzania.) No doubt, there must be several more success stories by these two security services that we do not know about and if it is true (in the opinion of this highly placed intelligence official), that ISO and ESO are not such narrow-minded agencies as to confuse Museveni's interests with those of the country, then it is reassuring. However, we must trace the root of this very widely held impression that Uganda's intelligence agencies have historically been created to work for the immediate shielding of their appointing governments from coups, armed rebellion, and internal dissent. Why does a sense of unease, dread, and even outright revulsion come to mind whenever these present and past intelligence services are mentioned? It is largely because a negative impression among the general public was formed from concrete experience and observation. Let us pick up from an example that the President himself set in August 2003. In a letter to the Sunday Vision, President Museveni said: "When it comes to medical care for myself and my family, there is no compromise..." He added: "The issue is about security given some of the hostile doctors we have in the medical system here." The President argued that he faces constant assassination attempts and that he could not trust Ugandan doctors and other medical personnel to tamper with the security of his family. The matter drastically ended the prestige Museveni had enjoyed for many years in the eyes of many thousands of people across Africa and much of the rest of the world. Zimbabwe's Financial Gazette newspaper of October 23, 2003, commented on the scandal: "But what, may [we] ask, does it say about Museveni's long political stewardship if he and members of his family cannot even feel safe in a hospital bed in Uganda? Isn't his 17-year stint at the helm supposed to be a sign of his popularity? And even if a real threat existed, why couldn't Natasha be sent to a hospital in another African country at a more realistic cost?" Is this not, among other things, a comment on the security services that Museveni feels more secure with his daughter giving birth in Germany not Uganda? And even if that were so, does he not know that the German security services are just as capable, through working with the French intelligence, of bringing his daughter to harm while in Germany, considering how much he has provoked French interests by his involvement in the DR Congo and Rwanda? But most of all, how are the rest of us ordinary Ugandans supposed to feel when, faced with the same security threats from these same Ugandan doctors, we cannot be granted the opportunity to fly our wives and sisters to Europe for safe child delivery? There has since been no statement or at least the impression of action by ISO or ESO to investigate the medical profession for signs that it might have been infiltrated by saboteurs. Members of the public, as such, are no nearer knowing whether they are safe in local hospitals after this public _expression of fear by no less a person than the President. This and numerous other examples serve to reinforce the impression that the Ugandan security services were created to secure the President, his family and regime. Consider for a moment how disruptive this has been to the nation. To have such speculation of whether Museveni will or won't seek another term in office has taken up the bulk of newspaper opinion and political reporting space, been the major theme on FM radio talk shows, made it difficult for businesses and investors to plan with certainty past 2006, and in general led to an unhealthy climate in the country that can, in no way, be of any advantage to Uganda. If the security of Uganda is the brief of ISO and ESO, how can they possibly permit this situation to remain unchecked? How come they don't influence the President and his henchmen and women to see the effects of keeping Uganda in a state of uncertainty on the economy, the politics, and the social order? What are Uganda's security interests? In order to gain the confidence of the Ugandan public, the security services should at least address some of these and other questions. How can we speak of the security of Uganda when practically everything in the country is run by foreigners, or dictated by foreigners? The kind of security policies Uganda should be pursuing cannot yet be defensive. Whatever they are, they must be geared toward helping build the strong institutions we don't yet have; they must, most importantly, aim at helping the government and private sector identify talented people to fit into key positions. After all, even if in the worst case of events Uganda were invaded by a hostile neighbour, as happened with Tanzania in November 1979, the damage to the economy and infrastructure is negligible because it isn't there. |
© 2005 The Monitor Publications.
Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! MSN Messenger Download today it's FREE!
_______________________________________________ Ugandanet mailing list Ugandanet@kym.net http://kym.net/mailman/listinfo/ugandanet % UGANDANET is generously hosted by INFOCOM http://www.infocom.co.ug/
