James,
You hit the nail on the head there.
I was trying to avoid overkill. In Telecoms networks you would have
Management plane
Control/Signalling plane
User/Data plane
Usually these are separated at SDH or ATM level as separate VCs.
The Enterprise view would be to physically separate networks
Internet
DMZ
Core
But in an ISP you are not going to build a physical separate network.
Then the private cloud view is that all of these are together, separated by
network and server virtualisation.
I think the danger is trying to use Enterprise models for Service Providers,
where even those Enterprise models are blurring.
Thanks
John
-Original Message-
From: uknof [mailto:uknof-boun...@lists.uknof.org.uk] On Behalf Of James Bensley
Sent: 21 September 2016 09:38
To: uknof@lists.uknof.org.uk
Subject: Re: [uknof] ISP Security architecture
On 15 September 2016 at 11:46, John Bourke <john.bou...@mobileinternet.com>
wrote:
> Hi,
>
>
>
> Touchy subject, but can anyone share some war stories about how they
> keep raw Internet traffic away from ISP operational systems, which be
> definition need to talk to the equipment which carries that Internet traffic.
I'm not 100% certain of what you are looking for here but if you search through
the list archives for the c-nsp and j-nsp mailing lists (others too I'm sure)
you'll see many discussions about ISPs moving the Internet into a dedicated
L3VPN.
In that example keeping the internet traffic in a dedicated L3VPN and say
having a separate dedicated L3VPN for management traffic segregates the two
traffic types but the NMS/OSS/BSS systems still have access to the routers (if
you configure them to allow management access from within that management
L3VPN).
I’m not sure where the horror stories fit in to this that specifically relate
to the Internet? A decent ISP (IMO) should have good control plane and
infrastructure protection in place, so there should be no threat. I think the
main issues from the Internet into the ISPs OSS/BSS systems is DDoS traffic,
either targeted at the ISP or a downstream customer that fills the pipes and
they can’t even get management access to their devices (perhaps no out of band
connectivity for example). But control plane attacks can come from within the
IPS, not just out on the Internet and can be fairly well defended against.
Cheers,
James.
John Bourke