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President Yoweri Museveni on April 6th launched the new National Strategy to Fight Corruption and Build Ethics and Integrity in public office 2004- 2007.
This is second government strategy, after the first one, which covered the period 2001-2004.
The strategy, which was drawn up by the Directorate of Ethics and Integrity, is a framework on which anticorruption actors are to carry out their mandates up to the end of 2007, says Minister of State for Ethics and Integrity Tim Lwanga.
However, only days after the launch, the strategy whose overall aim is to "minimize levels of corruption and increase and increase transparency and integrity in public office, has come under criticism.
Many legislators, pro anti-government alike questioned its effectiveness, and therefore government's commitment. This is a sort
of
government anticorruption blueprint, but does it address the real political problems on which corruption breeds? Will it make any difference or is it a waste of time?
According to Lwanga, the strategy details a four-year plan being implemented and it a very crucial tool needed in the war against corruption.
"We are in a war fighting corruption and we must have a plan. W are going to sit down and come up with what is necessary to win the war," he says.
But the real problems, which have been pointed out again and again are not addressed by the strategy, according to former IGG Augustine Ruzindana. What has now become sort of a 'theme song' in the corruption debate; the lack of political will is nowhere near mention in the strategy.
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SAME OLD STORY: (L-R) Former IGG Augustine Ruzindana believes that the new report by Ethics Minister Tim Lwanga is a hoax. Maj. Kakooza Mutale is one of those whose court battle helped cripplethe anti-corruption fight. |
"Whatever strategy they come up with, this government does not have the capacity to fight corruption. There is simply no political will at all levels of government from the center to the lower councils. They can have a strategy, but it will not be useful," he says.
The anti corruption blue print touches on the political environment as one of the factors that will affect its implementation.
"Political commitment on the part of government and all parliamentary and local government institutions to take on issues of corruption and accountability in a consistent and vigorous manner is central to the success of the strategy," it says.
But a look at recent events suggests that such a statement is actually blunt, and the strategy therefore fails to address the problem.
In the ongoing prosecution in which Emma Kato is accused of causing loss to government in the junk helicopter saga is puzzling because the DPP chose to leave out some people whom the Ssebutinde probe recommended for prosecution. Government has also not caused prosecution of other individuals implicated by various judicial probes.
There is also another question that has been asked over and over: can government talk of political will given the cabinet recommendations to the constitutional review commission regarding the institution of the IGG? Although Cabinet later dropped some, the fact that cabinet could recommend such measures says volumes about government's apathy.
Also, although the strategy calls for strengthening of the institutio
nal
framework, it does not call for any action concerning the row over the Leadership Code, in which some crucial sections were nullified during the Mutale petition.
The Constitutional Court ruled that the IGG could not recommend to the President sacking of some officials because it would interfere with Presidential Prerogative.
Jotham Tumwesigye, the IGG at that time, questioned government's commitment to support the institution of the IGG.
Lwanga acknowledges that there were some loopholes in the code, a reason the AG chose not to appeal.
"You appeal when you feel the judgment is wrong. In this case, the judges were right. The legislators made mistakes in the code. But we are making constitutional amendments and they will take care of the loopholes," he says.
What the strategy therefore refers to as a mere "perception that there is inadequate political commitment in support of anti corruption efforts" turns out to be not just a perception but
reality.
This is what the strategy refers to as "the ambiguity in high level political commitment [which] is associated with an inability or unwillingness to penalize high profile corruption."
But the strategy is spot on, noting that such ambiguity "increases public cynicism, and increases perceptions that grand corruption can be committed with impunity. The strategy must seek to increase political support and commitment for the anti corruption agenda."
Such passing statements have led critics to point out that this is just another of government's rhetoric.
Do these reports reflect a genuine desire on the part of government to fight corruption, or they are merely seeking to portray a populist stance?
"On the surface, whatever strategies, government wants to show its commitment. But is has been undermining institutions that are supposed to fight corruption at the top, the ministries and local governments," Ruzindana says.
However, Lwanga say
s that
such a criticism is unfounded.
"This strategy has strategic goals and objectives. We are basically fighting poverty by eradicating corruption. How can you say that such a grand plan is a populist stance?" he says.
More telling is the fact that the previous 2001-2004 strategy was never fully implemented and the same problem will happen.
"We need al lot of money but we shall use what we have within our means but we will complete our mission," the minister says.
The strategy addresses a few issues, but still to the big fish and the political elite, the strategy could turn out to be a big let off.
Yet, this is where Uganda's problem with corruption is. |
