On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 15:41:20 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> On 2020-06-16 14:17, Cornelia Huck wrote:
> > On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 13:57:26 +0200
> > Halil Pasic wrote:
> >
> >> On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
> >> Pierre Morel wrote:
> >>
> >int virtio_finalize_features(struct
On 2020-06-16 14:17, Cornelia Huck wrote:
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 13:57:26 +0200
Halil Pasic wrote:
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
{
int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev);
@@ -179,6 +184,10
On 2020-06-16 14:20, Cornelia Huck wrote:
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
On 2020-06-16 11:52, Halil Pasic wrote:
On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
@@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
return
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 09:35:19 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> On 2020-06-16 08:55, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
> >> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
> >> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> On 2020-06-16 11:52, Halil Pasic wrote:
> > On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
> > Pierre Morel wrote:
> >> @@ -162,6 +163,11 @@ bool force_dma_unencrypted(struct device *dev)
> >>return is_prot_virt_guest();
> >> }
> >>
> >>
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 13:57:26 +0200
Halil Pasic wrote:
> On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
> Pierre Morel wrote:
>
> > >> int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
> > >> {
> > >> int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev);
> > >> @@ -179,6 +184,10 @@ int
On Tue, 16 Jun 2020 12:52:50 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
> >> int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device *dev)
> >> {
> >>int ret = dev->config->finalize_features(dev);
> >> @@ -179,6 +184,10 @@ int virtio_finalize_features(struct virtio_device
> >> *dev)
> >>if
On 2020-06-16 11:52, Halil Pasic wrote:
On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already
accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is
the ability to reject.
An architecture protecting the
On Mon, 15 Jun 2020 14:39:24 +0200
Pierre Morel wrote:
I find the subject (commit short) sub optimal. The 'arch' is already
accepting devices 'without IOMMU feature'. What you are introducing is
the ability to reject.
> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
>
On 2020-06-16 08:55, Christian Borntraeger wrote:
On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the
On 2020-06-16 08:22, Jason Wang wrote:
On 2020/6/15 下午8:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture
On 15.06.20 14:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
> An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
> access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
> use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
>
> Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
> without
On 2020/6/15 下午8:39, Pierre Morel wrote:
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
without
An architecture protecting the guest memory against unauthorized host
access may want to enforce VIRTIO I/O device protection through the
use of VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Let's give a chance to the architecture to accept or not devices
without VIRTIO_F_IOMMU_PLATFORM.
Signed-off-by: Pierre Morel
14 matches
Mail list logo
