Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence
On May 24, 2020 4:49:50 PM UTC, Stefan Mayr wrote: >Hi, > >Am 20.05.2020 um 17:19 schrieb Mark Thomas: >> CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session >persistence >> >> Severity: High >> >> Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation >> >> Versions Affected: >> Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4 >> Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34 >> Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 >> Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 >> >> Description: >> If: >> a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on >the >>server; and >> b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a >>FileStore; and >> c) the PersistenceManager is configured with >>sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a >>SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the >>attacker provided object to be deserialized; and >> d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage >location >>used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; >> then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able >to >> trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under >> their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for >the >> attack to succeed. >> > >Assuming an attacker can do (a), (d) and the Tomcat instance is running >with a default configuration (c): is the StandardManager vulnerable or >not (b)? No. >Also a question about naming: is PersistenceManager the same >PersistentManager as in org.apache.catalina.session.PersistentManager? Yes. >So a vulnerable configuration would need to use something like > > > > Yes. Mark - To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscr...@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-h...@tomcat.apache.org
Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence
Hi, Am 20.05.2020 um 17:19 schrieb Mark Thomas: > CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence > > Severity: High > > Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation > > Versions Affected: > Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4 > Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34 > Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 > Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 > > Description: > If: > a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the >server; and > b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a >FileStore; and > c) the PersistenceManager is configured with >sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a >SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the >attacker provided object to be deserialized; and > d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location >used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; > then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to > trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under > their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the > attack to succeed. > Assuming an attacker can do (a), (d) and the Tomcat instance is running with a default configuration (c): is the StandardManager vulnerable or not (b)? Also a question about naming: is PersistenceManager the same PersistentManager as in org.apache.catalina.session.PersistentManager? So a vulnerable configuration would need to use something like Regards, Stefan Mayr - To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscr...@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-h...@tomcat.apache.org
Re: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence
roxy Password Attacks - BruteSpray - Burp Suite - CeWL - chntpw - cisco-auditing-tool - CmosPwd - creddump - crowbar - crunch - findmyhash - gpp-decrypt - hash-identifier - Hashcat - HexorBase - THC-Hydra - John the Ripper - Johnny - keimpx - Maltego Teeth - Maskprocessor - multiforcer - Ncrack - oclgausscrack - ophcrack - PACK - patator - phrasendrescher - polenum - RainbowCrack - rcracki-mt - RSMangler - SecLists - SQLdict - Statsprocessor - THC-pptp-bruter - TrueCrack - WebScarab - wordlists - zaproxy Maintaining Access - CryptCat - Cymothoa - dbd - dns2tcp - HTTPTunnel - Intersect - Nishang - polenum - PowerSploit - pwnat - RidEnum - sbd - shellter - U3-Pwn - Webshells - Weevely - Winexe Hardware Hacking - android-sdk - apktool - Arduino - dex2jar - Sakis3G - smali Reverse Engineering - apktool - dex2jar - diStorm3 - edb-debugger - jad - javasnoop - JD-GUI - OllyDbg - smali - Valgrind - YARA Reporting Tools - CaseFile - cherrytree - CutyCapt - dos2unix - Dradis - MagicTree - Metagoofil - Nipper-ng - pipal - RDPY emma davis emma.davi...@aol.com -Original Message- From: Mark Thomas To: Tomcat Users List CC: Tomcat Developers List ; annou...@tomcat.apache.org ; annou...@apache.org Sent: Wed, 20 May 2020 16:19 Subject: [SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence Severity: High Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected: Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4 Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34 Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 Description: If: a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed. Mitigation: - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M5 or later - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.35 or later - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 8.5.55 or later - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 7.0.104 or later Alternatively, users may configure the PersistenceManager with an appropriate value for sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter to ensure that only application provided attributes are serialized and deserialized. Credit: This issue was discovered and reported responsibly to the Apache Tomcat Security Team by report by jarvis threedr3am of pdd security research References: [1] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-10.html [2] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-9.html [3] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-8.html [4] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-7.html - To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscr...@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-h...@tomcat.apache.org
[SECURITY] CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence
CVE-2020-9484 Apache Tomcat Remote Code Execution via session persistence Severity: High Vendor: The Apache Software Foundation Versions Affected: Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M1 to 10.0.0-M4 Apache Tomcat 9.0.0.M1 to 9.0.34 Apache Tomcat 8.5.0 to 8.5.54 Apache Tomcat 7.0.0 to 7.0.103 Description: If: a) an attacker is able to control the contents and name of a file on the server; and b) the server is configured to use the PersistenceManager with a FileStore; and c) the PersistenceManager is configured with sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter="null" (the default unless a SecurityManager is used) or a sufficiently lax filter to allow the attacker provided object to be deserialized; and d) the attacker knows the relative file path from the storage location used by FileStore to the file the attacker has control over; then, using a specifically crafted request, the attacker will be able to trigger remote code execution via deserialization of the file under their control. Note that all of conditions a) to d) must be true for the attack to succeed. Mitigation: - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 10.0.0-M5 or later - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 9.0.35 or later - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 8.5.55 or later - Upgrade to Apache Tomcat 7.0.104 or later Alternatively, users may configure the PersistenceManager with an appropriate value for sessionAttributeValueClassNameFilter to ensure that only application provided attributes are serialized and deserialized. Credit: This issue was discovered and reported responsibly to the Apache Tomcat Security Team by report by jarvis threedr3am of pdd security research References: [1] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-10.html [2] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-9.html [3] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-8.html [4] http://tomcat.apache.org/security-7.html - To unsubscribe, e-mail: users-unsubscr...@tomcat.apache.org For additional commands, e-mail: users-h...@tomcat.apache.org
