On 1/25/2017 7:54 PM, Joe Quinn wrote:
As a side note, spamassassin will not be able to fully implement
DMARC. Part of a valid implementation involves being able to notify
the authentic sender of when they are being forged, which involves
sending a new email.
Which is a hurdle but a simple c
On 1/25/2017 11:03 AM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2017-01-25 16:46:
On 1/25/2017 9:10 AM, David Jones wrote:
Could we build a tool like masscheck to help extend these
entries for trusted senders that are known to maintain
proper SPF, DKIM, DMARC with valid opt-out processi
>From: Paul Stead
>Sent: Wednesday, January 25, 2017 3:34 PM
>On 25/01/2017, 17:49, "David Jones" wrote:
>> Here is an example I just received:
>> http://pastebin.com/fwbgMKF4
>Received: from mta165a.pmx1.epsl1.com (mta165a.pmx1.epsl1.com
>[142.54.245.165]) - Pastebin.com
>pastebin.com
On 25/01/2017, 21:34, "Paul Stead" wrote:
A similar method I use is to have the DKIM signing domains I like in a rbl
server and query them with askdns
askdns LOCAL_TRUSTED_DKIM _DKIMDOMAIN_.lookup.example.com A 127.0.0.2
tflags LOCAL_TRUSTED_DKIM nice net
describe
On 25/01/2017, 17:49, "David Jones" wrote:
Here is an example I just received:
http://pastebin.com/fwbgMKF4
This message is very spammy looking and hit a high BAYES_ rule but
was sent from a trustworthy sender with good SPF, DKIM and opt-out.
The IP was not listed on any ma
>>Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2017-01-25 16:46:
>>> On 1/25/2017 9:10 AM, David Jones wrote:
Could we build a tool like masscheck to help extend these
entries for trusted senders that are known to maintain
proper SPF, DKIM, DMARC with valid opt-out processing?
>>> Off the cuff
On Wed, 25 Jan 2017, Benny Pedersen wrote:
same as with clamav 3dr party spam signatures should not really have being in
clamav, but on a sa channel, i know there is a perl script to make that 3dr
party sigs back to sa, but it uses so much memmory that its not practical :(
my solution to th
Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2017-01-25 17:20:
dkim is domain based, spf and dmarc is ip based, so not really easy to
use a ip based rbl :=)
Good point. I will clarify that I personally use RBLs as an inclusive
term for RBLs and URIBLs and I use them in ways that aren't blacklists
but just more
>Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2017-01-25 16:46:
>> On 1/25/2017 9:10 AM, David Jones wrote:
>>> Could we build a tool like masscheck to help extend these
>>> entries for trusted senders that are known to maintain
>>> proper SPF, DKIM, DMARC with valid opt-out processing?
>>>
>> Off the cuff, this s
On 1/25/2017 11:03 AM, Benny Pedersen wrote:
Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2017-01-25 16:46:
On 1/25/2017 9:10 AM, David Jones wrote:
Could we build a tool like masscheck to help extend these
entries for trusted senders that are known to maintain
proper SPF, DKIM, DMARC with valid opt-out processi
Kevin A. McGrail skrev den 2017-01-25 16:46:
On 1/25/2017 9:10 AM, David Jones wrote:
Could we build a tool like masscheck to help extend these
entries for trusted senders that are known to maintain
proper SPF, DKIM, DMARC with valid opt-out processing?
Off the cuff, this sounds like the concep
On 1/25/2017 9:10 AM, David Jones wrote:
Could we build a tool like masscheck to help extend these
entries for trusted senders that are known to maintain
proper SPF, DKIM, DMARC with valid opt-out processing?
Off the cuff, this sounds like the concept of more than a few whitelist
RBLs.
Regard
A couple of years ago I started making an extensive list
of whitelist_auth and whitelist_from_rcvd (for those with
broken SPF and no DKIM) which made my SA scoring very
reliable. Before I did this, I was constantly reacting to new
spam campaigns which was a loosing battle.
I noticed some patterns
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