http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2009/06/19/the-tni-crisis-transition-or-termination.html
The TNI in crisis: Transition or termination? T. Hari Prihatono , JAKARTA | Fri, 06/19/2009 11:39 AM | Opinion The recent consecutive transportation accidents involving Indonesia's military (TNI) personnel and military equipment have confi rmed how bad the military management system is. What is happening with our TNI? Observation over the performance of the TNI over the last few years indicates that the management of our defense and development of our military power had been put on hold, and is being run without adequate planning, therefore, resulting in almost no changes. Worse still, it seems as if the TNI has ignored and/or has made worse the structural problems within the defense system, failing to ensure the development of our military capacity. One good example is that the TNI is an armed force without adequate infrastructure. TNI personnel are often considered as not well paid, not well equipped and not well trained. This chronic problem can also be seen from the following facts. First, of the 170 types of weapons in use with the TNI, only 5 percent were produced locally and the rest were imported from 17 other countries. The Western countries supplied more than 70 percent of Indonesia's Armed Forces' weaponry (34 percent from the US, 12 percent from France and Germany, and 9 percent from the UK). Second, defense is no longer the main function of the territorial units so almost half of TNI personnel (49.4 percent) is no longer assigned to the line of battle. In fact, today the TNI is the weakest spot for Indonesia as an independent and sovereign country. Although the TNI, as the state's primary defense actor, needs to be improved, it should also be noted that the TNI is a state apparatus which has neglected its main responsibility as provider of defense services. The TNI is in second place after the national bureaucracy as being the most diffi cult state institution to reform and, instead, in practice, is a signifi cant contributor to maintaining poverty in Indonesia. This has been proved by the low level of welfare of the lowest ranking soldiers. The monthly salary of lower ranking soldiers is only enough to support them and their families for 12 days per month. In some provinces/areas in the country, the commander of a TNI unit had to fi nd additional resources to cover the deficit. The cases of violence involving TNI personnel against civilians, and reports of violent clashes between the TNI and police force are evidence of the negative impacts of the low level of economic welfare of TNI personnel. Over the years, the capacity and readiness level of the TNI's defense and weaponry system has been only 60 percent of the level it normally needs to defend the country, or even lower (around 33 percent) for surveillance squadrons and 42 percent for fighter squadrons. The TNI has only three weapons for every fi ve members of the Army's Special Forces (Kopassus) or the Army Strategic Reserves (Kostrad) personnel. Almost 60 percent (435 of the total 756) of the TNI's tanks and 48 percent (204 of the total 476) artillery pieces are in need of repair). The TNI's warships are (average) 25 years old, and the Marine's combat vehicles and artillery are (mostly) more than 40 years old. Meanwhile, the Indonesia Air Force's (new) Sukhoi fi ghter aircraft have fl own only for military parades and actually have no weapons mounted on them. With poor weapons systems and low budgets and resources to support the military defense function, it has been to no one's surprise when an operational plan or patrol has been cancelled due to lack of resources. The low budget and resources allocated for the state's defense systems has also resulted in inadequate maintenance and servicing for the existing weaponry and military equipment. Therefore, the increased number of transportation accidents involving military aircraft over the past few years has simply underlined that recurrence of similar accidents is very likely. The crash of an Air Force Puma SA-330 helicopter a few days ago has added to the mounting cases of aircraft accidents involving the TNI and its personnel over the past few years. There are some measures that the government and the TNI Headquarters can take to resolve this problem. First, high ranking offi cers and government offi cials should openly take the political, institutional and moral responsibilities for those unfortunate incidents by resigning gracefully from their respective posts and hand over their authority to a transitional management team for immediate regeneration and/or succession within their related institutions. Second, immediately ground all the TNI's aircraft and associated weaponry and equipment as they have put the TNI's personnel and the public into danger . Third, the government, with political support from the parliament, should conduct a comprehensive audit of the TNI, the results of which should be objectively and transparently reported to the public. Forth, immediately prepare appropriate measures for the revitalization of the TNI as a national defense stakeholder that should be developed professionally as a reliable force. Otherwise, should the government not be willing to do so, the dissolution of the TNI should be considered as a serious possible option if the running of the institution requires more resources than the state can conceivably provide for it. Without bold decisions to take the kind of radical steps recommended above, the TNI's defense and weaponry systems will likely continue to decline and deteriorate and, at certain point, entirely vanish from view. However, the challenges in the future will be much greater. Learning from experience, Indonesia failed to keep the Sipadan and Ligitan islands within its sovereign territory, so we cannot do much to convince Malaysia that Ambalat is part of Indonesia's legal territory; millions of dollars worth of national resources cannot be optimally utilized because of weak law enforcement, including on the law of the sea. The experts have predicted that at least 12 of Indonesia's outer islands may be gone one by one, annexed and/or occupied by neighboring countries if Indonesia's armed forces remain weak. The lack of knowledge or commitment of the members of the bureaucracy, political fi gures and high ranking TNI offi cers on issues related to the nation's sovereignty and reputation will only lead to the undermining of the nation's reputation, loss of national resources and persistent delays in opportunities to improve the people's welfare. Moreover, if we observe what other countries are currently doing to prepare for strategic transitions in military power between 2020 and 2030, the TNI will be among the regional actors most seriously lagging behind in this process. The TNI should have been well prepared for major geopolitical waves in eastern Asia within the next 10-15 years. Had the military development program been conducted appropriately ten years ago, the TNI would have been well prepared for regional transitions in strategic military power within the next ten years. By comparison, China started such a transition since 1981, Malaysia since 1993, and South Korea since 1996. Without bold decisions from the government and the TNI to take progressive and radical steps to reform the TNI, the state will fi nd itself doing a fi nal countdown on the TNI, leading to its termination. It is not impossible for the armed forces to become extinct, not because the people want them to, but because of massive and systemic avoidance of responsibilities by political elites and high ranking military offi cers themselves. Ideally, the TNI, in whatever condition, should always be well prepared for combat and for winning battles. Remember, war comes up upon you just like a thief in the night. For all these reasons, save our military now or never. The writer is the executive director of the ProPatria Institute, Jakarta. [Non-text portions of this message have been removed]
