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Jan 6, 2009 Hamas looks to Hezbollah's inspiration By Sami Moubayed DAMASCUS - The similarities between what is taking place in Gaza today, and what took place in Lebanon in 2006, are striking. Both wars were waged by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) against a small military group, seen as "heroes and resistance leaders" by the Arab world, labeled as "terrorists" by Israel and the United States. In both wars, Israel resorted to unconditional force, devastating Lebanon in 2006 and Gaza in 2008, and it seems like this war - just like 2006 - will last longer than most people expect. It won't be that easy to eliminate Hamas from Gaza, however, because of its grassroots popularity, just like Israel was unable to destroy Hezbollah in Lebanon. In back-to-back speeches by Hezbollah secretary general Hassan Nasrallah during the first week of the current war on Gaza, he drew parallels between Hezbollah and Hamas. Both were under savage attacks by Israel, he noted, carried out with dubious objectives. In 2006, Israel claimed that it was attacking Lebanon to free two abducted Israeli soldiers, while in 2008 it is bombing Gaza to ostensibly stop al-Kassam rockets from landing in northern Israel, fired by Hamas militias. The real targets, Nasrallah said, were the Islamic groups because it was part of their doctrine to fight and destroy Israel. By uttering these words, Nasrallah was drawing red lines for Arab activists, journalists and politicians, making it very difficult - in some places close to impossible - to criticize Hamas, while the bloodbath in Gaza was taking place. It was political suicide for most Arabs to be critical of Nasrallah while he was sending missiles to strike "at Haifa and beyond Haifa" in Israel in 2006. In times of war, many reasoned, one cannot be neutral in the Arab world. One has to take sides, either with Hezbollah and Hamas, or with Israel. Refusing to support them, or standing on neutral ground, was seen as politically incorrect by the Arab masses. If Hamas has committed a mistake, accountability can be made, later - once the war on Gaza comes to an end. For now, it is the duty of Arabs - Nasrallah was saying - to stand by Hamas. Let us try to see the similarities between both groups, and what are the differences. Similarities Ideology: Both groups are governed by an Islamic ideology that dictates war against Israel as a national, moral and religious duty for believers. The warriors from both groups are not afraid to die. On the contrary, they seek it as a religious obligation in jihad (holy war). The IDF goes into battle with the objective of getting done with its duty, and returning home. They do not want to die. Iran: Both are strongly allied to Iran, although Iranian support is stronger for Hamas than it is for Hezbollah. That explains why both are at odds with both Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which are engaged in a cold war with Tehran. In 2006, Saudi Arabia was not pleased because of the war, because it further strengthened Iran's influence and clout in the Arab and Muslim world. This time, Egypt is frowning at Hamas' performance, especially that Nasrallah came out praising the leadership of Hamas, and came short of calling for a national uprising against the pro-American regime of President Hosni Mubarak. Hezbollah's victory in 2006 scored a point for Iran over Saudi Arabia. The same would apply with regard to Egypt if Hamas were to win the war in 2009. Popularity: Both were voted in with an overwhelming majority in their respective countries and are more popular than their pro-Western counterparts within the Lebanese and Palestinian systems, Fouad al-Siniora and Mahmud Abbas. Decision-makers in Beirut and the West Bank are at a complete loss over what to do with Hamas and Hezbollah. Neither the Lebanese nor the Palestinian system has been able to disarm or weaken them. Nor has the United Nations or the United States. Both operate a wide network of charity and welfare organizations, including schools and hospitals, which makes them well rooted in Gaza and South Lebanon. Bombing them - or refusing to deal with them - will not make them go away. Differences Action: Hezbollah performed with flying military colors in 2006, surprising everyone with its strength, even the IDF. Arabs around the globe were enchanted when Hezbollah downed an Israeli warship - live during one of Nasrallah's speeches, or when he lived up to his promise and struck at Haifa, in the heart of Israel, for the first time since 1948. Hezbollah projects itself as a resistance group that can deliver, psychologically through the media, and militarily in ground combat. It has a well-trained and professional army, with sophisticated missiles, radars and weapons. When its al-Manar TV was hit by Israel, the station stopped broadcasting for no more than a few minutes and was immediately back on air, beaming images of dead Israeli soldiers and victorious warriors from Hezbollah, along with talk-shows of Hezbollah's might, with subtitles in Hebrew. Hamas also has none of Hezbollah's media machine to promote itself. During its heyday in the Palestinian uprising that started in 2000 (known in Arabic as intifada), it excelled at surprise explosions in crowded places within Israel, and target assassinations, not in professional warfare like Hezbollah. Hamas cannot duplicate Hezbollah's performance, it is that simple, and its targets are easy to strike at, within Gaza. In South Lebanon, there are no military bases for Hezbollah, no visible training camps, or arms warehouses. No Hezbollah flags flying at official Hezbollah buildings, forcing Israel instead to strike at everyone and everything in Lebanon, hoping that in the mayhem they would succeed at hitting Hezbollah targets. As one journalist put it back then, "One walks through South Lebanon and feels Hezbollah, but one does not see Hezbollah." The situation in Gaza is different. Hamas is everywhere. Caught by the trappings of state after it took control of Gaza in 2007, Hamas placed its name and hallmarks on all buildings it controls, making them easy targets for Israel. Geography: The terrain in South Lebanon is suitable for guerilla warfare, giving Hezbollah a grand advantage over the IDF in 2006. The Lebanese warriors knew the caves, the mountains and slopes by heart and used them to make life miserable for Israel. Gaza is not like that, with its 360 square kilometers of flatland and a population of 1.2 million Palestinians. Israel controls Gaza's airspace and waters, which is not the case with South Lebanon. Gaza is dislocated from the West Bank, and has no neighboring support - unlike the case with Hezbollah, which relied on Syria for help in 2006. Hamas' borders are with Egypt, which not only is unsupportive but is a burden for Hamas because of its refusal to open the Rafah Crossing and its close ties to both Israel and the US. If a country like Syria were bordering Gaza - rather than Egypt - the results of Hamas' performance would be very different. Leadership: In the age of satellite TV, Nasrallah is a walking, talking phenomenon, due to the tremendous amount of charisma that he projects, which endears him to millions around the Muslim world. He managed to lift the spirits of ordinary Lebanese - especially from within his constituency - throughout the 33-day war on Lebanon, when he spoke to them from his secret hiding place, almost on a daily basis. He did not flee to Iran or Syria, as the Israeli press had said, but rather remained in the heart of combat, bunkered in the southern suburb of Beirut, which was destroyed by Israeli warplanes. Hamas does not have a single leader as charismatic - or even half as charismatic - as Nasrallah, and therefore nobody to keep the spirits high for ordinary Palestinians under fire. The day after: The day after the war ended, Hezbollah immediately began to rebuild south Beirut and South Lebanon. It had plenty of money for reconstruction, which started on the 34th day, and distributed stipends to the families of those injured or killed in the war. When the war on Gaza ends, Hamas can provide none of the above, because it lacks the financial resources of Hezbollah. Analysts disagree on what the objectives of this war really are. Most Arabs believe the ultimate goal is to break Hamas, either by annihilating it or by forcing it to sign an agreement to disarm and distance itself from the border with Israel. Some, however, claim that Hamas wanted this war, to force international recognition into a de facto recognition of Hamas' control of Gaza. Hamas believes that it can survive the Israeli onslaught, just like Hezbollah did in 2006, and emerge politically victorious. In the case of Hezbollah, the victory was more military than it was political. Today's victory, Hamas believes, would be the opposite. One example of de facto recognition would be to open the Rafah Crossing, which, according to a 2005 agreement, should be controlled by the Fatah-controlled central command in the West Bank (President Mahmud Abbas), Egypt, Israel and the Europeans, through the European Union Border Assistance Mission Rafah (EUBAM). It was built by the Israeli and Egyptian governments after the Camp David Agreement between Israel and Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1979. Rafah, the lifeline of Gaza, was strictly managed by Israel and was used to collectively punish the Gazans when Palestinian groups waged war against Israel, until Gaza was evacuated by Israel in September 2005, at which time it became a Palestinian-Egyptian affair. The crossing was completely sealed off by Egypt and Israel after the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2007. The European Union ambassador to Israel said that EUBAM monitors could not return to man the crossing because the legal basis for EUBAM specified that the terminal was to be manned by Fatah's Force 17, which was no longer there as of the summer of 2007. If an agreement is reached, the Europeans would have to talk to Hamas, and so would the Egyptians, thereby offering the Islamic party de facto recognition. Regardless of the objectives of the war, the indisputable truth is that Israel's massive war machine is waging an all-out war on Gaza, and neither the Arab world nor the outgoing George W Bush administration is able or willing to put a halt to it. The Americans are in dire need of a success story to wrap up the Bush era. Iraq has been a failure by all accounts. So have Pakistan and Afghanistan. The Bush team timidly tried to create peace at Annapolis in the US in 2007, but that, too, ended in vain. Bush faces leaving the White House with many loose ends: Hezbollah, Hamas, Syria and Iran. Hezbollah cannot be crushed militarily. Syria and Iran are too difficult to tackle, leaving Hamas as the "weak link" that Bush wants to see destroyed, by January 20, when Barack Obama takes over. By the first evening of war, the IDF had deployed approximately 100 tons of explosives in Gaza, under the watchful eye of the US, hitting 100 targets that it claimed were run by Hamas, in the first four minutes of war. Images on the Doha-based al-Jazeera TV showed otherwise, however, with piles and piles of blooded bodies, many children lying dead in the streets of Gaza City, Beit Hanoun, and Khan Younes. None of them was carrying arms or even looked like warriors. Hamas struck back with rockets, hitting as far as 40 kilometers into Israeli at towns like Beersheba and Ashdod. The operation was submitted for ratification by Defense Minister Ehud Barak as early as November 19, meaning that Israel had planned for six months, according to the Israeli daily Ha'aretz. Nearly 500 people have been killed in Gaza (including 75 children), and the number is expected to increase dramatically now that the ground invasion has began, when the IDF entered Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun in northern Gaza on January 3. Israel has to date refused to allow any journalists into the Gaza Strip. The UN claims that over 300 Palestinians are confirmed dead, including 60 women and children, in addition to over 2,000 wounded, describing the situation as "catastrophic". Numbers actually don't really count any more in Gaza. Three hundred or 500 is not really a difference - both are horrendous and kill whatever hopes optimists had that 2009 was going to be a year of peace in the Middle East. The Arab world remains glued to its TV sets watching the Gaza saga, with daily riots erupting in favor of the Palestinians in major Arab capitals. Arabs are keeping their fingers crossed that Hamas will survive, just like Hezbollah survived in 2006. Yasser Arafat's Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), after all, survived during the siege of Beirut, from June to September 1982. That was when the PLO was nowhere as powerful or armed as Hamas is today. Also, they were fighting in Beirut - hostile territory that is not even there own. If the PLO survived Beirut in 1982 - and remained alive and kicking - then Hamas will be able to do so in Gaza, its own territory, which it knows by heart. Sami Moubayed is editor-in-chief of Forward Magazine. (Copyright 2009 Asia Times Online (Holdings) Ltd. All rights reserved. Please contact us about sales, syndication and republishing.) [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
