Reposting since the cisco mailing lists are no longer in service. Please respond to this email.
Thanks and sorry for inconvenience, Dino > On Sep 21, 2016, at 2:12 PM, Dino Farinacci <farina...@gmail.com> wrote: > > Hello folks. In draft-padma-ideas-problem-statement-00.txt, we have a section > on mapping system requirements for map-n-encap and translation based loc/id > split protocols. Rather than having you go into the document in detail (we > wish you would and comment though), I will provide the short list below to > attempt a discussion on requirements. > > I have copied the possible WGs that may want to use the mapping system > technology. And I have also copied the LISP working group who can shed > expertise on the subject as well as some beta lists that have some > operational experiences with mapping database deployment and management. > > The requirements below have a security and robustness twist to it but I think > that is the best place to start and to consider security “up front”. > > Thanks in advance, > Dino > > ---- > > 6.4. Mapping System Security > > The secure mapping system must have the following requirements: > > 1. The components of the mapping system need to be robust against > direct and indirect attacks. If any component is attacked, the > rest of the system should act with integrity and scale and only > the information associated with the compromised component is made > unavailable. > > 2. The addition and removal of components of the mapping system must > be performed in a secure matter so as to not violate the > integrity and operation of the system and service it provides. > > 3. The information returned by components of the mapping system > needs to be authenticated as to detect spoofing from > masqueraders. > > 4. Information registered (by publishers) to the mapping system must > be authenticated so the registering entity or the information is > not spoofed. > > 5. The mapping system must allow request access (for subscribers) to > be open and public. However, it is optional to provide > confidentiality and authentication of the requesters and the > information they are requesting. > > 6. Any information provided by components of the mapping system must > be cryptographically signed by the provider and verified by the > consumer. > > 7. Message rate-limiting and other heuristics must be part of the > foundational support of the mapping system to protect the system > from invalid overloaded conditions. > > 8. The mapping system should support some form of provisioned > policy. Either internal to the system or via mechanisms for > users of the system to describe policy rules. Access control > should not use traditional granular-based access lists since they > do not scale and are hard to manage. By the use of token- or > key- based authentication methods as well as deploying multiple > instances of the mapping system will allow acceptable policy > profiles. Machine learning techniques could automate these > mechanisms.
