Thanks for all responses from Jan, Ulrich and Digimer !
We are already using bond'ed network interfaces, but we are also forced to go
across IP-subnets. Certain routes between routers can go and have gone missing.
This has happened for one of our node's public network, where it was
inaccessible
Martin Schlegel napsal(a):
Thanks for the confirmation Jan, but this sounds a bit scary to me !
Spinning this experiment a bit further ...
Would this not also mean that with a passive rrp with 2 rings it only takes 2
different nodes that are not able to communicate on different networks at the
PS. in security handling everything at one (high) level is known as
"hard crunchy shell with soft chewy center". It's not seen as a good thing.
--
Dimitri Maziuk
Programmer/sysadmin
BioMagResBank, UW-Madison -- http://www.bmrb.wisc.edu
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On 10/06/2016 11:25 AM, Klaus Wenninger wrote:
> But it is convenient because all layers on top can be completely
> agnostic of the duplicity.
It's also cheap: failing over a node, esp. when taking over involves
replaying a database log, or even just re-establishing a bunch of nfs
connections,
On 10/06/2016 09:26 AM, Klaus Wenninger wrote:
> Usually one - at least me so far - would rather think that having
> the awareness of redundany/cluster as high up as possible in the
> protocol/application-stack would open up possibilities for more
> appropriate reactions.
The obvious
Thanks for the confirmation Jan, but this sounds a bit scary to me !
Spinning this experiment a bit further ...
Would this not also mean that with a passive rrp with 2 rings it only takes 2
different nodes that are not able to communicate on different networks at the
same time to have all rings
Hello all,
I am trying to understand why the following 2 Corosync heartbeat ring failure
scenarios
I have been testing and hope somebody can explain why this makes any sense.
Consider the following cluster:
* 3x Nodes: A, B and C
* 2x NICs for each Node
* Corosync 2.3.5 configured
