Ryan Sleevi wrote:
On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 6:58 AM John Mattsson
mailto:40ericsson@dmarc.ietf.org>>
wrote:
- In some applications using mutually authenticated TLS, e.g., between nodes in
5G core networks or in mesh networks there is basically no difference between
the client and the
On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 11:57:59AM +, John Mattsson wrote:
> - In some applications using mutually authenticated TLS, e.g., between
> nodes in 5G core networks or in mesh networks there is basically no
> difference between the client and the server. It would be very good if
> the document
On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 10:57:01AM +, John Mattsson wrote:
> I expect most TLS stacks to happily continue the connection after
> external PSK (I think those do not even have standard expiry
> times) or certificate expires.
>
> John: Yes, and I think they should. The application has the
>
On Sat, Nov 20, 2021 at 6:58 AM John Mattsson wrote:
> - In some applications using mutually authenticated TLS, e.g., between
> nodes in 5G core networks or in mesh networks there is basically no
> difference between the client and the server. It would be very good if the
> document states that
Hi,
Two comments:
- In some applications using mutually authenticated TLS, e.g., between nodes in
5G core networks or in mesh networks there is basically no difference between
the client and the server. It would be very good if the document states that
for such use cases the recommendations
HI Ilari,
See inline.
Cheers,
John
From: Uta on behalf of Ilari Liusvaara
Date: Monday, 15 November 2021 at 17:54
To: uta@ietf.org
Subject: Re: [Uta] Long connections, forward secrecy, and key exfiltration,
certificate lifetimes, exporter_secret
On Sun, Nov 14, 2021 at 08:27:25AM +,